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Abstract
Anarchism rarely turns its revolutionary energies towards questions of textual politics. 
While anarchists have historically offered an uncompromising rejection of state 
authority, this thesis applies this position to the discourse of anarchism, mapping its 
critique onto a consideration of the authority in certain key texts.
By investigating such anti-authoritarianism, this study marks the beginning of an 
anarchist theory of textual politics. Understanding the text in both its literary and 
political guises, this study draws on the work of Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes and 
Michel Foucault to interrogate the figure of authority legible within anarchist discourse. 
Commencing with a critical reappraisal of Emma Goldman’s writings on theatre, 
chapter two compares them to the radical theatre criticism of Bertolt Brecht and 
Augusto Boal, establishing the centrality of the question of form, and identifying how 
anarchism does not depend on the figure of the author in order to produce meaning.
Turning to the political texts of anarchism, chapter three deconstructs the work of 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, bringing his logic of authority to a point of crisis while at the 
same time maintaining the force of his analysis. Focusing on Michael Bakunin, chapter 
four shows how critical authority can enforce a univocality on its subject which 
simultaneously restricts interpretative freedom. Chapter five turns to Goldman’s 
political writing, demonstrating how her textual constructions divorce the reader from 
the (revolutionary) referent.
Returning to literature, chapter six is informed by recent autobiographical theory, and 
establishes how questions of faith, interpretation and memory underwrite textual 
authorities in the overlooked genre of anarchist autobiography. Chapter seven ends the 
study with a consideration of the internally contradictory rhetorical strategies of 
contemporary anarchist writing. Concluding that anarchist discourse has too long left 
the figure of authority unchallenged within its own texts, this thesis argues that if 
anarchism is to maintain the commensurability of its means and ends, new textual forms 
must be sought.
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1Introduction
1
Deconstruction’s politics have been hotly debated in recent years. Yet encounters 
between anarchism and deconstruction have rarely been staged. It is not the purpose of 
this thesis to theorise an anarchist deconstruction -  and by ‘deconstruction’ I am 
referring specifically to the work of Jacques Derrida. My project here is to bring a 
deconstructive critique to bear on a number of texts that can be gathered together under 
the rubric of anarchism.1 The selection of these texts, for reasons that will become clear, 
is neither an attempt to represent the totality of the historical (textual) legacy known as 
anarchism nor the prospective elements of a future canon. It is, rather, an attempt to 
mark both a continuity and a point of rupture, to address previously unconsidered 
problems within a discursive field (anarchism) while simultaneously renewing the 
critique that that discourse has offered.
What, though, is ‘anarchism’? The very question is a recurrent trope of anarchist 
texts, for generically they tend to begin with an explanation of the etymology of the 
word, which is derived from the Greek word meaning without a leader, hence a politics
1 The elusiveness o f  the ‘political’ meaning o f  Derrida’s work is perhaps signalled by the number o f  
competing interpretations o f  it. Both Simon Critchley and Geoffrey Bennington argue that deconstruction 
posits a democracy-to-come, while Michael Ryan argues for a Marxist deconstruction, and Saul Newman 
argues for an anarchist one. See Simon Critchley, The Ethics o f  Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Geoffrey Bennington, Interrupting Derrida  (London: Routledge, 2000); 
Michael Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982); and Saul Newman, ‘Derrida’s Deconstruction o f Authority’, Philosophy &
Social Criticism , 27.3 (2001), 1-20. Derrida’s own political interventions became more overt in the 1990s, 
most clearly in Specters o f  Marx. This garnered a host o f varying critical responses which were collated 
(and then in turn answered by Derrida in the final essay) in the collection Ghostly Demarcations. See 
Jacques Derrida, Specters o f  Marx: The State o f  the Debt, the Work o f  Mourning, and the New 
International, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994) and Ghostly Demarcations: A 
Symposium on Jacques D errida’s ‘Specters o f  M arx’, ed. by Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1999). 
See also Richard Beardsworth, Derrida & the Political (London: Routledge, 1996).
2opposed to state authority. Yet the recurrence of the question might seem to indicate, in
relation to any answer given, a certain provisionality or a degree of anxiety as to its
validity. At the beginning of his text T he Anarchist Tension’ Alfredo Bonanno asks the
same question, and reflects, ironically, that faced with an audience of anarchists:
It might seem strange that I should take up such a problem in this 
situation as I know for certain that there are many anarchists here, 
because I know them personally. And if nothing else, anarchists should 
at least know what anarchism is.3
Bonanno, though, offers one of the most succinct justifications for the repeated asking
of this question, ‘what is anarchism?’:
[...] it is not a definition that can be made once and for all, put in a safe 
and considered a patrimony to be tapped little by little. Being an 
anarchist does not mean one has reached a certainty; or said once and 
for all, ‘There, from now on I hold the truth and as such, at least from 
the point of view of the idea, I am a privileged person’. Anyone who 
thinks like this is an anarchist in word alone. Instead the anarchist is 
someone who really puts themselves in doubt as such, as a person, and 
asks themselves: What is my life according to what I do and in relation 
to what I think? [...]
Anarchism is not a concept that can be locked up in a word like a 
gravestone. It is not a political theory. It is a way of conceiving life, and 
life, young or old as we may be, old people or children, is not something 
definitive: it is a stake we must play day after day.4
Taking my cue, then, from Bonanno, this thesis will be a type of extended
deconstructive consideration of ‘what anarchism is’. The anarchist critic, though, in
approaching a text might be expected to come prepared with a ready-made critical
yardstick by which to judge it. Yet this gesture would imply an already existing
anarchism that is somehow extraneous to the texts under consideration. Rather than
2 Kropotkin gives ‘from the Greek an- and arche, contrary to authority’. Malatesta offers ‘from the Greek 
and its literal meaning is without government'. Gu6rin suggests that it ‘means something like the absence 
o f authority or government’. Marshall writes that ‘the word “anarchy” comes from the ancient Greek 
auapxia meaning the condition o f  being “without a leader” but usually translated and interpreted as 
“without a ruler’” . Peter Kropotkin, Anarchism & Anarchist Communism, ed. by Nicolas Walter (London: 
Freedom Press, 1993), p. 7. Errico Malatesta, Anarchy, trans. by Vernon Richards (London: Freedom 
Press, 1995), p. 15. Daniel Guerin, Anarchism: From Theory to Practice, trans. by Mary Klopper (New  
York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 11. Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History o f  
Anarchism (London: Fontana, 1993), p. x.
3 Alfredo M. Bonanno, ‘The Anarchist Tension’, trans. by Jean Weir, available online at 
<http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/tension.html>.
4 Bonanno, ‘The Anarchist Tension’.
3‘transgress the text toward something other than it, toward a referent (a reality that is 
metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified outside the text’ 
as Derrida has written, I would hope to follow O f Grammatology in developing a 
reading that ‘although it is not commentary, [...] must be intrinsic and remain within the 
text’.5 The challenge then is simultaneously to map and explore, to allow an anarchist 
aesthetic to emerge from the texts under consideration at the same time as elaborating a 
critique of it.
The anarchism that I address is not taken on its own ostensible political grounds, 
nor do I seek to engage with its political content qua political science. This thesis is 
motivated to read the texts of anarchism on what might be called a literary basis, to read 
them for their more marginal aspects, their rhetoric and metaphors, in pursuit of their 
aporias which centre on one question: can an anti-authoritarian text legitimately 
(following its own logic) take up the authority to command its reader? And what, if any, 
are the implications for an anti-authoritarian theory of authority? The internal tensions 
that I explore in relation to the anarchist texts under consideration here are those which 
concern figures of authority. If anarchism is, as already suggested, a politics that rejects 
government and hence state authority, what happens when the figure of another type of 
authority creeps back into the anarchist text? Anarchism has long held to the notion that 
it must be a ‘prefigurative’ politics, in the sense that for anarchism the means become 
the ends. For example, Uri Gordon argues that direct action -  as an example of 
prefigurative politics -  is ‘widely recognised as the primary reference point for how 
anarchist groups should function’.6 Despite the easy stereotype of anarchism as 
hopelessly utopian, in fact anarchists have more typically disavowed any sense of a 
final (future) destination, and thus this absence of an identifiable future ‘state’ of affairs
5 Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, corrected edn. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 158, p. 159.
6 Uri Gordon, ‘Anarchism and Political Theory: Contemporary Problems’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Oxford University, 2005), p. 103.
4has meant that the ‘authority’ to take decisions can only reside in the hands of those 
directly affected by the decisions. This disavowal of a future condition is evident even 
from the early nineteenth-century writings of William Godwin, one of the precursors of 
modem anarchist thought. Godwin’s notion of ‘perfectibility’, for example, meant that 
‘the term perfectible, thus explained, not only does not imply the capacity of being 
brought to perfection, but stands in express opposition to it. If we could arrive at
n
perfection, there would be an end to our improvement’. Without a determining image 
of a future society by which to judge present actions, anarchism has traditionally 
insisted on the commensurability of its actions with its ethos as understood by the actors 
involved. Therefore the concern that motivates this thesis is the possibility that anarchist 
texts come to exhibit a disparity between their (textual) means and their (ideological) 
ends. Do anarchist texts attempt to govern the reading practice? In this critical re­
reading of certain texts from the textual heritage of anarchism, the question I have 
sought to put to the texts is precisely this: is a figure of authority perceptible within 
those texts? And if this is the case, what does this come to signify for the reader, and 
consequently how does it impact on the production of the meaning of those texts?
My interest in these questions springs from a long-standing involvement with 
and commitment to anarchist politics, as practiced with varying degrees of success in 
various places around the globe. Yet I find it troubling to come across texts such as 
Murray Bookchin’s 1995 polemical essay, Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An 
Unbridgeable Chasm. Bookchin is undoubtedly the foremost anarchist theorist of the 
late twentieth century, and in this text argues for a social anarchism in the vein of 
Kropotkin’s anarchist communism (where the stateless society of the future is built on 
the image of the self-governing commune), against what he sees as a sub-Stimerite 
‘anarcho-individualism’ (where the state gives way in the face of the absolute
7 William Godwin, The Anarchist Writings o f  William Godwin, ed. by Peter Marshall (London: Freedom 
Press, 1986), p. 62 (my emphasis). Unless otherwise stated, all emphasis is in original texts.
5
• Qsovereignty of the individual). ‘Like it or not,’ Bookchin writes, ‘thousands of self- 
styled anarchists have slowly surrendered the social core of anarchist ideas to the all- 
pervasive Yuppie and New Age personalism that marks this decadent, bourgeoisified 
era’.9 Despite Bookchin’s valid concern with the reaffirmation of the social anarchist 
heritage, his text becomes hugely problematic when one finds, on the final pages, 
exhortations such as the following -  ‘Anarchism must not be dissipated in self- 
indulgent behaviour [...] it must not retreat into the primitivistic [s/c] demimonde [...]. 
Anarchism today must resolutely retain its character as a social movement.’10 
Bookchin’s tenor has not gone unnoticed by other readers, for Peter Marshall notes that 
‘his style may be difficult at times and his tone unduly virulent’.11 Yet beyond questions 
of style, textual constructions such as this surely raise difficult questions concerning the 
nature of the relationship of the text to the reader. On what grounds, in this instance, can 
another’s behaviour be judged as ‘self-indulgent’ and therefore un-anarchist? Where 
does the text derive the authority for its exhortations of what anarchism ‘must’ or ‘must 
not’ do?
Despite the tricky questions that such a mode of address may provoke, this issue 
has not been previously considered in relation to anarchist texts. When I wrote that 
encounters between anarchism and deconstruction have rarely been staged, the 
encounters that have taken place have tended to examine potential theoretical 
congruencies and productive imbrications. The most sustained anarchist engagement 
with Derrida’s thought has come from Saul Newman, particularly in his essay 
‘Derrida’s Deconstruction of Authority’. Here Newman argues that the revolution that
8 Murray Bookchin, Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm (Edinburgh: AK 
Press, 1995), p. 9. For an introduction to this aspect o f Kropotkin’s thought, see Alan Ritter, Anarchism:
A Theoretical Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), particularly pp. 56-60. For a 
discussion o f  Stimer, see John P. Clark, Max Stirner’s Egoism  (London: Freedom Press, 1976).
9 Bookchin, Social Anarchism, p. 1. Bookchin’s text has proved controversial in anarchist circles, 
prompting one book-length rebuttal from leading ‘post-left’ anarchist Bob Black, along with much heated 
online debate which unproductively focusses on disputed instances from the actual authors’ lives. See 
Bob Black, Anarchy After Leftism (Columbia: Columbia Alternative Library Press, 1997).
10 Bookchin, Social Anarchism, p. 60.
11 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 622.
6‘classical’ anarchism aimed for is one which ‘substituted political and economic 
authority for a rational authority founded on an Enlightenment-humanist subjectivity’.12 
This is what he refers to as a logic of subversion, where state authority is ‘abolished as 
the first revolutionary act’ (as opposed to the Marxist logic of inversion, which replaces 
bourgeois political power with proletarian economic power).13 Nevertheless, both 
logics, for Newman, represent an inversion of the hierarchical structure of the binary 
opposition underwriting them, and therefore reaffirm ‘the place of power in the very 
attempt to overthrow it’.14 He consequently conceives of deconstruction making 
possible ‘an outside created by the limits of the inside [which] may allow us to conceive 
of a politics of resistance which does not restore the place of power’.15 In seeking to 
revitalise a (post)anarchism with deconstructive theory, Newman’s work takes a very 
different approach to the staging of the encounter between the two discourses than this 
thesis does.16
Newman’s text occupies a leading position in a field now recognised as
‘postanarchist’ thought.17 In a recent conference paper Benjamin Franks argues that
postanarchism displays three identifiable characteristics:
First, a rejection of traditional anarchist concerns and the adoption of 
new critical approaches and tactics that lie beyond the remit of anarchist 
orthodoxy, using as their basis those poststructural theorists that are
12 Newman, ‘Derrida’s Deconstruction o f  Authority’, p. 5. With this Newman is repeating the view that 
‘classical anarchist politics [ ...]  is governed by an original principle such as human essence or rationality’ 
(p. 17). A revised version o f this article was included in Newman’s later text, From Bakunin to Lacan: 
Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation o f  Power (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001).
13 Newman, ‘Derrida’s Deconstruction o f  Authority’, p. 5.
14 Newman, ‘Derrida’s Deconstruction o f  Authority’, p. 4.
15 Newman, ‘Derrida’s Deconstruction o f  Authority’, p. 11. While Newman’s argument is a serious
attempt to harness deconstruction for the purposes o f  theorising a postanarchism, limitations o f space do 
not permit me to detail my points o f  disagreement with it. See my ‘Challenging the Challenge: 
Deconstruction and the Politics o f  Naming the Anarchist Movement’, available online at 
<http://www.psa.ac.Uk/joumals/pdf/5/2006/Gordon.pdf> and also Jesse Cohn, ‘What is Postanarchism 
“Post”?’, Postmodern Culture, 13.1 (2002), available online at <http://www3.iath.virginia.edu/pmc/text- 
only/issue.902/13.1 cohn.txt>.
16 It should be noted that John Caputo’s article on Derrida’s ‘responsible anarchy’ investigates what he 
sees as the Levinasian ‘ethical turn’ in deconstruction’s responsibility. This text, though, has very little, if  
anything, to say to anarchism p er  se, short o f  it being a comparable questioning o f the arche. John 
Caputo, ‘Beyond Aestheticism: Derrida’s Responsible Anarchy’, Research in Phenomenology, 18 (1988), 
59-73 (p. 72).
17 For an overview o f the postanarchist field, see Jason Adams, ‘Postanarchism in a Nutshell’, available 
online at <http://info.interactivist.net/article.pl?sid=03/l 1/11/1642242>.
7antipathetic to traditional anarchism. Second, the adoption into 
anarchism of poststructural theory to enrich and enliven exiting [sic] 
practices. Then finally, a postmodern post-anarchism, the reapplication 
of anarchist analyses and methods to the new globalized, post-Puitt-Igoe 
political economy.18
The first text to establish itself on what is now known as postanarchist terrain 
was Todd May’s The Political Philosophy o f Poststructuralist Anarchism in 1994. In 
this text May, as Franks suggests, attempts to weld poststructuralist thought to anarchist 
concerns. The text takes its cue from the work of Foucault, Lyotard and Deleuze, which 
May argues ‘replaces traditional anarchism’s a priori with, on the one hand, the 
positivity or creativity of power and, on the other, the idea that practices or groups of 
practices (rather than subject or structure) are the proper unit of analysis’.19 However 
with only one mention of Derrida, this text is not concerned with the encounter between 
anarchism and deconstruction.
A more recent work that pays slightly closer attention to deconstructive concerns 
is Lewis Call’s 2002 text Postmodern Anarchism. The focus, though, is primarily on 
the intersections of anarchist thought with that of Nietzsche, Foucault and Baudrillard, 
along with a re-reading of the works of William Gibson and Bruce Sterling as 
exemplars of the new types of subjectivities that Call theorises. Thus the text cannot be 
considered as a reading of the heritage of anarchism, such as I am attempting here. 
Moreover this text, along with that of May and Newman, has been criticised for offering
18 Benjamin Franks, ‘Questioning Postanarchism in the Age o f Security’, available online at 
<http://www.psa.ac.Uk/joumals/pdf/5/2006/Franks.pdf>, p. 4.
19 Todd May, The Political Philosophy o f  Poststructuralist Anarchism (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1994), p. 87. In a review o f  this text, John Moore rejects the anarchistic potential o f  
poststructuralism, arguing that ‘the poststructuralist perspective offered [by May] depends on piecemeal 
change, the mark o f  the reformist’. See John Moore, ‘Anarchism and Poststructuralism’, Anarchist 
Studies, 5 (1997), 157-161 (pp. 160-161). Yet as the debate has moved on, a more recent article argues 
that the current wave o f  anti-capitalist protests demonstrate a social anarchism ‘that now possesses a 
distinctively poststructuralist dynamic’. See Dave Morland, ‘Anti-capitalism and Poststructuralist 
Anarchism’, in Changing Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a G lobal Age, ed. by Jonathan 
Purkis and James Bowen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 23-38 (p. 38).
20 Quite how well focussed that attention may be is a moot point. Call writes, for example, that hypertext 
‘deconstructs conventional text by interspersing such text with nonlinear hypertextual links’. This sense 
o f ‘deconstruct’ seems to me to owe more to the everyday usage propagated by newspaper columnists 
rather than the notion o f  uncovering an aporia at the heart o f a system o f  logic that would be the more 
specifically Derridean sense o f  the term. Lewis Call, Postmodern Anarchism (Oxford: Lexington Books,
2002), p. 1.
8a reductive picture of what is loosely referred to as ‘classical’ anarchism. Call holds that 
‘the politics of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin -  vibrant and meaningful, perhaps, to 
their nineteenth-century audiences -  have become dangerously inaccessible to late 
twentieth-century readers’. So for Call his postmodern anarchism ‘is meant to elude 
troubling difficulties of classical anarchism, such as the disturbing reliance upon
instrumental rationality, or the stubborn attachment to an implicitly Cartesian concept of
 ^|
human subjectivity’. I would reject Call’s position for a number of reasons, but 
primarily I would suggest that this thesis is an attempt to demonstrate that ‘classical 
anarchism’ has not exhausted its reserves of significance, is not ‘dangerously 
inaccessible’ and that it still does have something to say to the reader of the twenty-first 
century.
Call’s notion of a foundational essence to classical anarchism is one that has 
been nearly uniformly repeated by the first generation of postanarchist critics. 
Simultaneously, though, this trope has met its counter-critique from other sections of 
the postanarchist field that argue for a more nuanced reading of the anarchist canon.22 
Moreover Siireyyya Evren, editor of the Turkish postanarchist journal Siyahi, has 
criticised this new postanarchism for its lack of attention to ‘non-western anarchism(s)’, 
and argues for a different postanarchism that ‘will not construct itself from within a 
Western epistemology only’.23 Hence Evren sees these three texts (by May, Newman 
and Call) as representing an introductory period which is now over.
I would share Evren’s hope that this introductory period of postanarchism is 
over. Indeed, the very purpose of this thesis is to try to demonstrate, pace Call and his
21 Call, Postmodern Anarchism, p. 117.
22 This notion has been perhaps equally perpetuated by ‘postanarchist’ theory and also rebutted by its 
critics. For a detailed rejection o f  what they call these ‘critical missteps’, see Jesse Cohn and Shawn P. 
Wilbur, ‘What’s Wrong With Postanarchism?’, available online at <http://www.anarchist- 
studies.org/article/articleprint/26/-1/1/>. See also my ‘Challenging the Challenge’. For a response to 
Newman’s argument, see Zabalaza Anarchist Communist Federation, ‘A Platformist Response to “Post- 
Anarchism”: Sucking the Golden Egg: A Reply to Newman’, available online at 
<http://slash.autonomedia.org/article.pl?sid=03/l 0/10/1220218>.
23 Slireyyya Evren, ‘Postanarchism and the “3rd World’” , available online at 
<http://www.psa.ac.Uk/joumals/pdf/5/2006/Evren.pdf>, p. 4.
9notion of anarchism’s ‘stubborn attachment’ to essentialist foundations, that there is still 
much more to be gleaned from a careful re-reading of the ‘canon’, and that the case for 
a univocal notion of classical anarchism is very far from closed. As Cohn and Wilbur 
write, ‘in criticizing the supposed “essentialism” of “classical anarchism,” rather too 
many postanarchists throw the baby out with the bathwater’.24 This thesis will attempt 
to avoid such an infelicitous emptying of the anarchist bathtub.
In focussing my re-reading of anarchism around the figure of authority I have 
found instructive precursors in a number of earlier texts. Thomas Docherty’s On 
Modern Authority offers an enormously broad survey of half a millennium of writing, 
but what I take from this is Docherty’s argument that ‘what is written can be considered 
as some kind of “pre-text” of its performance. In short, there are no texts, only
9 <interpretations or performances’. Thus Docherty argues that there is ‘an intrinsic 
“oppositionalism” at work’ in the critical reading practice, and that (following Jeffrey
96Mehlman) ‘the revolutionary critic strives to “rewrite” the text’. I hope, therefore, that 
this thesis will be oppositional to anarchism in one sense, but at the same time fulfil the 
‘task of reading’, in Docherty’s words, which is ‘to fulfil the hypothetical reference of 
the text, to enact meaning in such a way as to give voice to the critical consciousness’.27 
By ‘oppositional’, though, I have something slightly different in mind than Lennard 
Davis’s sense of resistance. In Resisting Novels he argues that resistance ‘is both a 
political and a psychoanalytic term. In the first sense, I mean “resistance” as the way 
politically oppressed groups fight back against the powers that oppress them’.28 The 
second sense is borrowed from Freud’s Interpretation o f Dreams as ‘all those forces
24 Cohn and Wilbur, ‘What’s Wrong With Postanarchism?’.
25 Thomas Docherty, On Modern Authority: The Theory and Condition o f  Writing: 1500 to the Present 
Day (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1987), p. 12.
26 Docherty, On Modern Authority, p. 29, p. 32.
27 Docherty, On Modern Authority, p. 43.
28 Lennard J. Davis, Resisting Novels: Ideology and Fiction (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 12.
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within the patient which oppose the procedures and processes of analysis’. So for 
Davis political resistance ‘aims at change’, while psychoanalytical resistance ‘is
*i/\
defensive reluctance or the blockage of change’. Yet Davis’s focus is specifically on
the novel, and how ‘formal elements of the novel add up to a social formation that
resists change [...] reading novels is an activity that prevents or inhibits social action as
 ^1 •do so many leisure activities in a consumer society’. With this exclusive focus on the 
novel Davis’s text considers an entirely different field of literature than this present 
study.
In relation to literature there has been very little published that investigates 
either anarchism from a literary perspective, or literature from an anarchist perspective. 
One recent notable exception to this observation is ‘To Hell With Culture Anarchism 
and Twentieth-Century British Literature. This collection of essays, though, aims ‘to 
trace how perceptions and misperceptions of anarchist ideas and practices have 
infiltrated British writing over the last one hundred years’. Thus as one of the 
contributors, Valentine Cunningham, notes, ‘literary anarchism [...] is not quite the 
same thing as (though it clearly overlaps with) the literature of anarchism’. In this 
sense my thesis approaches a somewhat different corpus of work, work that might be 
considered, in Cunningham’s words, as the literature of anarchism. Another text that 
examines where anarchism and literature have overlapped historically is Lily Litvak’s 
recent collection El Cuento Anarquista. The anthology brings together a selection of 
short stories printed in Spain in anarchist periodicals over a period from 1880 to 1911. 
In the introductory essay, Litvak claims that ‘the anarchist short story follows a certain 
range of themes, plot structures and developmental patterns. In general it has little in the
29 Freud, as cited by Davis, Resisting Novels, p. 12.
30 Davis, Resisting Novels, p. 12.
31 Davis, Resisting Novels, p. 18.
32 H. Gustav Klaus and Stephen Knight, ‘Introduction’, in ‘To Hell With Culture’: Anarchism and 
Twentieth-Century British Literature, ed. by H. Gustav Klaus and Stephen Knight (Cardiff: University o f  
Wales Press, 2005), pp. 1-10 (p. 5).
33 Valentine Cunningham, ‘L itvinoffs Room: East End Anarchism’ in Klaus and Knight, eds, ‘To Hell 
With Culture’, pp. 141-161 (p. 141).
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way of a narrative core, and is based on ideological exegesis’.34 Litvak proposes that 
one of the objectives ‘in conceiving of a revolutionary literature’ in this period was ‘to 
change the nature of creative production’. This sentiment is valuable to me, for if this 
thesis is to have any significance as an intervention in anarchist discourse, then I would 
hope that its observations might serve as a call to rethink the nature of the anarchist text.
There has, as well, been recent attention to the historical influence of anarchism 
on cultural production in a wider sense. In Anarchy & Culture David Weir documents 
the influence of anarchist politics on the nascent modernist movement, and argues ‘that 
avant-gardism and anarchism were closely connected in the late nineteenth century’. For 
Weir ‘the politics of anarchism takes aesthetic form with modernism. Ideas particular to 
anarchism were adapted by poets and novelists in such a way that the outcome of those 
ideas was aesthetic rather than political’. In place of addressing the texts themselves, 
though, Weir’s study focuses on the (demonstrable) historical and textual 
interrelationships between the participants in the two scenes at that time. For reasons 
that will become clear in the following chapters, taking biographical features of the 
actual authors’ lives as a guarantee of textual signification is not an approach that 
interests me here. Not only on this point, though, do I diverge from Weir’s approach, for 
when he writes of ‘the diminishing hope that anarchism might one day arrive as a social 
reality’, he demonstrates a lack of engagement with the contemporary anarchist milieu, 
where autonomous spaces are created on a daily basis.
34 Lily Litvak, El Cuento Anarquista (1880-1911): Antologia (Madrid: Fundacidn de Estudios Libertarios 
Anselmo Lorenzo, 2003), p. 9 (my translation). The original text states that ‘el cuento anarquista sigue 
una determinada tem&tica, alineamientos y estructuras. Tiene por lo general muy poco nucleo narrativo, y 
se basa en una exposicidn ideoldgica’.
35 Litvak, El Cuento Anarquista, p. 25 (my translation). The original reads ‘al concebir una literatura 
revolucionaria, es el cambiar las bases de la creacidn’.
36 David Weir, Anarchy & Culture: The Aesthetic Politics o f  Modernism  (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1997), p. 161.
37 Weir, Anarchy & Culture , p. 267. For only one o f the very latest in a series o f  texts that document the 
struggle against an externally imposed social reality, see We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise o f  
G lobal Anticapitalism, ed. by Notes from Nowhere (London: Verso, 2003).
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From a more positive perspective, Alan Antliff examines the role that anarchism 
had as ‘the formative force lending coherence and direction to modernism in the United 
States between 1908 and 1920’. Taking his cue from Emma Goldman, Antliff argues 
that:
it is perfectly feasible that activism could expand beyond matters of 
governance to encompass any sphere, including the artistic. The project 
of individual liberation lying at the heart of anarchism in the early 
twentieth century was not only antigovemmental: the movement 
generated a far-flung cultural rebellion encompassing lifestyles, 
literature, and art as well as politics.38
Antliff s text documents the influence that anarchism had on the first American avant-
garde. In so doing, he addresses only the artistic, as distinguished from the literary,
production of the period, and has little in common with this thesis. Nevertheless Antliff
ends with a call for a ‘culture o f  anarchy’, self-consciously echoing the words of John
Moore. As Antliff notes, Moore argued that ‘anarchism’s ultimate goal, beyond political
change, is the realization of a new culture’. In hoping, as I have stated above, that this
thesis ‘might serve as a call to rethink the nature of the anarchist text’, I would likewise
hope that it is indeed contributing to Moore’s notion of a ‘realization of a new culture’.
In re-reading the literature of anarchism (in the broadest sense), this thesis has 
adopted a two-pronged approach. I have sought firstly to examine what, from an 
anarchist perspective, has been said about literature in the past, and then, secondly, to 
re-read some key anarchist texts for their textuality in the light of my previous analysis.
I have sought to employ a deconstructive approach to this re-reading, by which I mean a 
close and attentive double reading that reaffirms the text under consideration at the 
same time as it critiques it. Yet in stating this I am very conscious of Christopher 
Norris’s caveat that ‘to present “deconstruction” as if it were a method, a system or a 
settled body of ideas would be to falsify its nature and lay oneself open to charges of
38 Allan Antliff, Anarchist Modernism: Art, Politics, and the First American Avant-Garde (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 2001), p. 1.
39 Antliff, Anarchist Modernism, p. 216 and p. 263, n. 8. For a discussion o f  the work o f John Moore, see 
my chapter seven below.
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reductive misunderstanding’.40 This will, I hope, go some way towards explaining the 
absence of ‘Derrida’ in this thesis. By rejecting deconstruction as a methodology, I have 
sought to avoid an analogical manner of re-reading based on a formula such as ‘As 
Derrida showed X, I shall show Y’. I hope that for this reason it will not seem 
incongruous of me to claim this as a deconstructive reading of anarchism, for as Norris 
points out, ‘deconstruction is always already at work, even in those texts that would 
seem most expressly committed to a “logocentric” order of assumptions’.41 At the same 
time, this re-reading must avoid what Derrida calls the ‘respectful doubling of 
commentary’ while, as I have already suggested above, it must simultaneously ‘be 
intrinsic and remain within the text’.42 In attempting to understand the workings of 
authority in anti-authoritarian texts, I have been guided by Norris’s sense of a 
deconstructive reading consisting ‘not merely in reversing or subverting some 
established hierarchical order, but in showing how its terms are indissociably entwined 
in a strictly undecidable exchange of values and priorities’.43 In questioning the text’s 
attempts to exercise control over the production of meaning at the expense of 
interpretative freedom, my objective is most certainly not to invert this hierarchy and 
put the reader in charge instead.
To begin, then, with the literary, the thesis opens with a consideration of Emma 
Goldman’s 1914 text of theatre criticism The Social Significance o f Modern Drama. 
There has been practically nothing written about this text, and despite its modest status 
to date, I argue that there is useful insight to be derived from it, perhaps as much from 
the claims that it fails to make as from what it actually says. Goldman’s text can be 
considered as the first English language intervention from an anarchist in the field of 
literary criticism and accordingly bears productive comparison with later theories of
40 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, 3rd edn (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 1.
41 Christopher Norris, Derrida  (London: Fontana, 1987), p. 57.
42 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 158, p. 159.
43 Norris, Derrida, p. 56.
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theatrical production with an avowedly revolutionary intent, namely those of Bertolt 
Brecht and Augusto Boal. The comparison brings to the surface the tension between the 
form and the content of a literary work, in this case the theatrical play, and so provides 
the departure point for a reconsideration of some of the canonical figures of anarchist 
theory. Therefore the literary frames my consideration of the political. The literary 
considerations produced by my reading of Goldman raise the question of form. Having 
established this (literary) form/content dichotomy, I bring this concern to bear on the 
question of the (political) content of traditional anarchist discourse, before returning 
once more to the framing question of the literary in the final chapters.
In the middle section of the thesis, I turn my attention to the content of anarchist 
discourse as found in several historically prominent figures. The second chapter 
examines the work of the writer who is recognised as the first self-identified ‘anarchist’ 
in modem history, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon is perhaps best known for his 
celebrated aphorism that ‘property is theft’ and this axiom provides an entry point into 
considering how Proudhon’s texts seek to exercise authority over their own 
significance. Having written specifically about the need to abolish authority, Proudhon 
reserves a limited sphere of action for it, namely the family, in a move that seems to 
function as a supplement to his general understanding of authority as intolerable. Hence 
his texts institute a gerontocracy, leaving the figure of Proudhon-as-author with the 
property rights to the very texts which aspire to do away with property. This 
proprietorial logic, according to Proudhon, effaces the social bond underwriting society. 
In my reading, though, it would also, by analogy, destroy the interpretative bond 
between reader and text. Proudhon’s observations are turned back on his own work with 
the result that this gerontocratic figure of authority undoes the text’s own claims to 
authorize it.
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This then brings me to the controversial and contradictory figure of Michael 
Bakunin, Russian aristocrat and lifelong revolutionist. Bakunin’s work seems to prompt 
anxiety in critical circles, due to the degree to which it is shot through with internal 
inconsistencies. This anxiety, though, is symptomatic of an urge to impose an external 
coherence, which comes to take on its own authoritarian character. Specifically, 
Bakunin’s life seems to provide endless material for critics to dismiss his writings, and 
this chapter examines the relationship between biographical detail and textual detail to 
uncover the workings of critical authority in the process of what Foucault calls the 
construction of an author figure. At the same time it uses Bakunin’s own writings as the 
basis for questioning the very authority that premises itself on them.
To finish the central section of the thesis which focuses on the overtly political 
literature of anarchism, I return to the work of Emma Goldman. Goldman, as should 
now be clear, wrote widely and prolifically, although her political work is mainly 
concentrated in the short collection Anarchism and Other Essays. Goldman’s work 
attempts to balance the demands of individual and social emancipation, but my reading 
of her political texts suggests that in their mode of address they construct a particular 
concept of the mass (as non-reader) which both interpellates and repudiates the reader.
From here I turn my attention back towards the frame of reference for this thesis, 
the question of the literary. My sixth chapter addresses the largely overlooked category 
of anarchist autobiographies in the light of current thinking about autobiography as a 
literary genre. Autobiography raises intriguing questions about the nature of authority 
when it comes to narrating certain events from one’s own life, and these questions 
become doubly complicated if one is dealing with the work of a writer who supposedly 
lived for the rejection of authority. Once more Emma Goldman comes under 
consideration, as her two-volume Living My Life is one of the most substantial 
autobiographies left by anarchist writers. This text is read alongside the partial
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autobiography of her lifelong comrade and one-time lover Alexander Berkman, 
Prisoner Memoirs o f an Anarchist, a particularly fascinating text which has not yet 
received any critical scrutiny. This is a comparison that strangely has not been 
undertaken until now, considering how intertwined their two lives were. In relating two 
different perspectives on a set of lived and shared experiences, these texts are read in the 
light of contemporary autobiographical theory which problematizes the notion of 
autobiographical truth in a narrated account of a past life. The chapter ends with a 
consideration of the problem of memory in relation to historical truth by examining the 
text left by leading anarcho-syndicalist Rudolf Rocker, The London Years, and that of 
his son, Fermin, The East End Years.
Finally, to bring the thesis to a close, my last chapter surveys present-day 
anarchist writing with the purpose of comparing the points derived from my earlier 
readings with what might be considered as (one aspect of) contemporary practice. As 
this chapter shows, although the mainstream of anarchist writing still follows the mode 
that I have sought to problematise here, there are currents of writing that confound the 
easy distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘literature’. Yet despite over a century and a half 
of questioning an external figure of authority, it would seem that there are clearly those 
writing for and within the anarchist movement who have not paused to consider the 
construction of textual authority.
In any study of this nature, there will inevitably be more left out than can 
possibly be included. It has never been my intention to provide anything approaching a 
‘representation’ of the historical or current state of anarchist writing or writing about 
anarchism. A project, such as this thesis, that attempts to take in elements of an entire 
discursive field (that of anarchism) can never set itself the untenable proposition of 
being an exhaustive study. There are therefore always going to be omissions, some less 
glaring than others. The lack of attention to the works of Peter Kropotkin would perhaps
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be the first and most notable absence on these pages. Kropotkin wrote as widely as 
Goldman, being in his day an influential geographer, as well as political theorist, 
pamphleteer, and activist. He left texts on art as well as ethics, alongside a substantial 
autobiography, Memoirs o f a Revolutionist,44 On that basis alone the entire thesis could 
easily have been dedicated solely to a consideration of Kropotkin’s work. Yet with the 
work of Proudhon and Bakunin already under examination, I wish to avoid repeating 
what Sharif Gemie has called the ‘now standard Godwin-Stimer-Proudhon-Bakunin- 
Kropotkin approach’. For Gemie, ‘too often works on anarchism have reduced the 
subject to the biographies of a few celebrated writers, or to the experience of particular 
moments of revolt’.45 My desire to avoid a reiteration of a questionable canon has meant 
that Kropotkin has been sacrificed in favour of Proudhon and Bakunin in order to allow 
for a consideration of other writers who have not received the same degree of critical 
attention.
In addressing contemporary anarchist writing, there is another omission that 
might raise some eyebrows: Noam Chomsky. Yet I would argue that, above the ever­
present limitations of space, there are more complex reasons for not addressing 
Chomsky in a study of this nature.46 In the first place, Chomsky’s own politics are not 
universally accepted as being anarchist: in an essay comparing the thought of Chomsky, 
Murray Bookchin and Fredy Perlman, John Moore cites an interview with Chomsky 
where he states that ‘I don’t really regard myself as an anarchist thinker. I’m a 
derivative fellow traveller, let’s say’. Moore also cites the pre-eminent historian of 
anarchism, George Woodcock, who argues forcefully that the (economic) politics
44 Peter Kropotkin, Memoirs o f  a Revolutionist, ed. by Colin Ward (London: Folio Society, 1978)
45 Sharif Gemie, ‘Counter-Community: An Aspect o f Anarchist Political Culture’, Journal o f  
Contemporary History, 29 (1994), 349-36 (p. 350).
46 Limitations o f  space mean, beyond the two examples I am discussing here, the impossibility o f giving 
anything like a representative picture o f  anarchist thought and writing. One particular writer who I greatly 
regret having to leave out o f the final chapter is the British anarchist Colin Ward, perhaps one o f  the most 
modest yet lucid theorists o f  anarchist thought in the latter half o f the twentieth century. For an 
introduction to his inspirationally crystalline expositions o f  anarchism, see Colin Ward, Anarchy in Action 
(London: Freedom Press, 1973).
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espoused means that neither Chomsky nor Daniel Guerin (in relation to Guerin’s 
Anarchism, for which Chomsky wrote the foreword) ‘is an anarchist by any known 
criterion; they are both left-wing Marxists’.47 Without wanting to take a position on this 
aspect of Chomsky’s work, I hope it suffices to say that Chomsky is only one of so very 
many who could readily have found a place in the last chapter of this thesis.
As the quotation from Bonanno at the beginning of this introduction suggested,
anarchism is perhaps the one political ideology that is uniquely obliged to constantly ask
itself the question of its own nature. George Woodcock writes that:
To describe the essential theory of anarchism is rather like trying to 
grapple with Proteus, for the very nature of the libertarian attitude -  its 
rejection of dogma, its deliberate avoidance of rigidly systematic theory, 
and, above all, its stress on extreme freedom of choice and on the 
primacy of the individual judgement -  creates immediately the 
possibility of a variety of viewpoints inconceivable in a closely 
dogmatic system.4*
It is my hope, then, that this thesis does not provide a singular and definitive answer to 
the question ‘what is anarchism?’, based on my firm belief that such an answer will 
never come. It might, rather, be considered as something approaching a series of studies 
towards an embryonic anarchist theory of the text.49 In considering ‘why anarchism still 
matters’, James Bowen and Jonathan Purkis write in the introduction to a recent 
collection of essays that ‘the theoretical matters that define the global age of anarchism 
are complex, controversial and constantly adapting to new forms of conflict and 
struggle in ways that seem impossible to articulate coherently’.50 Hopefully this present
47 George Woodcock, as cited by John Moore, ‘Prophets o f  the New World: Noam Chomsky, Murray 
Bookchin, and Fredy Perlman’, available online at 
<http://lemming.mahost.org/johnmoore/prophets.htm>.
48 George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History o f  Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Harmonds worth: 
Penguin Books, 1963), p. 15.
49 One major step towards the formulation o f  an anarchist literary theory would appear to be Jesse Cohn’s 
forthcoming text Anarchism and the Crisis o f  Representation. Unfortunately the draft manuscript o f this 
work came to me too late to be able to include it in my considerations in this chapter. See Jesse Cohn, 
Anarchism and the Crisis o f  Representation (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 
forthcoming).
50 James Bowen and Jonathan Purkis, ‘Introduction: Why Anarchism Still Matters’, in Changing 
Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a Global Age, ed. by Jonathan Purkis and James Bowen 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 1-19 (p. 17).
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work will offer a new perspective on one particular area of struggle that has so far been 
overlooked from an anarchist perspective: the struggle over the means of production of 
meaning or the struggle between text and reader for control of the anarchist text.
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2
Emma Goldman’s Theatre Criticism: 
Rehearsing Revolution?
Originally published in 1914, Emma Goldman’s The Social Significance o f Modern 
Drama is a revision and an extension of her lectures and articles on theatre -  the germ 
of the book can be found, for example, in the earlier essay ‘The Modem Drama: A 
Powerful Disseminator Of Radical Thought’.1 The purpose of the text, she writes in the 
very first sentence, is to ‘understand the social and dynamic significance of modem 
dramatic art’.2 Taking a total of 32 plays, Goldman’s text divides them into categories 
depending on the nationality of the author, with sections on Scandinavian, German, 
French, English, Irish and Russian theatre, and provides a brief synopsis and 
commentary. Given the pivotal status that Goldman’s life and writings have for 
anarchist history (a life and writings which will be considered in subsequent chapters), 
the purpose of this chapter will be to examine to what degree Modern Drama can 
function as a template for an anarchist approach to the text, as I begin to trace the 
outline of a potential anarchist theory of the text. This chapter, then, will examine how 
Goldman’s text functions and what characterises its approach to both the authors and 
plays that it considers. I will compare her readings of some of the plays to more recent 
readings. In his introduction to the 1987 reprint, Harry Carlson calls it an ‘unpretentious 
survey’, and remarks on Goldman’s ‘amateur status as a drama expert’. Perhaps 
Goldman’s relevance to the world of contemporary theatre has long since come to an
1 See Emma Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays (New York: Dover, 1969), pp. 241-271.
2 Emma Goldman, The Social Significance o f  Modern Drama (New York: Applause Theatre Book 
Publishers, 1987), p. 1. All further references in this chapter will be given in the text.
3 Harry G. Carlson, ‘Introduction’, in Emma Goldman, The Social Significance o f  Modern Drama (New 
York: Applause Theatre Book Publishers, 1987), pp. v-xiii (p. v).
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end? To consider this, I will contrast her approach with that of two other authors, Brecht 
and Boal, who similarly espouse an openly revolutionary agenda in their theatre 
practice. Through all this I hope to develop a series of crucial questions that will, by 
way of conclusion, be turned back onto a number of plays in order to bring the chapter 
to a close with a reading of its own.
The ambition of Goldman’s text, as expounded on the second page of its
introduction, is to bring to the attention of the American public material that had up
until then been unavailable. In this it shares a mission with Kropotkin’s review of his
own nation’s literary history in Russian Literature, although Goldman’s avowed remit
is distinctly more interventionist and political than his.4 She writes that:
Because the modem drama of Europe has till recently been inaccessible in 
printed form to the average theatergoer in this country, he had to content 
himself with the interpretation, or rather misinterpretation, of our dramatic 
critics. As a result the social significance of the Modem Drama has well 
nigh been lost to the general public, (p. 2)
The text undermines its notions of the artistic object as an objective mirror, for if it were
so then there could be no possibility of ‘misinterpretations’. Rather than document what
these misinterpretations may have been, the text moves on to its principle task, that of
rescuing the ‘social significance’ of the plays under discussion.
In seeking to understand the ‘social and dynamic significance of modem drama,’ 
Goldman’s text sets up a distinction between ‘art for art’s sake’, which ‘presupposes an 
attitude of aloofness on the part of the artist toward the complex struggle of life’ and 
‘modem art’, which is ‘preeminently the reflex, the mirror of life’ (p. 1). This formula 
appears to hark back to the Platonic opposition of the ideal to the real, where the first 
type of (Goldman’s) artist is ‘merely an artistic conjurer of beautiful forms, a creator of 
pure fancy’ (p. 1). For Goldman this type of idealism is not a characteristic of modem 
art, where the artist, enmeshed in materiality, is ‘a part of life [and] cannot detach
4 See Peter Kropotkin, Russian Literature: Ideals and Realities (London: Duckworth, 1916).
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himself [s/c] from the events and occurrences that pass panorama-like before his eyes, 
impressing themselves upon his emotional and intellectual vision’ (p. I).5 The 
introduction does not pursue the implications of what the first type of artist means to the 
world, but it does insist on the mirror function of modem art. Goldman’s mirror 
function is presented unproblematically in the text, yet as Terry Eagleton observes, 
‘literature [...] does not stand in some reflective, symmetrical, one-to-one relation with 
its object. The object is deformed, refracted [and] dissolved.’6 The text, then, fails to 
interrogate the ‘mirror’ as a distorting or deceiving optic. Indeed such is its enthusiasm 
for the mirror’s powers that Goldman claims that ‘Modem Drama [...] mirrors every 
phase of life and embraces every strata of society’ (p. 3). Goldman’s mirror seems to be 
something akin to Borges’ map, presenting a one-to-one scale image that ends up 
duplicating the original object.
Yet despite Goldman’s desire to sustain a notion of the mirror as a faithful
reflector, the text has already recognised the absence of any potential objectivity. In an
interesting passage on the apparent reasons for the failure of political propagandising
within the realm of the arts, Goldman writes that:
The reason that many radicals as well as conservatives fail to grasp the 
powerful message of art is perhaps not far to seek. The average radical is as 
hidebound by mere terms as the man devoid of all ideas. ‘Bloated 
plutocrats,’ ‘economic determinism,’ ‘class consciousness,’ and similar 
expressions sum up for him the symbols of revolt. But since art speaks a 
language of its own, a language embracing the entire gamut of human 
emotions, it often sounds meaningless to those whose hearing has been 
dulled by the din of stereotyped phrases, (p. 1)
This paragraph makes a number of linked points that are germane to the development of
my argument here. Firstly, the text recognises that the failure to transmit the message of
political art does not inhere in the artistic object, but rather in the ‘dulled’ hearing of the
reader/listener. Hence, secondly, the content of the text is not at issue as much as the
5 This thesis will observe gender neutrality in its language. This will hopefully be sufficient comment on 
all further manifestations o f  the supposedly gender neutral generic ‘he’ in quotations from original texts.
6 Terry Eagleton, Marxism and Literary Criticism  (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1976), p. 51.
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way in which its representation is constructed -  Goldman comments on the ‘creative 
genius’ of the playwrights that she considers, which ‘strikes root where the ordinary 
word often falls on barren soil’ (p. 1). Thirdly, with the complaint about ‘stereotyped 
phrases,’ Goldman’s text locates the challenge to modem drama as making the familiar 
seem new again. Although this recalls a kind of Shklovskian formalism, for Goldman 
the motivation could not be more different. While Shklovsky wrote that ‘the process of 
perception is an aesthetic end in itself and that the object itself was not important, for 
Goldman it is not so much about making the stone stony, but rather how to bring about 
a reaction in an audience that would lead it to pick the stone up and cast it against the 
oppressor.7
The readings, though, are clearly aimed at a particular audience, an audience that
has a definite bearing on the interpretation of the text’s own politics. In the Foreword,
Goldman argues that modem drama:
mirrors the complex struggle of life, -  the struggle which, whatever its 
individual or topical expression, ever has its roots in the depth of human 
nature and social environment, and hence is, to that extent, universal. Such 
literature, such drama, is at once the reflex and the inspiration of mankind 
in its eternal seeking for things higher and better, (p. 3)
Goldman seems to identify a pedagogical value for drama, for while she concedes that
those who Team the great truths of the social travail’ in life do not need drama, ‘there is
another class whose number is legion, for whom that message is indispensable’ (p. 3).
This ‘class,’ as she calls it, refers to intellectuals, for she argues that ‘in countries where
political oppression affects all classes, the best intellectual element have made common
cause with the people, have become their teachers, comrades, and spokesmen’ (p.3).
This has not yet happened, in her view, in America. For this reason ‘another medium
[the modem drama] is needed to arouse the intellectuals of this country, to make them
realize their relation to the people, to the social unrest permeating the atmosphere’ (p.
7 Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, trans. by Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, in M odem  Criticism 
and Theory: A Reader, ed. by David Lodge (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 16-30 (p. 20).
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3). While this didacticism might be seen nowadays as overtly mechanistic, it is worth
bearing in mind the situation that Goldman in particular found herself in during her
American years. She was a frequent protagonist in free speech battles, often arrested
and at times suffered physical abuse for her attempts at her propaganda work. Candace
Falk cites an ‘apocryphal story’ about:
a time when Goldman acquired a strong, heavy lock and chain, wound it 
around herself and the podium, then threw it out the window to have it 
attached to a pole outside. She anticipated that it would take the police so 
long to release her that they couldn’t possibly interrupt her lecture.8
Goldman’s text argues, then, that ‘the “common” people’ have learnt ‘the great truths of
the social travail in the school of life’. It suggests that ‘in America political pressure has
so far affected only the “common” people’, and that in other countries where oppression
is more widespread, a common bond has developed between ‘the best intellectual
elements’ and ‘the people’ (p. 3). As a frequent victim of police harassment, Goldman
was looking beyond the ranks of striking workers, for example, who would be only too
familiar with the repressive actions of the police; she was looking to others who could
bring different forms of solidarity to bear in the struggle.
This underlying appeal in the Foreword gives a hint as to the thread that links
the readings offered by the text. It can be seen that by not placing ‘the “common”
people’ at the centre of its reading (and it might be supposed that by this term the text is
referring to the working class), and by making this appeal to other classes, or elements
thereof, the text rejects any economic determinism concerning the nature of social
struggle. This is a familiar characteristic of anarchist thought -  the emphasis on
economic exploitation, but a refusal to make it central to the analysis offered. This is
paralleled in the text of the readings, for one finds a wide thematic variety under
consideration and there is no predisposition merely to consider situations through the
prism of economics or class struggle. Goldman ranges across topics as diverse as
8 Candace Falk, ‘Emma Goldman: Passion, Politics, and the Theatrics o f  Free Expression’, Women’s 
History Review, 11 (2002), 11-26 (p. 13).
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patriarchal oppression (in various forms, within marriage, within families, in terms of 
the definition of motherhood, in relation to the situation of sex workers, abortion and 
the right to choose); societal pressure on perceived misfits (tramps, gypsies); strikes; 
sexuality/morality and sexually transmitted diseases; the plight of exploited peasants; 
the arms trade and the morals of business; and prison. In all of these Goldman identifies 
something that she variously characterises as ‘sociorevolutionary significance’ (p. 8), 
‘revolutionary message’ (p. 12), ‘revolutionizing factor’ (p. 71) or ‘important social 
lesson’ (p. 129). What the revolution would be against is perhaps harder to paraphrase. 
Indeed the breadth of thematic concerns of the plays considered make a simplifying 
reduction of their content to a single line a difficult task. Modern Drama largely focuses 
on plays where the protagonists experience some sort of social, familial or peer pressure 
to conform to a value system that they do not feel their own, or experience this pressure 
as a result of a situation of struggle in which they already find themselves. Therefore the 
significance of the drama that Goldman examines lies in the image of struggle against 
authority that it offers. It is clear, then, that Goldman bases her reading specifically on 
the overt content of the plays chosen, and not on some supposition of the political 
affiliation of the author. Indeed, as I will now show, it would be to overstate the case to 
suggest that this sense of ‘struggle’ is one that could be claimed as anarchistic, and 
Goldman conspicuously does not attempt to do that.
The Social Insignificance of the Author
The text commences with a look at ‘Scandinavian drama’, and turns first to Henrik 
Ibsen. Goldman cites a letter from Ibsen in which he wrote, after the Paris Commune, 
that ‘the State must go! That will be a revolution which will find me on its side’ (p. 5). 
Can this be sufficient cause to label Ibsen an anarchist? Goldman, though, does not go 
down the route of seizing on an author and trying to present a partial portrait that would
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find favour amongst her contemporary anarchist ideologues. Indeed in the whole of the 
text of Modern Drama there are but three direct references to anarchism, and I will 
come to them in a moment. With regard to Ibsen, more recent critics have recognised 
the radicality of the critique contained within his work. In his introduction to one 
collection of essays, Rolf Fjelde argues that ‘Ibsen’s defensive reaction to that force 
[society] drove him to a position verging on anarchism’.9 Goldman does not try to claim 
Ibsen as an anarchist, though, insisting rather on the ‘revolutionary significance of his 
dramatic works’ (p. 5). Superficially, then, Goldman’s position seems to be in keeping 
with Eric Bentley’s appraisal of the contemporary late nineteenth-century reaction to 
Ibsen:
one either expressed one’s detestation of the dramatist’s iconoclasm or 
one’s enthusiastic acceptance of it. Either way, the Ibsen under 
consideration was the revolutionary; and one accepted or rejected him 
according as one was oneself a revolutionary or not.10
Bentley’s comments demonstrate a desire (on the part of contemporaries) for a univocal
meaning for the term ‘Ibsen’, and Georg Brandes, the Danish literary critic and friend of
Ibsen’s, writing in Emma Goldman’s journal Mother Earth in 1906, seems to identify
what might be called the desire of the audience to create the author in its own image.11
He noted how Ibsen had been all things to all people: in France, he had been
‘consecrated’ as an anarchist ‘during the years when it was good form to pose in favour
of Anarchism’; ‘the English see in him the perfect materialist’; and that ‘the
Norwegians have declared Ibsen a radical after having proclaimed him a
1 9conservative’. Yet Bentley and Brandes both focus more on the personality of the 
author, whereas Goldman derives her reading of ‘Ibsen’ from the plays, and I will show
9 Rolf Fjelde, ‘Introduction’, in Ibsen: A Collection o f  Critical Essays, ed. by Rolf Fjelde (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 1-10 (p. 7).
10 Eric Bentley, ‘Henrik Ibsen: A Personal Statement’, in Ibsen: A Collection o f  Critical Essays, ed. by 
Rolf Fjelde (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 11-17 (p. 11).
11 For some examples o f Ibsen’s correspondence with Brandes, see Henrik Ibsen: A Critical Anthology, 
ed. by James McFarlane (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), pp. 76, 79, 80, 102, 160.
12 Georg Brandes, ‘Henrik Ibsen’, in Anarchy!: An Anthology o f  Emma Goldm an’s ‘Mother Earth’, ed. by 
Peter Glassgold (Washington: Counterpoint, 2001), pp. 168-173 (p. 173).
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how she does not replicate the uncritical ascription of a character’s point of view to the 
author in question.
An examination of the three scant references to anarchy per se in Modern
Drama, will reveal, I think, the text’s position with regard to the traditional concept of
author as psychological unity of the text, for Goldman’s criteria for selecting texts
seems more closely wedded to the texts themselves, rather than the explicit ideological
position of an author. In the first, Goldman concludes her reading of Shaw’s Major
Barbara with what is, in truth, a gently self-deprecating reference to anarchism.
Arguing that Major Barbara ‘is one of the most revolutionary plays’, Goldman writes
that ‘the sentiments uttered therein would have condemned the author to long
imprisonment for inciting to sedition and violence’ (p. 107). She then suggests that
‘Shaw the Fabian would be the first to repudiate such utterances as rank Anarchy,
“impractical, brain cracked and criminal.’” Although Shaw’s left-wing orientation is
quite well known, his brief encounter with anarchism is less so. In his history of the
nascent British anarchist movement at the end of the nineteenth century, John Quail
records that Shaw contributed an article to the inaugural edition of a monthly paper,
1Anarchist, launched in March 1885. In Socialism and Superior Brains, though, Gareth 
Griffith argues that this was a ‘flirtation with individualist anarchism [which] was of an 
equivocal kind’ and not something that can be taken as wholly representative of Shaw’s 
views, although he concedes that ‘Shaw might well have been an anarchist at heart’.14 
Despite prima facie biographical evidence being available to fashion some sort of claim 
of Shaw-the-anarchist, Modern Drama does no such thing. In fact Goldman’s text 
makes a much more interesting gesture. Immediately following on the ‘rank Anarchy’ 
comment mentioned above, the text contrasts the position of ‘Shaw the Fabian’ with
13 John Quail, The Slow Burning Fuse: The Lost History o f  the British Anarchists (London: Paladin,
1978), p. 48.
14 Gareth Griffith, Socialism and Superior Brains: The Political Thought o f  Bernard Shaw (London: 
Routledge, 1993), pp. 34-35.
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that of ‘Shaw the dramatist’ who is ‘closer to reality, closer to the historic truth that the 
people wrest only as much liberty as they have the intelligence to want and the courage 
to take’ (p. 107).15 So rather than forthrightly attempting to set out an unequivocal 
meaning of ‘Shaw’ based on the presupposition of a psychological (and ideological) 
unity of ‘author’, the text teasingly constructs a plural Shaw, ‘Shaw the Fabian’ against 
‘Shaw the dramatist’. What is more, it does not seek to establish the priority of one over 
the other, or of one as the ‘true’ Shaw.
The second mention of anarchism in Modern Drama is much slighter, a passing 
reference to Berkman’s Prison Memoirs o f an Anarchist (p. 115). The third, though, is 
more interesting, for again the text recognises a distinction to be drawn between text 
and author. While Goldman writes that Yeats’s play Where there is Nothing is ‘as true 
an interpretation of the philosophy of Anarchism as could be given by its best 
exponents’, she immediately qualifies this with the explanation that ‘I say this not out of 
any wish to tag Mr. Yeats, but because the ideal of Paul Ruttledge, the hero of the play, 
is nothing less than Anarchism applied to everyday life’ (p. 139). Indeed the text makes 
clear that ‘Mr. Yeats himself would repudiate any implication of a social character, as 
he considers such dramas too “topical” and therefore “half bad” plays’ (p. 138). The 
play turns out to be an intriguingly anomalous choice from Yeats’s repertoire, for it was 
originally co-written by Yeats, Lady Gregory and Douglas Hyde, and Yeats later 
repudiated the play and gave it to Lady Gregory to re-write, the result being her The 
Unicorn from the Stars. Yeats subsequently banned it from his collected works of 
1908.16 In their discussion of Where there is Nothing, Patricia McFate and William 
Doherty comment on his ‘rather ostentatious disdain’ for it.17 In opposition to what they
15 This is a familiar trope in Goldman’s work. In Anarchism and Other Essays she cites Max Stimer 
approvingly, suggesting that ‘man has as much liberty as he is willing to take’ (p. 65).
For a detailed discussion o f the history o f this text, see David S. Thatcher, ‘Yeats’s Repudiation of  
Where there is Nothing', Modern Drama, 14 (1971), 127-136.
17 Patricia Ann McFate and William E. Doherty, ‘ W. B. Yeats’s Where there is Nothing: Theme and 
Symbolism’, Irish University Review, 2 (1972), 149-163 (p. 149).
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perceive as the received critical opinion that ‘behind the character of Paul [Ruttledge] is 
the author, Yeats, himself, McFate and Doherty attempt to divine to what degree the
1 o
writer George Moore provided Yeats with the inspiration for the central character. 
They cite various other critics who seem eager to conflate character with author, for 
example Richard Ellmann’s contention that ‘Paul Ruttledge is a kind of 
anthropomorphosis of Yeats’s secret desires’.19 Yet Modern Drama clearly refuses to 
engage with the text in any comparable fashion. Indeed, in place of attempting to 
conflate Ruttledge with Yeats, the text highlights the incongruities between Yeats’s 
rejection of plays with ‘a social character’, his ‘standard of true art’ and the programme 
at the Abbey Theatre, which Goldman describes as consisting ‘mainly of social 
dramas’, and Where there is Nothing, which she describes as ‘no less social in its 
philosophy and tendency than Ibsen’s “Brand”’ (p. 138). Goldman recognises the 
disparities, yet to her credit does not attempt to iron them out and manufacture a 
uni vocal version of Yeats -  in fact she sums up Yeats’s work as being ‘deep in human 
appeal’ but having ‘no bearing on the pressing questions of our time’ (p. 138).
What can be concluded, then, from the brief references to anarchism that one 
finds on the pages of Modern Drama, is that Goldman did not choose authors that 
would fit some pre-formed ideological mould, but rather chose plays that offered 
material which could be considered propitious for her political concerns. In this sense, 
while The Social Significance o f  Modern Drama is absolutely clear, even from its very 
title, about its objectives in the readings that it provides of the plays, it opens up a 
productive gap between the texts under consideration and what might be described as 
their erstwhile authors’ demonstrable ideological persuasion.
As to the readings themselves, Goldman’s commentary on A Doll’s House 
establishes the ostensible subject matter of the play in the opening sentence, that being
18 McFate and Doherty, ‘ W. B. Yeats’s Where there is Nothing’, p. 157.
19 Richard Ellmann, as cited by McFate and Doherty, ‘W. B. Yeats’s Where there is Nothing', p. 157.
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‘the Social Lie and Duty,- this time as manifesting themselves in the sacred institution 
of the home and in the position of woman in her gilded cage’ (p. 8). The text pre-empts 
its own reading of A Doll’s House by suggesting straight away that the subject matter is 
that of the social lie, and thus the analysis works in a largely linear and expository 
fashion towards that conclusion. The text’s language shows, though, that there is a 
disavowal of any pretence of objectivity, for describing marriage as a ‘gilded cage’ 
surely leaves the text wearing its colours on its sleeve. Indeed in disavowing the more 
usual critical locus of dispassionate objectivity, Goldman’s text seeks in minor fashion 
to re-enact the dynamic of the play itself. The description of Torvald offered at the 
beginning of the reading is of ‘an admirable man, rigidly honest, of high moral ideals, 
and passionately devoted to his wife and children. In short, a good man and an enviable 
husband’ (p. 8). Hence the text eschews the traditional omniscient position of the critic, 
and it is not until it has provided a synopsis of the play’s action that the reader then 
finds that Torvald ‘proves himself a petty Philistine, a bully and a coward, as so many 
good husbands when they throw off their respectable cloak’ (p. 11). The reading in 
general deals principally with the dynamic of the relationship between Nora and 
Torvald, and picks up on, for example, only the innocent qualities that Nora exhibits in 
the opening scenes of the play. One reads that Nora is ‘light-hearted and gay, apparently 
without depth’, and the text asks ‘who, indeed, would expect depth of a doll, a 
“squirrel,” a song-bird?’ (p. 9). Yet despite reiterating the superficial presentation of 
Nora that occurs in the first act of A Doll’s House, once the reading introduces the 
figure of Krogstad, it suggests that ‘down deep in the consciousness of Nora there 
evidently slumbers personality and character’ (p. 9). In mirroring the contours of the 
play’s own revelations the reading seeks, with its own objectives in mind, to amplify 
those aspects that highlight the (political) message regarding the institution of marriage 
that Goldman wants to reinforce.
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Goldman’s reading of A Doll's House makes an interesting comparison to that
90offered, for example, by John Northam, in his essay ‘Ibsen’s Search for the Hero’. 
Ibsen commented in his preliminary notes for the play that ‘a woman cannot be herself
in contemporary society, it is an exclusively male society with laws drafted by men, and
•  • • • • 2 1  with counsel and judges who judge feminine conduct from the male point of view’.
Although Ibsen’s comments might well be said to be premised on a notion of female
essence, they do highlight the way that patriarchal law has historically grounded itself
as a universal value. Northam, though, seems not to take into account the question of
competing value systems that are in conflict in the play, and indeed at times his reading
borders on reproducing the very patriarchy that the play questions. In the middle of the
reading, one encounters ‘the one fundamental truth about women’, which is apparently
motherhood.22 Northam is referring to the scene in which Mrs. Linde announces to
Krogstad that ‘I need someone to mother, and your children need a mother’.23 He adds
that Mrs. Linde at the beginning of the play ‘had nothing to live for’ due to the fact that
her two sons had grown up: moreover the scene (where Linde persuades Krogstad that
they should be reconciled and together again) ‘describes for us in advance the painful
void into which Nora consigns herself at the end of the play’ by dint of walking away
from her own children.24 Consequently for Northam a woman’s worth is defined by her
family, or lack thereof. Northam’s reading of Nora’s final revelation also sounds a
curiously ambivalent note, for while he skips over Torvald’s astonishing reversal of
feeling towards Nora as a ‘vulgar rage’, he qualifies the notion that Nora has suffered at
the hands of a patriarchal society as being a matter of her perception:
20 John Northam, ‘Ibsen’s Search for the Hero’, in Ibsen: A Collection o f  Critical Essays, ed. by Rolf 
Fjelde (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 91-108.
2 Henrik Ibsen, ‘Preliminary notes for A D o ll’s House (1878)’ in Henrik Ibsen: A Critical Anthology, p. 
90 (p. 90).
22 Northam, ‘Ibsen’s Search for the Hero’, p. 106.
23 Henrik Ibsen, A D o ll’s House, in Four Major Plays, trans. by James McFarlane and Jens Arup (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 65.
24 Northam, ‘Ibsen’s Search for the Hero’, p. 106.
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They [Torvald and Nora’s father] have both treated her as a doll-child. It is 
the men who run society who have condemned Nora to a stultifying life.
That is the real crime, the real corruption, as she clearly sees, not her 
forgery or her little lies, but the male conspiracy to debase the female
[ - ] • ”
The deficiency in Northam’s reading is not so much the question of Nora seeing the 
crime perpetrated against her -  there can be no doubt she clearly realises the injustice 
she has been subjected to -  but rather his failure to locate this injustice in a wider, 
social, realm. For a crime to transcend the category of personal grievance it surely must 
be recognised by society as such, otherwise it remains within the ambit of interpersonal 
relationships. Northam’s failure to address this is compounded by the symmetrical 
sentence structure, which balances the ‘real crime, the real corruption’ against Nora’s 
‘forgery or her little lies’. Northam’s elision of what Goldman calls the ‘social 
significance’ leaves Nora as not only the victim of injustice, but also the victim of any 
notion of justice in the play. For while Northam acknowledges that ‘it is the Doll’s 
House attitude that is the corruption which must not be transmitted’, the responsibility 
for this falls back on Nora’s shoulders -  ‘she must go into a hostile world and educate 
herself.27
With this in mind, Northam’s conclusion that Nora’s self-imposed exile from 
her family will be ‘a life-in-death’, and that she ‘leaves the play [...] lonely, unhappy, 
with no one to love or live for’ strikes a radical contrast with Goldman’s opinion.28 
Goldman’s contention is that ‘when Nora closes behind her the door of her doll’s house, 
she opens wide the gate of life for woman, and proclaims the revolutionary message that 
only perfect freedom and communion make a true bond between man and woman’ (p. 
12). The two readings could easily be held up as diametrically opposed interpretations
25 Northam, ‘Ibsen’s Search for the Hero’, p. 107, my emphasis.
26 It might further be questioned as to whether or not these crimes are comparable. Northam brings them 
into an economy o f  equivalences. By so doing he ignores the heterogeneity o f  experiences that engender 
the two ‘crimes’, and thus reproduces the masculine system o f  jurisprudence where a putative equality 
before the law masks a gendered universality that favours the historically privileged male.
27 Northam, ‘Ibsen’s Search for the Hero’, p. 107.
28 Northam, ‘Ibsen’s Search for the Hero’, p. 108.
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of the same text, but in fact, as will become clear below, if one begins to ask, for 
example, how the audience relates to Nora, the readings share more in common than at 
first appears.
Northam’s reading tries to establish whether A Doll’s House can really qualify 
as a modem tragedy, as Ibsen suggested in his preliminary notes, and whether Nora 
tmly warrants the status of heroine. In so doing, Northam attempts to decide if Ibsen’s 
play measures up to the Aristotelian standard, and whether the audience undergoes a 
cathartic theatrical experience as a result. Northam takes for granted the mechanisms of 
identification that are necessary for catharsis to take place, and therefore he shares with 
Goldman an exclusive focus on the content of the text. Indeed Northam writes that his 
‘method will be that of close analysis of the development of the play, that is to say of 
the growth of the play’s meaning from first curtain to last’. By a deft sleight of hand, 
Northam de-historicises meaning. Historical context and discourses of femininity, to 
take two pertinent examples, are suddenly excluded from the production of meaning. 
Yet at least Northam’s text states as much openly -- this, in a certain sense, is what is 
missing from Goldman’s analysis, a statement of the text’s own approach to the 
material considered. Goldman’s approach is wholly content-orientated, and this itself 
raises some interesting questions for elaborating an ‘anarchist’ approach to literature.
What are the implications of basing a reading wholly on the content of the text 
considered? Before turning to that question, it might be worth noting that Goldman’s 
text is not completely oblivious to the varying formal concerns that surround a work of 
art. The clearest example of this comes during the discussion of Githa Sowerby’s play 
Rutherford and Son. Goldman writes of how her first encounter with a performed 
presentation of the play left her feeling that one character’s behaviour was ‘unreal and 
incongruous’. Yet after ‘repeatedly rereading the play’ she becomes ‘convinced’ of
29 Northam, ‘Ibsen’s Search for the Hero’, pp. 99-100.
34
what she had previously found ‘unreal’ (p. 137). The text, though, tantalisingly leaves
this potentially productive aperture unexplored at this point. The obvious conclusion to
be drawn from this is that at the very least there is a tacit recognition of the polysemous
nature of a text, or artistic/literary object. This, then, draws the critic’s attention to the
question of form, in this case ‘performed’ versus ‘printed’ text.
In a certain sense the question that I want to ask of Goldman’s theatre criticism
is ‘is it good enough?’ By this I mean to ask if what I have identified as the
characteristics of the readings, namely their near exclusive focus on questions of content
and their reliance on a simplistic reflectionist model of art coupled with an avowed
didacticism, can be usefully integrated into a renewed anarchist approach to the text.
Terry Eagleton, writing in Marxism and Literary Criticism, argues that:
In its cruder formulations, the idea that literature ‘reflects’ reality is clearly 
inadequate. It suggests a passive, mechanistic relationship between 
literature and society, as though the work, like a mirror or photographic 
plate, merely inertly registered what was happening ‘out there’.30
If Goldman is to be condemned, as ‘inadequate’, what can be learned from her
inadequacies? Given that Goldman was writing at the beginning of the twentieth
century, it may seem odd that she should have focused so narrowly on questions of
content. Although one might identify an earlier anarchist heritage in relation to art, for
example with Proudhon’s insistence that ‘man will become his own mirror, and he will
learn how to contemplate his soul through studying his true countenance’, and that the
purpose of art, which for Proudhon was exemplified by Courbet, is to ‘improve us
though portraying us as we really are,’ the debate around formal concerns was well
under way long before Goldman’s time.31 David Bradby and John McCormick, in their
history People’s Theatre, record how ‘impatience’ with existing theatrical forms began
to manifest itself even before the end of the nineteenth century with the concerns of the
30 Eagleton, Marxism and Literary Criticism , p. 49.
31 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Selected Writings o f  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, trans. by Elizabeth Fraser, ed. 
by Stewart Edwards (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 215-216.
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Naturalists. At the turn of the century they note a ‘sudden burst of activity’ from the 
likes of the ‘social reformers [...] who wanted to democratise the theatre by ridding it of 
its aristocratic or bourgeois associations’.33 Indeed even the very construction of the 
physical space where theatre was performed came in for reconsideration. For example, 
Bradby and McCormick argue that Wagner’s reforms to the traditional horse-shoe­
shaped auditorium, while attempting to do away with the class hierarchy of expensive 
seats with a good view versus cheaper seats with a view only of those who could afford 
the expensive seats, ‘strengthened the barrier of the proscenium arch’ and thus 
reinforced the ideality of the world presented as opposed to the real world of the 
spectators.34 The question of form, then, has a long history, and although Eagleton 
warns that ‘a good deal of Marxist criticism has in practice paid scant attention to 
questions of artistic form’, one can find in the work of theatre critics Bertolt Brecht and 
Augusto Boal a thoroughgoing engagement with the question of form.35 It is by an 
examination of their work that I hope to bring out some of the ‘sociorevolutionary’ 
aspects that are clearly absent from Goldman’s position.
Early in his career Brecht characterised the relationship between ‘new plays’ and 
the theatrical establishment as a ‘murderous clash’. Brecht argued that by trying to stage 
the new plays, theatre risked ‘being radically transformed’ and that all the audience had 
to do was ‘observe whether the theatre emerges as victor or vanquished’.36 Brecht’s 
analysis of theatre was wide-ranging, for it can be seen that even before engaging with 
questions of the relationship of audience to play, his critical reflections included the 
material structure of the producing environment. One finds him, in A Short Organum 
for the Theatre, offering an unequivocal condemnation of the theatrical status quo of his
32 David Brady and John McCormick, P eop le’s Theatre (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1978), p. 11.
33 Brady and McCormick, P eop le’s Theatre, p. 15.
34 Brady and McCormick, P eople’s Theatre, p. 15.
35 Eagleton, Marxism and Literary Criticism, p. 20.
36 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre: The Development o f  an Aesthetic, trans. and ed. by John Willett 
(London: Eyre Methuen, 1964), p. 22. All further references in this chapter will be given in the text.
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day, arguing that contemporary ‘entertainment emporiums [had] degenerated into 
branches of the bourgeois narcotics business’ (p. 179). Brecht conceived of the theatre 
as a ‘means of production’ and by underscoring the ‘economic reasons’ behind the logic 
of its attempts to defend itself from radical new plays, he mined a line of criticism that 
is absent from Goldman’s considerations (p. 43). In a sense one could say that while 
Goldman’s critique commences as the curtain rises, Brecht’s critique begins from the 
moment one enters the theatre and purchases a ticket. So the first lesson here would be 
that form can include the very locus of the theatrical presentation.
Brecht’s theatre practice was designed to rouse what he saw as the ‘cowed, 
credulous, hypnotized mass’ (p. 188) from the narcoleptic slumber that ‘culinary’ 
theatre had induced. As the theatre historian Robert Leach writes, Brecht sought 
‘thinking theatregoers, not people who were swept away by an overwhelming tide of 
experienced feeling’. The major technique employed to achieve this was Brecht’s 
Verfremdung, or alienation effect. Leach suggests that this effect owes its genealogy to 
Shklovsky and the Formalists, in its desire to shake the audience into seeing the artistic 
object anew. Hence Brecht’s ‘epic’ theatre is one that does not shy away from the 
didacticism that Goldman embraces -  ‘the new purpose is called paedagogics’ as he 
wrote in ‘On Form and Subject-Matter’ (p. 30). This, however, was most decidedly not 
at the expense of the audience’s enjoyment -  Brecht is often to be found commenting on 
the ‘fun’ or lack of it in productions. Goldman, though, makes no mention of the 
enjoyment or otherwise of the spectators at the plays of which she writes. It would 
seem, perhaps, that for Goldman there is no space for an overlap between the openly 
didactic role that she assigns to theatre, and its more received role as entertainment. 
Brecht, on the other hand, encounters a putative opposition between education and 
entertainment:
37 Robert Leach, Makers o f  M odem  Theatre: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 116.
38 Although it should also be noted that Brecht perceived fun ‘in its current historical role: as 
merchandise’ (p. 36).
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One of the chief objections made by bourgeois criticism to non-aristotelian 
plays like Die Mutter is based on an equally bourgeois distinction between 
the concepts ‘entertaining’ and ‘instructive’. [...] Surprising as it may 
seem, the object is to discredit learning by presenting it as not enjoyable.
But in fact of course it is enjoyment that is being discredited by this 
deliberate suggestion that one learns nothing from it. (p. 60)39
So one can take from this that while the play, for Goldman as much as for Brecht,
should be instructive, Brecht adds to this the sense that this should not be at the cost of
it being entertaining. One finds Brecht suggesting a range of subject matters that come
uncannily close to exactly what Goldman was examining -  ‘The proper way to explore
humanity’s new mutual relationships is via the exploration of the new subject-matter.
(Marriage, disease, money, war, etc.)’ (p. 29).
The question then is of how this message or lesson is to be transmitted to the 
audience. If one recalls Goldman’s reading of A Doll’s House, why should it be that the 
spectator comes out of the theatre having had some light cast on the position of women 
within marriage -  could one not conceive of an audience member leaving a production 
of this play thinking that Torvald had proved a model husband hard done by? This 
raises the question of the mechanisms of identification.
One answer to this question is provided by the concept of empathy. The ‘lesson’,
such as it is, of Ibsen’s play is to be found once the spectator has identified with Nora.
This empathy is of course a fundamental feature of Aristotelian drama, traditionally
leading to the purging of fear and pity through the experience of catharsis. Brecht reacts
strongly against this, arguing that:
the play’s meaning is usually blurred by the fact that the actor plays to the 
audience’s hearts. The figures portrayed are foisted on the audience and are 
falsified in the process. Contrary to present custom they ought to be 
presented quite coldly, classically and objectively. For they are not matter 
for empathy; they are there to be understood. Feelings are private and 
limited. Against that the reason is fairly comprehensive and to be relied on.
(p. 15)
39 As an example o f  the reaction against didacticism, one finds Eric Bentley, in an essay on Ibsen, writing 
that ‘the playwright must not be directly didactic, for it is the didactic writer, out not to learn but to teach, 
who concentrates on finding effective form for thinking that was finished long ago’. Bentley, ‘Henrik 
Ibsen: A Personal Statement’, p. 16.
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This, then, gives the defining feature of Brechtian drama, that being that it plays to the
audience’s reason, as well as its emotions. This in itself raises new problems, which are
worth noting before moving on. The character’s ‘truth’ of which Brecht conceives is
based on presenting or exposing the historical production of the character, and in so
doing portrays it as liable to being changed. Yet this act of presentation may not
necessarily produce the liberation for the audience to which an anarchist textual theory
might aspire. In his account of his production of Brecht’s Galileo, the actor and director
Sidney Homan comments that the audience’s ‘vital role had been anticipated, and to a
large extent set up,’ and that ‘the audiences’ reactions fell within clear limits’.40 With
Brecht, as Leach observes, the:
spectator has in fact been drawn into the productive process of the theatre.
His critical response, his aesthetic judgement has been brought into play 
decisively, so that the play has, in a sense, produced him, just as he has 
produced the play. This was precisely the two-way dialectical process 
Brecht sought. 1
The danger, as Homan’s account shows, is that an audience of a Brecht play 
finds its participatory role already structurally pre-determined by the text. This would 
not seem to trouble the workings of the dialectical process that Leach describes, but 
does have implications for the freedom (or the lack thereof) of any given audience. I 
would argue that the work of Boal addresses this question more fruitfully, so for the 
moment I will leave to one side this question of the limits to an audience’s role in 
Brecht’s work. Nevertheless it throws Goldman’s work into a new light when 
juxtaposed with it. For example, Goldman does not consider the question of why or how 
an audience member relates to the character onstage. Plays are repeatedly referred to as 
having a clear message, or lesson, or being a true picture of some suffering, yet time and 
time again Goldman fails to address the question of how the audience member is
40 Sidney Homan, The Audience as Actor and Character: The Modern Theater o f  Beckett, Brecht, Genet, 
Ionesco, Pinter, Stoppard, and Williams (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1989), p. 93.
41 Leach, Makers o f  Modern Theatre, p. 120.
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addressed by the play. To take one striking example, in her reading of Frank 
Wedekind’s Spring's Awakening Goldman rails against children being sacrificed ‘on the 
altar of stupidity and convention’ (p. 64). For Goldman the play, concerning the sexual 
awakening of young children, goes against the ‘traditional authority and [...] the sacred 
rights of parenthood’ (p. 64).42 She then concludes that ‘it is hardly necessary to point 
out the revolutionary significance of this extraordinary play. It speaks powerfully for 
itself (p. 69). It would seem that Goldman’s theatre criticism wants to have it both 
ways -  to criticise the traditional authority of teachers (in the context of this play), and 
to rail against convention, but not to question the conventional nature of the didacticism 
that she relies upon in order to propose a revolutionary aspect to the plays.
That this position is untenable becomes even clearer if one turns to the work of 
Augusto Boal. Although Brecht is best known for his concept of ‘epic’ drama, ‘non- 
Aristotelian’ was another description that he employed, and in following on from 
Brecht, Boal fully explores the challenge to Aristotle. Boal states his intentions from the 
very first line of Theatre o f the Oppressed, contending that ‘all theater is necessarily 
political, because all the activities of man are political and theater is one of them’. Boal 
sees the theatre as being a vital weapon in the revolutionary armoury, and for this reason 
argues that ‘the ruling classes [have striven] to take permanent hold of the theater and 
utilize it as a tool for domination’.43 Even from the title of the first chapter, ‘Aristotle’s 
Coercive System of Tragedy’, the orientation of Boal’s critique is apparent.
Boal carefully works through the elements of Aristotle’s poetics, and holds that 
pity and fear are what link the spectators to the protagonists. Yet against Aristotle, Boal 
contends that these are not the emotions to be purged as such, but are rather the bonds 
of identification between spectator and character that are instituted by drama. The
42 For a longer discussion o f  this aspect o f  Wedekind’s work, see Elizabeth Boa, The Sexual Circus: 
Wedekind’s Theatre o f  Subversion (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
43 Augusto Boal, Theater o f  the Oppressed, trans. by Charles A. & Maria-Odilia Leal McBride (London: 
Pluto Press, 1979), p. ix. All further references in this chapter will be given in the text.
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purgation that tragedy (and its concomitant catharsis) bring about is a corrective to be
applied to circumstances when one has failed in achieving the objectives of ‘health,
gregarious life in the State, happiness, virtue, justice, etc.’ (p. 27). Boal writes that
Aristotle accepts ‘as “just” the already existing inequalities’ (p. 23). Aristotle’s failure
is, for Boal, the failure to historicise the society that a drama both grows out of and
confronts. The purgation that would take place with the catharsis of a tragedy would be
the purgation of some ‘impurity’ that threatens the notion of the just -  Boal arrives at
this by arguing that what is purged is some impurity:
that threatens the individual’s equilibrium, and consequently that of 
society. Something that is not virtue, that is not the greatest virtue, justice.
And since all that is unjust is forseen in the laws, the impurity which the 
tragic process is destined to destroy is therefore something directed against 
the laws. (p. 32)
For Boal, Aristotle’s theatre proposes that maximum virtue is ‘obedience to the 
laws [and that] the art of tragedy intervenes to correct [any] failure’ (p. 32). His critique 
suggests a wider function for theatre as a tool of social control far beyond anything that 
Goldman contemplated. The elements of Boal’s critique that are useful to me highlight 
the inherited and problematic features of the dramatic form. Boal gives a synopsis of his 
vision of the class history of theatre as beginning with ‘free people’ and ‘the carnival’. 
Then:
the ruling classes took possession of the theater and built their dividing 
walls. First, they divided the people, separating actors from spectators: 
people who act and people who watch -  the party is over! Secondly, among 
the actors, they separated the protagonists from the mass. The coercive 
indoctrination began! (p. 119)
Boal’s answer to this is that ‘the walls must be tom down’ (p. 119). He seeks to disrupt
the accepted norms of theatrical presentation by challenging the division between
audience and performers -  his pedagogics are apparent in a different form, for he asserts
that ‘perhaps the theater is not revolutionary in itself; but have no doubts, it is a
rehearsal of revolution!’ (p. 155).
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Boal’s frontal assault on the basic tenets of Aristotelian drama is perhaps
surpassed by a yet more radical approach to theatre practice outlined in another essay in
Theatre o f  the Oppressed. In the essay ‘Poetics of the Oppressed’ Boal recounts his
‘experiments with the People’s Theater in Peru’ (p. 120), where he tried to put his
theoretical approaches into action. He argues that:
the bourgeois theater is the finished theater. The bourgeoisie already knows 
what the world is like, their world, and is able to present images of this 
complete, finished world. The bourgeoisie presents the spectacle. On the 
other hand, the proletariat and the oppressed classes do not know yet what 
their world will be like; consequently their theater will be the rehearsal, not 
the finished spectacle, (p. 142)
Although Boal’s position displays a militantly Marxist grasp of the dialectic that has 
already been observed in Brecht’s work, with the questionable reduction of the world 
into opposing poles of bourgeois and proletariat, his observation permits a reassessment 
of the politics of the already composed text. The implications of this, I would contend, 
are that regardless of the nature of the content of any given text, for a text-reader 
relationship to be instituted, the text has clearly to exist prior to the encounter with the 
reader. A reader, or in this case a theatre ‘spectator’, will always necessarily be in a 
relationship of posteriority to the text in question. While this is not to be taken to imply 
the existence of any necessary hierarchy (premised on chronological antecedence), it 
does have certain implications for the scope of any potential meanings or presentations 
that a reader or actor can produce from a particular text. Boal describes the practicalities 
of this as the Brazilian theatre scene of the 1950s and 60s struggled to offer 
presentations that were both attractive to the Brazilian public, and relevant to their 
concerns. Boal describes an environment in which the alternative to ‘good European 
theater’ was ‘Hellenic myths’ (p. 159-160) -  neither of which satisfied the demands of 
the theatre-going public. Hence, he writes, ‘the only recourse left to us was to utilize 
modem realist texts, even though they were written by foreign authors’ (p. 160). Yet 
despite this engagement with the work of, for example, Steinbeck, O’Casey or Brecht,
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now performed in a realistic fashion, the problems of finding a Brazilian theatre for a 
Brazilian people remained -  Boal writes that ‘if before our peasants were transformed 
into Frenchmen by our “deluxe actors,” now the Irish revolutionists were Brazilian 
villagers. The dichotomy continued, now inverted’ (p. 161).
For Boal the central issue is ‘to change the people -  “spectators,” passive beings 
in the theatrical phenomenon -  into subjects, into actors, transformers of the dramatic 
action’. To engineer an environment where this can take place means that ‘the liberated 
spectator, as a whole person, launches into action. No matter that the action is fictional; 
what matters is that it is action!’ (p. 122). This would then go beyond the boundaries of 
the theatre itself, for Boal wants to see ‘people reassume their protagonistic function in 
the theater and in society’ (p. 119). In order to achieve this, Boal takes the obvious yet 
hugely daring step of approaching the theatrical space without a text as such.
The scenario in which Boal describes this taking place is clearly far removed 
from the proscenium arch theatre that Europe has known for centuries, for his 
environment is peopled by ‘illiterates or semi-illiterates’, ‘peasants, workers or villagers 
[who] have quite likely never heard of theater and if they have heard of it, their 
conception of it will probably have been distorted by television’ (p. 126-127). Boal 
maps out what can best be described as a methodology, one which resembles what we 
might think of here as a workshop procedure. He outlines a series of ‘stages’ in a system 
that will transform ‘the spectator into actor’ (p. 126). Thus in the first two stages he 
describes a series of exercises for the participants in the ‘experiment’ (p. 127), exercises 
designed firstly to help to get ‘to know one’s body’ and secondly to gain expressiveness 
through the body (p. 126). But beyond the need to break complete novices gently into 
the world of theatre and performance, Boal goes on to propose in the third stage what he 
calls ‘the theater as language’. This, for him, is where ‘one begins to practice theater as 
a language that is living and present, not as a finished product displaying images from
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the past’ (p. 126). This stage of his plan comprises three ‘degrees’, those being 
‘simultaneous dramaturgy’, ‘image theater’ and ‘forum theater’. In essence the three 
signify the integration of the erstwhile ‘spectators’ in the process of the creation of the 
theatrical text. For example, simultaneous dramaturgy means, for Boal, that ‘the 
spectators “write” simultaneously with the acting of the actors’. With ‘image theater’ 
the spectators intervene with their bodies to contribute to the language of the text via 
corporeal images, and with ‘forum theater’, the spectators ‘intervene directly in the 
dramatic action and act’ (p. 126). The culmination of this methodology is the fourth 
stage, ‘theater as discourse’, where Boal anticipates ‘simple forms in which the 
spectator-actor creates “spectacles” according to his need to discuss certain themes or 
rehearse certain actions’ (p. 126). Boal, then, reconceptualises the role of the audience 
to such a degree that the very name ‘audience’ becomes inadequate. This is something 
that was clearly absent from both Goldman and Brecht’s approaches, but does not 
appear incompatible with them.
Boal goes on to describe workshop situations where the ‘actors’ have acted out
every possible scenario as suggested by the participants. The subject matters that Boal
mentions range from marital fidelity, to counter-insurgency violence by police, to
strikers confronting a local factory owner. Clearly the topics were of direct relevance to
the participants in the experiment, and validate Boal’s claims of rehearsing revolution:
The truth of the matter is that the spectator-actor practices a real act even 
though he does it in a fictional manner. While he rehearses throwing a 
bomb on stage, he is concretely rehearsing the way a bomb is thrown; 
acting out his attempt to organize a strike, he is concretely organizing a 
strike. Within its fictitious limits, the experience is a concrete one. (p. 141)
Boal’s theatre practice is certainly a long way from the culinary delights served 
up nightly under the bright lights of the West End and Broadway, but does that mean 
that traditional theatre has to be overthrown, abolished, replaced? He does not propose 
that his theatre should suddenly usurp the theatrical status quo to the exclusion of all
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else. Indeed, he recognises that what he is dealing with is ‘rehearsal-theater, and not a 
spectacle-theater. One knows how these experiments will begin but not how they will 
end, because the spectator is freed from his chains, finally acts, and becomes a 
protagonist’ (p. 142). Hence his conclusion -  ‘“spectator” is a bad word!’ (p. 154-155). 
What remains unstated in Boal’s work is what place there would be for the theatre of the 
spectacle in a transitional or post-revolutionary society. Indeed the fact that Boal 
identifies Aristotelian theatre as an instrument of social control would perhaps suggest 
that he would have little tolerance for it during times of social upheaval or revolutionary 
change. Nevertheless, Theatre o f the Oppressed does not lay out a plan for the abolition 
of bourgeois theatre: perhaps Boal would be content with seeding a revolutionary 
rehearsal-theatre that would eventually supplant the theatrical old guard.
It is clear, then, that Boal addresses a space that is entirely absent from 
Goldman’s considerations on the theatre, and that is the empty space of the theatre 
itself, without a text as such. Boal insisted that ‘the spectator no longer delegates power 
to the characters either to think or to act in his place. The spectator frees himself; he 
thinks and acts for himself! Theater is action!’ (p. 155). In opposition to this Goldman’s 
aspiration that the plays she reviewed would inspire the American intelligentsia to take 
up the cause of the American labouring masses seems curiously vanguardist and limited 
in scope.
Yet Goldman’s theatre criticism clearly exists on a spectrum that extends
towards Brecht and Boal. In commenting on one of the authors that Goldman considers,
Gerhart Hauptmann, Leroy Shaw gives a precis that sums up Goldman’s strategy:
the drama is to function as a kind of mirror which reflects the historical 
situation and at the same time gives back to the people who look into it a 
true image of themselves. The fictional world is drawn from the actual state 
of affairs and returned to it again so that the audience will recognize its 
own experience and be moved to do something about it.44
44 Leroy R. Shaw, The Playwright & Historical Change: Dramatic Strategies in Brecht, Hauptmann, 
Kaiser & Wedekind (Madison: University o f  Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. 37.
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As this chapter has shown, Brecht retains the notion of approaching a 
performance with a rehearsed text, but seeks to address the audience on entirely 
different terms, not only to move them to action but also to appeal to their reason. Boal, 
at the furthest end of the spectrum of radicality, abandons even the idea of an already 
existing text, and thus turns audience into co-scriptor. What distinguishes Goldman’s 
position from that of Northam, for example, is that her text does not exclude any of 
these radicalisations of its own position. Northam, by contrast, explicitly states that his 
critique will focus on the ‘growth of the play’s meaning from the first curtain to last’, 
and so makes a gesture that now looks extremely reactionary. Goldman relies on 
Aristotle by default, whereas Northam actively enlists him and therefore replicates what 
Boal sees as the ‘coercive system of tragedy’. By integrating the later insights of Brecht 
and Boal into the social orientation that Goldman insisted on in her drama criticism, the 
outline of an anarchist approach to the text starts to distinguish itself. In brief this 
includes not selecting a text on the basis of the perceived political affiliation of the 
author; not shying away from a pedagogical approach when one has a point of view to 
expound regarding the incessant struggle for justice within society (in fact Goldman 
sought this pedagogy through the content of the plays themselves, hoping that they 
would ‘speak for themselves’); and aspiring to produce a reaction in the theatre 
audience that continues once they leave the precinct of the theatre, in other words, 
conceiving of the audience not as a theatre audience but as fellow members of society, 
bearing the responsibility for the future direction of it. This last links in with the work of 
Brecht and Boal, allowing one to imagine new ways of collective theatrical production 
that might indeed lead to rehearsals of little revolutions.
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Playing Emma
By way of conclusion, then, I will attempt to use these brief points as a framework for 
producing a reading of my own of a number of plays that take Goldman herself as their 
subject. Martin Duberman’s text, Mother Earth: An Epic Drama o f Emma Goldman’s 
Life, turns out to be neither an epic (in the Brechtian sense) nor a drama, but rather a 
screenplay for television.45 While recognising that television is a distinct medium that 
will have its own grammar and would require a detailed critique of its own, it does 
throw an interesting light onto the discussion above about the relationship of the 
audience to the process of producing the text. In the preface to the text of his screenplay, 
Duberman recounts how the script was bom out of his enthusiasm and admiration both 
for Goldman herself and for what she represented. Ironically the production of the 
television play was shelved before it even commenced, apparently due to government 
cutbacks in public service broadcasting in the United States during Nixon’s presidency. 
The political decision to drop the play underlines the fact that there was going to be a 
certain message contained therein that was not agreeable to the Nixon administration. 
Yet if one concedes the potentially pedagogical nature of the piece on Goldman, can 
television be a suitable medium bearing in mind the issues previously examined? With 
the text of a television play hermetically sealed behind a glass screen, it would seem to 
offer little possibility for the audience to escape the traditional role of spectator. While 
Boal’s methodology should not be enshrined as the exclusive mode of revolutionary 
theatre practice, it does seem to highlight the potential that the theatre uniquely offers 
for the reader to become co-scriptor of the discourse.
Although Duberman claims that by the early seventies no one had put 
Goldman’s life on screen or on stage, in fact in 1974 the Canadian playwright Carol 
Bolt wrote a play entitled Red Emma, and by 1976 Howard Zinn had staged the first
45 Martin Duberman, Mother Earth: An Epic Drama o f  Emma G oldm an’s Life (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1991).
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production of his play Emma.46 Bolt’s play, in conventional terms, plays fast and loose
with the historical record of Goldman’s life: yet in so doing it does not reject the
reflectionist model of art for something more akin to Goldman’s own spirit. One
conspicuous example concerns Johann Most, the most prominent member of the New
York anarchist milieu at the time of Goldman’s arrival there and instigator of her entry
into the world of political activism and public speaking. The stage directions have Most
entering ‘carrying the banner o f anarchy -  a red flag is more exciting than the correct
black? 41 Indeed the introduction openly recognises this when it records that:
Carol Bolt does not think of her plays as documentaries nor is she 
necessarily interested in presenting a fair and true picture of events or 
persons. She has stated that she would rather be interesting than accurate 
and rather be one-sided than give a well-rounded viewpoint honed to 
dullness.48
This rather tendentious apologia would not be quite so problematic if the play itself 
succeeded in some area that was noticeably lacking in Goldman’s own life. Yet by any 
measure Goldman led an extremely colourful and dramatic life, and so the false binaries 
that the above quotation sets up, o f ‘interesting’ versus ‘accuracy’, or indeed ‘one-sided’ 
versus ‘dullness’, ring fundamentally hollow. Indeed they bring to mind the traditional 
binary of enjoyment and education upon which Brecht commented. By following 
Brecht’s refusal to allow instruction to be privileged over fun, one might conclude that 
there should be no reason why Bolt’s play could not be both accurate and interesting. It 
is, perhaps, a greater challenge, and one to which this play fails to rise.
The play brings together characters that never met, for example Goldman enters 
into several dialogues with Henry Clay Frick, the industrialist whom her then lover,
46 Carol Bolt, Buffalo Jump-Gabe-Red Emma (Toronto: Playwrights Co-op, 1976). Howard Zinn, Emma: 
A Play in Two Acts about Emma Goldman, American Anarchist (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 
1986).
47 This comment leaves me entirely baffled -  why should red be any more or less exciting than black? I 
personally find it dispiriting to turn up to a demonstration and find a sea o f identikit red flags -  while on 
the other hand a march that defiantly waves homemade black flags most certainly offers the prospect of  
more ‘excitement’. Bolt, Buffalo Jump-Gabe-Red Emma, p. 135.
48 Sandra Souchotte, ‘Introduction’, in Carol Bolt, Buffalo Jump-Gabe-Red Emma (Toronto: Playwrights 
Co-op, 1976), pp. 7-13 (p. 8).
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Alexander Berkman, attempted to assassinate. It seems to focus to an alarming degree
on the more sensational aspects of Goldman’s love-life, indeed political tensions
repeatedly give way to arguments over who is sleeping with whom. The play ends with
Goldman singing:
I know I can show you wonders
I can paint the flags I fly
I know dreamers can build castles
I know castles can have banners
I know dreams are going to flash across the sky.49
Here we are but one step away from castles in the air. In attempting to put a ‘Goldman’
onstage, Bolt’s play neither tries to hold up a true mirror (as Goldman herself might
have proposed) with its ‘fast and loose’ strategy, nor escapes Boal’s category of
spectacle-theatre. The audience is addressed firmly in its role as spectator, and thus this
play offers an image of Goldman that bears little relation to the nexus of ideas that the
name signifies. Although this laxity with regard to the historical record is not a problem
in and of itself, from an anarchist textual theory perspective (bearing in mind the sense
of pedagogics borrowed from Brecht) the play engages in this laxity for no apparent
purpose. It succeeds merely in belittling Goldman’s message.
Howard Zinn, on the other hand, approaches Goldman from an entirely
sympathetic political position which leads him to want to propagate her message. Zinn
is a radical historian who describes himself as someone who goes into the past ‘for the
purpose of trying to understand and do something about what is going on in the
present’.50 His play covers the period from Goldman’s arrival in New York to the time
just before her deportation, and thus focuses primarily on her American experiences.
The play, moreover, is largely faithful to the historical record of Goldman’s life, even
adopting at times an intertextual strategy of lifting text directly from her speeches and
publications. The play moves rapidly between various settings, and Zinn does not
49 Bolt, Buffalo Jump-Gabe-Red Emma, pp. 183-184.
50 Howard Zinn, Artists in Times o f  War (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), p. 39.
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hamper the potential of any production with overly specific stage directions or lighting 
requirements. Indeed there is an admirable degree of openness for any cast and director 
to make a production of the play their own.
Zinn swiftly establishes his protagonist and her motivations straight from the 
opening scene. Goldman is seen working in a garment factory with three other girls. 
The very first words go to the foreman, the voice of authority, who upbraids them for 
singing while they work. The girls are discussing the question of fire safety in the 
sweatshops where they toil, and the recent deaths that have occurred elsewhere. Finally 
Goldman confronts the foreman, and with the eventual backing of the other girls, who 
refuse to take her work on once she is sacked, she manages to convince him to open the 
back door of the factory as a fire escape. The scene encapsulates many aspects of 
Goldman’s life and sets the tone of the play with a sure touch -  in microcosm it presents 
the growing consciousness of collective strength gained from acting in union in the 
workplace, it questions authority, it notes the unequal division of labour between the 
genders, in fact it even appeals to human reason as the foreman himself realises that he 
too would die in the event of a fire. This is in marked contrast with Duberman’s factory 
scene, where Goldman is portrayed as an outsider to the workforce who ridicule her 
concerns and where she is seen asking the factory boss for a raise in order to afford 
flowers or books or the price of a concert ticket.
Despite Zinn’s greater sympathy for Goldman’s ideas, his dramatic strategy 
perhaps shares more in common with that of Bolt or Duberman. For example, the play 
unsettles the audience/spectacle division at times, with the potential for some of the 
action to take place in the auditorium. The proscenium arch division fades precisely at 
moments when someone is making a public speech -  the first example of this comes 
with Most’s initial appearance onstage, and part of the stage directions are as follows:
‘ There is a policeman on each side o f the stage, holding a club, in semi-darkness. I t ’s a
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long speech for the stage, and can only work i f  Most grips the audience \ 51 In a sense 
the stage directions are inviting the production to locate the theatre audience in the 
position of Most’s actual audience -  it could be said that Most’s character directly 
addresses the theatre audience. This happens several times in the play, for example 
when Goldman is portrayed addressing crowds in Union Square, New York, urging 
them to take food if they cannot afford to pay for it (again, another incident from her 
life). In this fashion the pedagogical message of Goldman’s life comes to be 
communicated directly to the audience of Zinn’s play, an audience which oscillates 
between being addressed as the audience of the play and being addressed as the 
audience of the speeches of nineteenth-century anarchists.
Yet despite this attempt to disrupt the traditional role of the theatre audience as 
passive spectator, Zinn’s play cannot be said to open a space for the audience to become 
the protagonist that Boal advocates. This is nowhere more evident than in the scene 
portraying Goldman on one of her lecture tours. The play scripts in voices that come 
from the auditorium, after Goldman has finished her speech and her manager (and 
lover) Reitman has asked for questions. Yet with Boal in mind, one can only wonder 
what would happen if the actual theatre audience were to start asking real questions of 
the actor playing Goldman. One of the speeches in this scene concerns Goldman’s 
agitation against the First World War. Zinn himself, in Artists in Times o f War, takes 
Goldman as one of his inspirations for his activism against the current war against the 
people of Iraq. Yet what would happen if, during a performance of this play, the theatre 
audience instigated an unscripted discussion about the rights and wrongs of the Iraq war 
of today, not just listened to a scripted debate about the rights and wrongs of the war of 
nearly a century ago? This would surely be the very thing that Boal would look for, with 
the aim of transforming an audience from passive spectators of a televised slaughter to
51 Zinn, Emma, p. 27.
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demonstrating actors taking action about it. It would be my contention that the 
intervention of the audience, and the production of a debate about our current situation, 
would be the desired product of a Goldman-inspired anarchist textual theory approach, 
rather than an audience listening politely through to the end of the show.
Emma Goldman’s theatre criticism leaves a mixed heritage. I would characterise 
it as being the first step on the path towards an anarchist theory of the text, a step that 
can only be built upon, and that offers greater radical potential when read against other 
theories of the text and of theatre. Utilising the later developments of Brecht and Boal, a 
rough outline of this theory would bear a number of concerns in mind when considering 
a text. In rejecting the objectivity/subjectivity binary, there would be no attempt to feign 
objectivity. This anarchist theory would have a clear (if fluid) agenda, and like 
Goldman, who struggled all her life against injustice and inequality, would seek to 
highlight the ‘sociorevolutionary’ aspects of texts under consideration, or the lack 
thereof, in order to advance the cause of freedom in all its forms. Following Goldman, 
and keeping Barthes’s ‘death of the author’ in mind, this theory would not limit itself to 
merely discussing works by authors who were perceived to be loosely anarchistic, or 
sympathetic fellow-travellers. If the status quo is not an option, then following 
Goldman, Brecht and Boal, an anarchist textual theory should not be embarrassed about 
its desire to achieve a reaction in the reader of any given text that would lead towards 
potential change in society. Within the realm of theatre, this means, as with Boal, that 
this critical approach would seek to transform spectators into actors.53 As with Brecht,
52 See Roland Barthes, ‘The Death o f  the Author’, trans. by Stephen Heath, in Modern Criticism and 
Theory: A Reader, ed. David Lodge (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 167-172.
531 am thinking particularly o f  John BlankenagePs alarmist 1953 note on the way in which Hauptmann’s 
The Weavers was originally employed in an agit-prop fashion in the United States. He seems much 
exercised by the fact that ‘certain groups and individuals regarded D ie Weber as a welcome means o f  
promoting agitation and stirring up trouble. In some localities communist and anarchist elements greeted 
performances o f  this drama with violent enthusiasm’. Blankenagel’s characterisation o f  the efforts o f  
Goldman and her one-time mentor Johann Most (who acted one o f the principal roles in an early 
production) was that these ‘agitators regarded the drama as an effective aid to their sinister efforts’. John 
C. Blankenagel, ‘Early Reception o f  Hauptmann’s Die Weber in the United States’, Modern Language 
Notes, 68 (1953), 334-340 (p. 335).
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the false binary of enjoyment/instruction should be rejected. Politics can be fun. 
Learning from what Goldman failed to consider, the form of a text’s construction is as 
significant as its putative content. Moreover this distinction offers greater possibilities 
to interrogate the manner in which a text addresses its reader.
These points could not be further from any notion of a manifesto. In elaborating 
them at this stage I hope to provide a basic framework with which to engage with the 
range of texts addressed in the following chapters. The single most salient feature, at 
this moment, is the tension between form and content. Content in the way that Goldman 
reads her plays refers primarily to the text, and in the theatrical environment, the spoken 
text. Derrida has noted that ‘the stage is theological for as long as it is dominated by 
speech, by a will to speech, by the layout of a primary logos which does not belong to 
the theatrical site and governs it from a distance’.54 He highlights the coercion that the 
‘author-creator’ exercises over the stage, and so an anarchist textual theory would 
follow Derrida in seeking to avoid producing yet more ‘interpretative slaves who 
faithfully execute the providential designs of the “master”’.55 In so doing, in looking 
beyond the ‘mere’ content of a play for its potential significance, in drawing in many 
other aspects of the play-text’s construction and aspects of its presentation, the 
form/content opposition begins to crumble as every feature of a theatre-going (textual) 
experience can potentially contribute to the production of meaning.
Each chapter that follows will explore and refine these points, contributing 
something of its own to a constellation of perspectives for which Emma Goldman has 
served as a fruitful, if perhaps necessarily ambivalent, inspiration.
54 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Theater o f  Cruelty and the Closure o f Representation’, in Writing and  
Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 232-250 (p. 235).
55 Derrida, ‘The Theatre o f  Cruelty’, p. 235.
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The Paradox of Pere Proudhon: 
The ‘Mystery’ of Authority
Can we not, then, men of common sense, while awaiting the solution which 
the future will undoubtedly bring forth, prepare ourselves for this great 
transition by an analysis of the struggling powers, as well as their positive 
and negative qualities? Such a work, performed with accuracy and 
conscientiousness, even though it should not lead us directly to the 
solution, would have at least the inestimable advantage of revealing to us 
the conditions of the problem, and thereby putting us on our guard against 
every form of utopia. (Pierre-Joseph Proudhon)1
In his 1994 article, ‘Counter-Community: An Aspect of Anarchist Political Culture’, 
Sharif Gemie recognises that ‘anarchist works were marked by a sense of urgency: their 
purpose was to rouse the ignorant and the apathetic to action, to show them the 
necessity of revolt’. Yet as Gemie notes, the ‘propagandist^ stress on polarization [in 
the texts] often had unexpected consequences’ for the ‘counter-communities’ that were 
‘supposed to provide a model of “anarchism in action’” , in that ‘anarchists were 
frequently unwilling to acknowledge or even to perceive the existence of oppressive 
practices within the designated group’. The question that I wish to pursue here is 
whether Gemie’s concerns can be transposed onto the particular functioning of the 
anarchist text -  can one identify ‘oppressive practices’ at the textual level? Gemie 
writes that ‘for many anarchist writers, clear, sharp polarization represented a type of 
ideal political situation, within which anarchism would begin to function as a 
commanding political force’. That this is still the case today can be seen by even a
1 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, System o f  Economical Contradictions: or, The Philosophy o f  Misery, trans. by 
Benjamin R. Tucker (Boston, MA: Benj. R. Tucker, 1888; repr. New York: Amo Press, 1972), p. 51. All 
further references in this chapter will be given in the text.
2 Gemie, ‘Counter-Community’, pp. 363-364.
3 Gemie, ‘Counter-Community’, p. 364.
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cursory glance at, for example, the following statement on the first page of the website
of the Anarchist Federation:
We see today's society as being divided into two main opposing classes: the 
ruling class which controls all the power and wealth, and the working class 
which the rulers exploit to maintain this. By racism, sexism and other 
forms of oppression, as well as war and environmental destruction the 
rulers weaken and divide us. Only the direct action of working class people 
can defeat these attacks and ultimately overthrow capitalism.4
There is a wealth of criticisms that could be levelled at this one small piece of text,
indeed in some readings it would appear closer to an orthodox (if updated) Marxism
than anarchism, and its binary opposition of rulers/working class would seem to leave
no space for peasant, nomadic or indigenous societies. Nevertheless, the salient feature
here is that although coming from a group that denominates itself as anarchist, the text
attempts to govern its own meaning, and not only by offering a reductive Manichaean
analysis of society. When the text states that ‘only the direct action of working class
people’ can ‘overthrow capitalism’, it dramatically imposes its own criteria on who is
entitled or ought to participate in any liberation. Formally the text assumes the authority
to impose the terms on any future revolutionary experience, and moreover its textual
construction fails to make any acknowledgement of this. If the Anarchist Federation
maintains that it ‘aims to abolish Capitalism and all oppression to create a free and
equal society’ then the form/content dichotomy that its text displays returns to the centre
of the discussion, this time in the guise of interpretative freedom and the question of the
equality of the reader and the text with regard to the production of meaning.5
Having established in the previous chapter the instability of this form/content
dichotomy, the next three chapters will function as a demonstration of the crumbling of
that dichotomy, focused specifically around the rhetorical figure of authority. Already it
can be seen that there is potentially a tension between authoritarian language in a given
4 ‘Aims and Principles’, Anarchist Federation, available online at 
<http://flag.blackened.net/af/aims.html>.
5 ‘Aims and Principles’, Anarchist Federation.
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text and its putatively libertarian objective. My concern will be to examine how the 
workings of authority might be identifiable within anarchist texts, and to what degree 
that authority is in conflict with what might be supposed to be the spirit of the text itself. 
Beyond that, the question then becomes whether a text can be said to enjoy any partial 
degree of success in relation to its libertarian ends despite the identification of a 
potentially contradictory mode of address.
Fathering Anarchism
There is one figure, then, who is generally thought of as standing at the beginning of a 
self-consciously anarchist body of theory. That figure is Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the 
man who coined such challenging and inspirational aphorisms as ‘God is evil’ and 
‘property is theft’, widely regarded as the ‘father’ of the anarchist movement.6 Even 
Bakunin, apparently without irony, wrote that ‘Proudhon is the master of us all’.7 
Proudhon was bom in the east of France, in Besan9on, in 1809.8 Living in a period 
between the French Revolution and the Paris Commune, John Ehrenberg suggests that 
while he was ‘one of the nineteenth century’s most prominent social theorists,’ he was 
‘trying to understand the new with theoretical tools partly inherited from an earlier 
period’.9 The focus of Proudhon’s work moved during his lifetime, from a defence of 
his original class, the petty bourgeoisie, to a broader and more militant anarchism, and 
then towards a mutualism and emphasis on contract as a solution to France’s economic 
woes. Ever since the publication of Proudhon’s first essay, Ehrenberg holds that ‘a clear 
and unwavering commitment to equality of conditions rested at the heart of everything
6 See for example L. Gambone, Proudhon and Anarchism (London: Red Lion Press, 1996), available 
online at <http://flag.blackened.net/liberty/proudanar.html>.
7 Cited by Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 236.
8 For an account o f  Proudhon’s life, see George Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: A Biography
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1987) and Edward Hyams, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: His Revolutionary 
Life, M ind and Works (London: John Murray, 1979). For the historical background to his life, see John 
Ehrenberg, Proudhon and His Age (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996). For a discussion o f his thought, 
see Robert L. Hoffman, The Social and Political Theory ofP.-J. Proudhon (Ann Arbor, MI: University 
Microfilms Inc., 1968).
9 Ehrenberg, Proudhon and His Age, p. 1, p. 2.
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Proudhon tried to do for the rest of his life’.10 He is certainly the first person to be
credited with calling himself an anarchist as a positive denomination of a political
persuasion.11 In his 1840 text, What is Property?, Proudhon describes the following
conversation with an imaginary interlocutor:
‘But,’ as some of my younger readers may protest, ‘you are a republican.’ -  
Republican, yes, but this word defines nothing. Res publica; this is, the 
public thing. Now, whoever is concerned with public affairs, under 
whatever form of government, may call himself a republican. Even kings 
are republicans. ‘Well, then, are you a democrat?’ -  No. -  ‘What! You are 
a monarchist?’ -  No. -  ‘A constitutionalist?’ -  God forbid. -  ‘You are then 
an aristocrat?’ -  Not at all. -  ‘You want a mixed government?’ -  Still less.
19-  ‘So then what are you?’ I am an anarchist.
Robert Graham suggests that up until then ‘the word “anarchist” had been exclusively 
used as a derogatory epithet to be flung at one’s political opponents. Proudhon was the 
first person to adopt the label with enthusiasm’. Nevertheless, Hoffman claims that 
despite anarchism’s ‘negative sense of opposition to all forms of government’, it is ‘also 
a positive theory of how an ideal society is to be achieved in the virtual or total absence 
of government’.14 Whether Hoffman’s claim is in fact sustainable is a matter for a 
different discussion, but I will now turn to the work of Proudhon to examine what 
‘positive theory’ may be found therein.
To approach the question of what form authority might take within Proudhon’s 
work it is useful to start with one of his later texts in which he addresses the concept 
itself. The 1851 text, General Idea o f the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, was 
written while Proudhon was serving a three-year prison sentence for printing an article
10 Ehrenberg, Proudhon and His A ge, p. 47.
11 Hoffman writes that ‘although there were earlier anarchists or near anarchists, most notably William 
Godwin, they had little or no influence on the movement when it developed. [ ...]  Proudhon’s role has 
been very different: not only have anarchists learned much directly from his work, or from precis o f it, 
but the scope o f  his thought is so broad that they have been able to say little that he has not already 
discussed thoroughly, except in their venting o f negative and destructive impulses.’ Hoffman, The Social 
and Political Theory ofP.-J. Proudhon, p. 13.
12 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property?, trans. and ed. by Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 204-205. All further references in this chapter will 
be given in the text.
13 Robert Graham, ‘Introduction to the 1989 Edition’, in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, General Idea o f  the 
Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, trans. by John Beverley Robinson (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 
pp.vii-xxxix (p. viii).
Hoffman, The Social and Political Theory ofP.-J. Proudhon, p. 13.
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ridiculing the then newly elected president of France, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. It was 
composed as a reflection on the 1848 February revolution and consists of seven 
‘studies’, the fourth of which is titled ‘The Principle of Authority’. Proudhon entertains 
clear ideas about the direction that human society is taking, ideas that are based on a 
notion of evolutionary origins and subsequent development. The text begins by arguing 
that ‘negation is the preliminary requirement to affirmation. All progress begins by 
abolishing something; every reform rests upon denunciation of some abuse; each new 
idea is based upon the proved insufficiency of the old idea’. 15 Following this 
developmental framework, it suggests that these ideas should be seen as of a piece with 
the great leaps forward in thought that were variously achieved by Christianity in 
asserting monotheism over polytheism; by Luther in asserting the ‘authority of reason’ 
over the authority of the church; and by the ‘revolutionaries of ’89, in denying the 
sufficiency of feudal rule’ (p. 101). Proudhon’s task, as he saw it then, was to elucidate 
what the revolutionaries of ’89 had sought, that is to say to demonstrate the 
‘illegitimacy and powerlessness of government as a principle of order’ (p. 101). Order, 
the text suggests, is the first priority for an emancipated people -  ‘What do the people 
do when they proclaim their own sovereignty [...]? They say to themselves: Before 
everything else, order is necessary in society’ (p. 109).16
At this point it can be noted that the text does not appear to problematise the 
logic of substitution -  by replacing the rule of government with the rule of reason the
I *7
commanding structure is left in place. The authority of this structure is something that 
the text seems to want to claim, for while it rejects government as order, it wants to
15 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, General Idea o f  the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, trans. by John 
Beverley Robinson (London: Pluto Press, 1989), p. 101. All further references in this chapter will be 
given in the text.
16 Noland notes how the question o f  order was evident in Proudhon’s work from his first publication (The 
Utility o f  the Celebration o f  Sunday as Regards Hygiene, Morality and Social and Political Relations), 
where he framed the problem thus: ‘to find a state o f social equality [ ...]  characterized by liberty in order 
and independence in unity’. Aaron Noland, ‘Proudhon and Rousseau’, Journal o f  the History o f  Ideas, 28 
(1967), 33-54 (pp. 35-36).
17 For a greater discussion o f  the logic o f  substitution in anarchist thought, see Newman, ‘Derrida’s 
Deconstruction o f Authority’. See also my comments on this article above in chapter one.
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allow order to govern. Indeed, Proudhon’s valorisation of Luther’s assertion of ‘the 
authority of reason’ over the ‘authority of the church’ would appear to embrace the 
inversion of an opposition as long as the preferred term finds itself in the ascendancy, 
leaving the binarism unexamined. This becomes more troublesome when Proudhon (in 
responding to the intervention of a contemporary who had suggested that authority 
could be abolished through the simplification of government) argues, some pages 
further on, that:
Authority is to government what the thought is to the word, the idea to the 
fact, the soul to the body. Authority is government in principle, as 
government is authority in practice. To abolish either, if it is a real abolition, 
is to abolish both. By the same token, to preserve one or the other, if the 
preservation is effective, is to keep both. (p. 104)
It should be noted that in offering this definition, the text does not employ any
qualifications or restrictions on the notion of authority (or of government). While the
citation appears to demonstrate the rigidity of Proudhon’s binarism as mentioned above,
it also seems exclusively to link authority to government, and vice versa. This then
leaves no textual room for Proudhon’s previous enthusiastic affirmation of the
‘authority of reason’ -  with an unrestricted rejection of authority here, the attempt to
erect an authority or government of reason falls at the first hurdle.
In pursuing this developmental model, the text makes a comparison that is rather
telling. It argues that:
It is with ideas as with machines. No one knows the inventor of the first 
tools, the hoe, the rake, the axe, the wagon, the plough. These are found 
among all the nations of the globe from the earliest antiquity. But this 
spontaneity is not found with perfected instruments, the locomotive, the 
daguerreotype, the art of ballooning, the electric telegraph. The finger of 
God, if I may venture to say so, is no longer there [...]. (p. 101)
Thus, for Proudhon, human progress weakens the bond with the ‘immediate intuition’
that provided the first tools. This is a progress that leads away from the divine creator
that first placed humankind on earth. The development of human life has meant that
‘common sense’ is no longer adequate to provide for our needs, and so ‘all nations have
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produced and organized by themselves, without the aid of teachers, the ideas of 
authority, of property, of government, of justice, of worship’ (p. 102). Government, 
then, ‘presents itself as the absolute, necessary, sine qua non condition of order’ (p. 
129). The text reasons that this logic would hold that ‘the stronger the Government, the 
nearer order approaches perfection,’ and that the two are in a relation of ‘cause and 
effect: the cause is GOVERNMENT, the effect is Order’ (p. 129). The text rejects this 
faulty logic, though, on the grounds that order is the primary goal of society. Hence 
‘ORDER is the genus: Government is the species’ (p. 129).
This distancing from a divine origin and the subsequently mistaken direction 
taken by human thought would seem to point exclusively towards an ever-increasing 
worldly perdition, proportionate with the increase in human knowledge. The text traces 
out the various stages through which human organisation has evolved, and Noland 
suggests that Proudhon thought the reliance on God, religion and government ‘belonged 
to the childhood period of mankind’.18 The text maintains that the origin of authority is 
to be found not in the relationship of the divine to the human, but in the family. Arguing 
that ‘the governmental idea sprang from family customs and domestic experience’, 
Proudhon imagines that there was no protest at this hypothesized first government 
because ‘Government seemed as natural to Society as the subordination of children to 
their father’ (p. 106). Moreover in responding to Rousseau Proudhon remarks that 
authority’s ‘proper sphere is the family,’ and that it ‘is a mystical principle, anterior and 
superior to the will of the parties interested, of the father and mother, as well as of the 
children’ (p. 136). Within the text there is no debate as regards the legitimacy of 
authority within the family, nor is there any questioning of the foundation of this 
authority -  at a stroke Proudhon asserts that ‘authority imposes itself by generation’ and 
consequently establishes a putatively natural gerontocracy (p. 137).
18 Noland, ‘Proudhon and Rousseau’, p. 41.
60
At the moment of instituting the first government, Proudhon seems to suggest 
(as highlighted above) that there would be no perceived conflict between the interests of 
the governed and the governors, as the familial model would seem so ‘natural’. Yet he 
makes an absolute distinction between the family and society (to be considered below) 
which means that the two models are neither compatible nor interchangeable. Proudhon 
argues that in the family model authority would be absolute, and so the first 
manifestation of the principle of authority would be one of ‘absolute power’ (p. 128). 
Yet the attempt to translate this gerontocracy into public life leads to error, for those 
‘who take the family as the rudiments of Society’ will ‘arrive at a dictatorship, which is 
the most exaggerated form of government’ (p. 106). This ‘absolute power,’ the text 
contends, in a curious reversal of its logic, is ‘odious to reason and to liberty,’ and so 
‘the principle of authority is forced to retire: it retires step by step, by a series of 
concessions, each one more insufficient than the other’ (p. 128). The progression, as the 
text characterises it, is one from ‘absolutism’ to ‘anarchy’ (p. 128). Proudhon hails an 
‘Historic evolution leading Humanity inevitably to a new system’ (p. 126).
As a result, the translocation of familial authority to the governmental sphere (to 
guarantee order to a developing and complexifying society) is not condemned to be an 
irrevocable march towards tyranny. In Proudhon’s view the ideas of authority, property, 
and government are but an intellectual cul-de-sac, ideas that ‘are growing weaker’, and 
whose ‘insufficiency’ has been established ‘at the bar of reason’. For him, ‘the question 
is for us to discover, through science, what substitute we can find for ideas which, 
according to the verdict of science, are condemned as false and injurious’ (p. 102). 
Proudhon’s invocation of science, though, prompts a different question: does science 
come to provide an alternative authority by which Proudhon rejects the ‘false and 
injurious’ familial authority that he identifies in the state?
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In constructing a text to confront the social and economic iniquities of his day, it
is clear that Proudhon relied on several a priori foundations for his theory, and science
was not the least among them. From the opening of his major work, System o f
Economical Contradictions or, The Philosophy o f Misery, this science would indeed
appear to fulfil Hoffman’s notion of a ‘positive theory’. Published in 1846, the first
chapter begins with the bold declaration ‘I affirm the reality of an economic science’.19
From there the text continues in the following vein:
I affirm, on the other hand, the absolute certainty as well as the progressive 
nature of economic science, of all the sciences in my opinion the most 
comprehensive, the purest, the best supported by facts: a new proposition, 
which alters this science into logic or metaphysics in concrete, and 
radically changes the basis of ancient philosophy. In other words, economic 
science is to me the objective form and realization of metaphysics, (p. 43)
Nevertheless, despite this confident assertion of the objectivity of economic science,
within a few pages the text is already offering a basis from which to temper the
stridency of the first pronouncement. It sets up an opposition between two ‘powers’, as
Proudhon calls them, ‘political economy’ and ‘socialism’, and argues that political
economy merely explicates what is and bases its authority in the world as it finds it,
while socialism is utopian and ‘makes vigorous efforts to reconstruct social economy
from top to bottom’ (pp. 45, 47). For Ehrenberg, ‘Proudhon’s entire approach was now
based on his explicit desire to stand between political economy and socialism’.20
Proudhon’s System seeks to ground economics objectively, and so to solve the problems
about which socialism complains without resorting to its utopianism. The text
acknowledges that the two ‘pursue the same end,’ those being ‘liberty, order, and well-
being’ (p. 52). Yet in considering the competing claims of each of these ‘powers’ the
text defines them in relation to the already existing world, and not in transcendental
terms -  ‘socialism affirms the irregularity of the present constitution of society,’ and it
‘asserts, and proves, that the order of civilization is artificial, contradictory, inadequate;
19 Proudhon, System o f  Economical Contradictions, p. 43.
20 Ehrenberg, Proudhon and His Age, p. 72.
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that it engenders oppression, misery, and crime’ (p. 46). Given that he has already
described political economy as ‘a collection of the observations thus far made’ (p. 45), it
can be seen that in spite of his desire to institutionalise economics as an objective
science, it has been presented in negative (or differential) rather than absolute terms.
Ehrenberg comments that:
If Proudhon had been abstracting from history or human relations he might 
still have been able to analyze real life with some measure of accuracy; but 
because the categories of political economy were now timeless and eternal, 
he was left with a set of propositions which only betrayed his own 
confusion because they were little more than emanations of his own 
mind.21
The new objective science that Proudhon boldly announces is in fact contingent on the 
existing order, deriving a differential significance in contradistinction to it. In defining 
what he takes to be his chosen target, the text seems to fight shy of bestowing upon it 
even a fictitious transcendentality. When it argues that political economy claims its 
authority as ‘the authority of the human race, the strongest authority possible’ (p. 46), it 
is clear that it refuses political economy any objective foundation, but allowing rather a 
foundation firmly rooted in the world of human subjects. What is more, it again defines 
socialism in opposition to the transcendental when it states that socialists ‘reject 
authority and faith’ (p. 47). Yet if Proudhon rejects authority, what is it exactly that he 
feels he is rejecting? And can this be said to contradict the manner in which he 
formulates his text?
Contracting Readers
Within this reading it can be seen that Proudhon’s argument invokes a number of a 
priori foundations such as order (while simultaneously arguing that government is 
incapable of guaranteeing this order to the people) and the objectivity of science. 
Proudhon, though, is not averse to condemning this rhetorical tactic in others. In
21 Ehrenberg, Proudhon and His Age, p. 72.
63
General Idea o f the Revolution the first half of the fourth study goes to some lengths to
rebut Rousseau’s social contract.22 At one particular point, Proudhon identifies an a
priori in Rousseau’s work, which he lambastes in the following terms:
Rousseau is so far from desiring that any mention should be made in the 
social contract of the principles and laws which rule the fortunes of nations 
and of individuals, that, in his demagogue’s programme, as well as in his 
Treatise on Education, he starts with the false, thievish, murderous 
supposition that only the individual is good, that society depraves him, [and] 
that man therefore should refrain as much as possible from all relations with 
his fellows, (p. 117)
While it would be a matter of individual opinion whether Proudhon’s a priori was as 
‘false, thievish [and] murderous’ as Rousseau’s, the point here is that he employs the 
same tactic by founding his critique on order, without any discussion of this 
‘supposition’. This quotation, though, also points to the reasons why Proudhon so 
clearly distinguished the familial from the social, and why order could not be derived 
(via government) from a familial model. This distinction is evident from the reference to 
‘the fortunes of nations and of individuals’. Proudhon differentiates the familial from 
the societal on the grounds of economics, for the social is considered as an economic 
relationship between individuals, whereas the family is simply natural. This is where 
Proudhon bases his rejection of Rousseau’s concept of the social contract, for it ‘speaks 
of political rights only; it does not mention economic rights’ (p. 119). Indeed for 
Proudhon the ‘political idea and the economic idea’ were ‘a clear antithesis’ (p. 127). In 
this analysis, Rousseau’s social contract ‘teaches us that the people, a collective being, 
has no unitary existence’ (p. 119) and therefore conflicts with his notion of what a 
contract really is:
What characterizes the contract is the agreement for equal exchange; and it is 
by virtue of this agreement that liberty and well being increase; while by the 
establishment of authority, both of these necessarily diminish. This will be 
evident if we reflect that contract is the act whereby two or several 
individuals agree to organize among themselves, for a definite purpose and 
time, that industrial power which we have called exchange, (p. 113)
22 For a lengthier discussion o f  Proudhon’s ambivalent relationship to Rousseau, see Noland, ‘Proudhon 
and Rousseau’.
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Thus for Proudhon, as Robert Graham suggests, ‘only those obligations which the 
individual himself has freely assumed have any binding force’. ‘Economic criticism,’ 
writes Proudhon, will show ‘that political institutions must be lost in industrial 
organisation’ (p. 126).
Yet to turn the focus to the issue of authority within the text, which raises the 
issue of the relationship of the reader to Proudhon’s text, the question becomes one, in 
Graham’s terms, of what relationship the reader can meaningfully be said to have 
‘freely’ entered into with the text. Indeed Graham writes of ‘obligations’, though it is 
necessary to ask in what sense a reader can be said to have obligations to a text, or be 
said to enter into a ‘contract’ with the text. These are the questions that I would now 
like to pose to Proudhon’s texts, in the light of the above considerations of his theories 
of authority. To recapitulate, it has been seen that Proudhon admits of the authority of 
reason, deploys the presupposition of ‘order’ as an a priori foundation for his arguments 
(despite criticising Rousseau for precisely the same thing), maintains that the family is 
the proper sphere of authority (where it would be unquestionable), and proposes that 
liberty would be achieved from a re-ordering of the economic relations in society, by a 
revision of the concept of contract. This leads me to the question of how these concerns 
can be brought to bear on the text-reader relationship and what impact they would have 
on the freedom of the reader.
Firstly, Proudhon’s use of the concept of ‘the authority of reason’ and his 
enthusiasm for ‘science’ may not be as inflexibly positivist as they initially seem. 
Proudhon calls the authority of reason ‘the eternal, positive idea, substituted by the 
Reformation for the authority of faith’ (p. 111). This is not to premise authority on an 
objective sense of reason that would be automatically external to any one individual 
through which it would acquire a similar degree of transcendental significance as faith.
23 Graham, ‘Introduction to the 1989 Edition’, in Proudhon, General Idea, p. xx.
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Proudhon defines it as ‘an agreement between intuition and experience’ (p. 111). Both
terms of his definition, though, are immediately intelligible within a Saussurean system
of differences, and so fail to bestow transcendentality on reason. In failing to acquire the
status of what Saussure calls ‘positive terms’, intuition and experience become textual
in Derrida’s sense where ‘there is nothing outside of the text’.24 This notion of the
differential nature of meaning had already been raised in General Idea, when in the
second study Proudhon wrote that ‘it is by contrast with error that truth impresses itself
upon the understanding’ (p. 59). The important point here is that although the text
entertains a notion of external truth, its particular truth is only known by ‘contrast with
error,’ and indeed it is only an ‘impression’ of truth that is actually left. This was also
the case in What is Property?, Proudhon’s second major work which was published in
1840, some eleven years before General Idea. The text takes issue with ‘external
axioms,’ and Proudhon suggests that the law-makers ‘have always followed the
principle, adapted from the theologians, that what is universally, in all places, and at all
times accepted is unquestionably true [...] as if a general but spontaneous opinion
offered anything more than an appearance of truth’ (p. 81). The text clearly rejects an
existing notion of truth on the grounds that it is a mere acceptance of an appearance. It
continues by arguing that:
the opinion of all peoples may confirm the perception of a fact, the vague 
sense of a law; but it can teach us nothing about either fact or law. [...] 
Behind the appearance the truth remains hidden; faith may accept it, but only 
well-founded reflection can know. (p. 81)
Again, the crucial point here is that although there may be a ‘hidden truth’, it can only
be comprehended through ‘well-founded reflection’, rather than being an external
absolute that imposes itself in its transcendentality, what Derrida calls ‘a signified
outside the text’.25 From this it may be concluded that while Proudhon’s ‘authority of
24 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Roy Harris, ed. by Charles Bally and 
Albert Sechehaye (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 118. Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 158.
25 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 158.
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reason’ initially appears as a bold re-instatement of a concept of authority, on closer 
inspection his rejection of external truths and his locating of reason within the 
epistemological sphere of the individual undermine such a view and suggest a textual 
reading of the world, not one anchored in objective truths.
Proudhon’s language at times supports this latent textuality, for he elsewhere 
describes government as ‘always man giving orders to man, the fiction which makes an 
end of liberty; brute force which cuts questions short, in the place of justice, which 
alone can answer them’ (<General Idea, p. 126, my emphasis). General Idea o f the 
Revolution does not therefore exclude the sense of a textual world, indeed it could be 
said that Proudhon contemplates a materially textual world, for he wryly describes the 
proliferation of laws as falling ‘like hail upon the unfortunate people. After a time the 
political ground will be covered with a layer of paper, which the geologists will put 
down among the vicissitudes of the earth as the papyraceous formation’ (p. 132).
So if Proudhon’s textual world offers a paper surface to walk upon, how does 
this world attempt to construct a subject position for the reader? It has been seen already 
how, in the opening of System o f  Economical Contradictions, the text announces its 
project of launching an economic science in an authoritarian fashion, by invoking the 
authority of science to reinforce its argument. This manner of investing the authorial 
voice with a hidden authority is evident elsewhere in Proudhon’s work. For example in 
General Idea the text premises certain observations on a homogeneous concept of ‘the 
people’, without tempering this premise with any considerations of the reductive nature 
of the gesture -  ‘the reasoning of the masses is built upon this idea [progress]. The 
people is neither optimistic nor pessimistic; it admits the absolute not at all’ (p. 41). 
Later the text describes the people being ‘not at all utopian [...] they have no faith in the 
Absolute, and they reject every a priori system, as deadly in its nature’ (p. 76). This 
rhetorical strategy finds an even more provocative shape in What is Property?, where
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the text insists that ‘all men attest these truths [that property and theft are synonyms] in 
their heart, I say; it remains only for them to understand them’ (p. 16). Here the text has 
reached the questionable extremity of constructing a straw people, and then diagnosing 
what lies in their hearts, even while it admits that they themselves do not recognise this 
diagnosis. What is at stake here, is not so much the issue of presenting a ‘positive 
theory’, but rather the anterior movement of silently claiming the authority to articulate 
such a theory. The logic, though, of this authorial position for Proudhon, following the 
contours of his own arguments as laid out above, would surely be to locate him in a 
position of author-as-father. By employing an unquestioned authority to ground his 
arguments, Proudhon seems to encapsulate the very essence of what Barthes was 
criticising when he claimed that ‘the Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to 
say that he exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of 
antecedence to his work as a father to his child’. By failing to question the premises 
behind their arguments, the logic of Proudhon’s own texts locate the text-reader 
relationship in the realm of the familial, not the economic, and so the reader is offered a 
locus corresponding to that of the child within the nuclear family that Proudhon sees as 
the ‘natural’ sphere of authority. This is further complicated by the corresponding 
proprietorial relationship -  Proudhon emerges as author/owner of the text and the text is 
vulnerable to the use and abuse that the ‘author’ may see fit to inflict upon it, rather than 
permit those who productively engage with the text (the readers) to reap the benefit of 
that work (the reading process).
But it is precisely the anarchism derived from Proudhon’s texts, and his rejection 
of authority, that eschews familial authority as congruent with an ordered society. The 
challenge, then, for the remainder of this chapter is to explode what I will argue is the 
‘fiction’, as Proudhon called government, of any authority over the text. I will use both
26 Barthes, ‘The Death o f  the Author’, p. 170.
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a critique informed by the very terms of Proudhon’s own texts, before then examining 
what remains, in order to attempt to formulate aspects of a theory of cultural criticism in 
the light of these considerations.
Proudhon the Proprietor
Amy Wiese Forbes has written on Proudhon’s use of satire as a textual strategy. Setting 
Proudhon’s work in the context of 1830s republican politics in France, she argues that 
‘drawing audiences into a joke and involving them in politics by inviting them to 
unravel satire’s humour set up a model of popular participation’. Proudhon ‘the great 
scientist was also a great satirist,’ she maintains.27 But what Forbes sees as a rhetorical 
strategy, I would like to suggest can also be read as a deconstructive strategy, working 
from within the text towards the limits of its own self-imposed logic, to the point where 
that logic finally collapses. For example, in General Idea o f the Revolution in the 
Nineteenth Century Proudhon addresses his ‘First Study,’ titled ‘Reaction Causes 
Revolution,’ to the reactionaries (as he calls them), whom he sees as impeding the 
progress of the February revolution of 1848. In an acerbic attack on the position of the 
reactionaries, Proudhon offers ‘an outline of the policy and of the measures for 
organization and repression which the reaction must adopt in order to carry out what it 
has undertaken, i f  it wants to be logical and to follow its fortune to the end  (p. 36, my 
emphasis). This outline, that Proudhon so deceptively offers, amounts to ‘[suppressing] 
the whole representative system’ (p. 34), and includes a seven-point plan which takes in 
an unlimited state of general siege, mass deportations, huge increases in army and 
police numbers, enforced separation of tightly structured guilds, book-buming and 
astronomical tax rises. This, he continues, ‘will be necessary, if you [the reactionaries] 
expect your work to stand’ (p. 35). Proudhon ironically prophesises that these measures
27 Amy Wiese Forbes, ‘“Let’s Add the Stomach”: Satire, Absurdity, and July Monarchy Politics in 
Proudhon’s What is Property?', French Historical Studies, 24 (2001), 679-705 (pp. 680, 681).
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will herald a ‘social regeneration which carries civilization back to the fourteenth 
century, and restores feudalism, with the aid of the new elements furnished by the 
modem spirit and by experience of revolutions’ (p. 36). As Forbes notes, Proudhon 
‘used seemingly absurd rhetoric himself to expose the faulty reasoning of some of the 
most respected thinkers of the day’.
Here Proudhon takes the logic of the reaction and forces it to its extreme, 
offering a tyrannical vision so horrific that it becomes untenable, one that is beyond the 
very bounds of possibility. He challenges the reactionaries with a taunting question: 
‘Are you able to attempt even the first of these indispensable measures, from which a 
single omission will plunge you into the abyss?’ The conclusion, then, for him, is 
simple: ‘No, you can do nothing, you can dare nothing, royalists, imperialists, 
bancocrats, Malthusians, Jesuits, who have used and abused force against ideas’ (p. 37).
Where Proudhon seems to diverge from what might be thought of as a 
deconstructive strategy is in applying this questioning to his own position. Proudhon, as 
Kelly and Smith explain in the introduction to What is Property?, ‘was anxious that he 
should furnish absolute and incontrovertible “proof’ of his arguments’.29 As Marshall 
notes, he ‘hoped that the discovery of these laws [of development] would turn politics
TOand economics into a science’. Proudhon concludes his General Idea arguing that 
progress, revolution and reason ‘are the laws of necessity itself. No man has made them: 
nobody forces them upon you. They have little by little been discovered, and I exist 
only to bear witness of them’ (pp. 294-295). That this approach would leave Proudhon 
in the somewhat envious position of prophet-of-revealed-truth seems only strengthened 
by his opening remarks in System o f  Economical Contradictions. In the introduction, 
while explaining how, for him, God has become ‘a necessary dialectical tool’ (p. 2), he
28 Forbes, ‘“Let’s Add the Stomach”’, p. 683.
29 Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith, ‘Introduction’, in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property?, 
trans. and ed. by Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
pp. xi-xxxiii (p. xxviii).
0 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 242.
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contends that ‘if humanity needs an author, God and the gods equally need a revealer’ 
(p. 7). The direction that these words seem to be taking is then confirmed some pages 
later when he writes that ‘God inspires, an Academy questions,’ and that he is ‘one of 
the prophets who attempt to answer’ (p. 39).
Now Proudhon-as-prophet will clearly only compound the problems of 
Proudhon-as-father-of-the-text, in terms of opening up the discursive spaces necessary 
to produce an anti-authoritarianism. Yet a careful distinction needs to be introduced 
here with regard to the means and ends of Proudhon’s work. Although Proudhon’s texts 
construct an author position of prophet (or father), the certainty implied by this position 
would correspond to the methodology employed. This is to say that Proudhon insists on 
a certainty for his methods, the ‘science’ that will work towards revealing the unfolding 
of a certain destiny. What that destiny will in fact be is something that the texts make no 
claim to foresee. This parallels his relationship to an external truth as discussed above -  
for example, he sees society as divided ‘into two great parties’. On the one hand there is 
‘property’ (his shorthand for everything that is ‘traditional and essentially hierarchical’) 
and on the other ‘socialism’, which is ‘anarchical and atheistic; that is, rebellious 
against all authority, human and divine’ (System, p. 51). For Proudhon, ‘modem 
civilisation has demonstrated that in a conflict of this nature the truth is found, not in the 
exclusion of one of the opposites, but wholly and solely in the reconciliation of the two’ 
(p. 51). Once more, truth is not an absolute value which vanquishes all before it, but is 
differential. Moreover, Proudhon asks if he and his readers can not, ‘while awaiting the 
solution which the future will undoubtedly bring forth, prepare ourselves for this great 
transition by an analysis of the struggling powers, as well as their positive and negative 
qualities?’ (p. 51).
Hence the careful distinction that I am proposing here between the means (an 
objective science that works towards a future) and the ends (a destiny that is,
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perpetually, an empty signifier) would maintain that Proudhon makes no claim about
what the future solution might be, eschewing what Derrida has called the sense of the
1 1
future being ‘announced, promised, called for in a performative mode’. Rather, the 
text’s convictions hang, in the citation above, on the word ‘undoubtedly’, for it is 
Proudhon’s own method that inspires his faith, not any teleological guarantees that 
might be on offer. Indeed the text even goes so far as to suggest that the analysis it is 
proposing might ‘not lead us directly to the solution,’ although it would have the 
‘inestimable advantage’ of elucidating the problem at hand (p. 51).
So the paradoxes keep multiplying with Proudhon, for while he seems to forgo a 
telos that would determine exactly the route of his progress, he displays a firm 
conviction that the (usually scientific) methods will reveal the path to this as yet 
unglimpsed end. This would, then, expose a striking contradiction at the heart of 
Proudhon’s texts, one that has taken on various forms in the course of this reading, be it 
authorial paternity against readerly liberty or the objectivity of science as opposed to the 
differential significance of its results. The terms of this contradiction are fundamentally 
premised on what could be characterised as the knowable and the unknowable, meaning 
that from within the Proudhonian text, the admission of the unknowable allows one to 
derive the textual tools to deconstruct his own occasional bid for authorial dominance of 
the text. For example, when Proudhon argues that the constancy of humanity is to be 
found in the fact that ‘everything in it, at every period of its development, in the 
individual as in the mass, proceeds from the same principle, which is, not being, but 
becoming,’ it becomes impossible to restrict the logic of this ‘becoming’ from applying 
to his work as a whole {System, p. 420). In his own words, from a letter of 1851, his 
‘theory of Progress [...] excludes all absolute notions and all so-called definitive 
hypotheses; it must, in my opinion, form the solid but nevertheless fluid basis o f the
31 Derrida, Specters o f  Marx, p. 103.
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future’. The text itself lets the genie out of the bottle, and therefore the Proudhonian 
text becomes a text becoming, not a text that is. As he argued elsewhere, ‘the 
unforeseeable far surpasses in its richness the prudence of the statesman’.33 But for 
statesman, here, one could substitute text, and indeed reader.
Having re-read Proudhon’s work the restricted locus that he offers for the 
fluidity of the future cannot maintain its own restrictions: indeed, the future, in 
Derrida’s terms, has ‘[dislocated] the self-presence of the living present and [installed] 
thereby the relation to the other’.34 What, then, is left of what I characterised at the 
beginning of this chapter as the putatively libertarian objectives in Proudhon’s work? 
Now that I have mapped the conflict between authority and liberty in Proudhon’s texts, 
I am in a position to be able to offer one possible evaluation of what Proudhon’s 
anarchism might mean in the light of how he expressed it.
In Philosophie du Progres, Proudhon wrote that in calling himself an anarchist,
he was:
declaring by this word the negation -  or better -  the insufficiency, of the 
principle of authority. That is to say [...] the notion of authority, like the 
notion of an absolute being, is only an analytic concept that is powerless to 
provide a constitution for society, regardless of the source of authority and 
the manner in which it is exercised.35
One possible response to this, in the light of my reading (identifying Proudhon’s
authorial position as being commensurate with his description of the role of the father in
the family) is that the paradoxical nature of his own texts has paradoxically achieved the
full import of his words. The text’s authority, that which underpins gestures such as
proclaiming the truth of what was to be found in people’s hearts, is now exposed as
merely a ‘concept that is powerless to provide a constitution for society,’ or in other
terms, powerless to enforce a particular meaning on a reader.
32 Proudhon, Selected Writings, p. 244, my emphasis.
33 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, The Principle o f  Federation, trans. by Richard Vernon (Toronto: University o f  
Toronto Press, 1979), p. 20.
34 Derrida, Specters o f  Marx, p. 154.
35 Proudhon, Philosophie du Progres (1853), cited in Selected Writings, p. 90.
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Nevertheless authority was not the only target of Proudhon’s critique. In 
attacking property, he was attempting to lay the foundations for an equitable distribution 
of society’s wealth, and thus subsume the restricted legislative sphere of the political 
within the broader category of the economic. Hoffman proposes three aspects to 
Proudhon’s attack on property: the first is ‘the dominance of will, which permits the 
proprietor to misuse or not to use at all what can be put to other uses benefiting society 
or individuals’; the second is ‘the exclusive character of ownership, unlimited in 
duration of time’; and the third is the possibility of unearned income. To relate this to 
the textual, the first two features have an important bearing on the argument that I have 
made so far. Proudhon’s texts, as has been suggested above, at times present a position 
of authorial certitude, where one can read, for example, that ‘politically, the idea of 
anarchy is quite as rational and concrete as any other’. These guarantees of the 
‘rational and concrete’ nature of anarchism function as an attempt to overdetermine the 
significance of the text, creating, as Derrida has put it, a transcendental signified which 
‘would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign’. Derridean differance 
is derived from a questioning of the concept of temporality, in that the concept
- IQ
traditionally presumes the eventual presence of the ‘thing itself. For Derrida, the 
‘irreducibility of temporalizing’ means the temporal deferring (without end) of the 
presence that the signified attempts to invoke.40 Therefore one of the deconstructive 
readings of Proudhon’s use both of a priori's and positive values would be that it 
locates him not only in the position of ‘father’ of the text but also (following the outline 
of the critique of property) as the owner of the text, striving for the ‘dominance of [his] 
will’ and trying to protect the text against the vagaries of time and re-readings.
36 Hoffman, The Social and Political Theory o f  P.-J. Proudhon, p. 62.
37 Proudhon, The Principle o f  Federation, p. 11.
38 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 49.
39 Jacques Derrida, ‘Difference’, in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on H usserl’s Theory o f  
Signs, trans. by David B Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 129-160 ( p. 
138).
40 Derrida, ‘Difference’, p. 130.
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Although Proudhon is credited with the origin of the aphorism ‘property is theft’, if one 
brings the slogan to bear on textual concerns the question becomes one of what it is that 
is being stolen.41
How, then, as owner of the text, does Proudhon escape the force of his own
critique of property? Once again Proudhon employs certain incontrovertible values in
the process of critiquing the concept of property -  ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, and ‘security’ are
all held to be ‘an absolute right’. Yet the nub of his argument is not that property per se
is unacceptable, but that the right to title, and also to buy, sell, rent, amalgamate
property, is in contradiction with, and infringes, the absolute rights mentioned above. A
title, though, does not have to be a property deed -  an author, for example, gives a title
to his or her work. Can the same gesture of naming a written work (in the case of
Proudhon) come to mean both giving and receiving a title? Property, in this sense, in
going against these rights:
is a right outside of society [...] if we are associated for the sake of liberty, 
equality, and security, we are not associated for the sake of property; thus, 
if property is natural right, this natural right is not social but antisocial. 
Property and society are completely irreconcilable with one another. [...]
Either society must perish, or it must destroy property. (What is Property?, 
pp. 42-43)
Following the thrust of Proudhon’s own argument, the position of author-as- 
proprietor of the text would establish the loss of a social bond between the reader and 
the text. By social I mean here any concept of an interaction between reader and text, or 
more simply, any act of reading. For without an act of reading in the sense elaborated 
by Barthes, in the sense of ‘a writing that can know no halt’, one would be left with the 
untenable proposition of a simple act of reference.42 Proudhon’s notion of the social
41 Hoffman discusses, and dismisses, the claims that Proudhon had stolen his ‘ideas and famous formula’ 
from J. P. Brissot de Warville, a ‘Girondin political leader o f the Revolutionary period’. When Hoffman 
concludes that ‘it is not o f  great importance who had or had not attacked property previously’, he seems 
to bear out Barthes’s statement that ‘the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never 
original’. Hoffman, The Social and Political Theory ofP.-J. Proudhon, p. 56, p. 58. Barthes, ‘The Death 
o f the Author’, p. 170.
42 Barthes, ‘The Death o f  the Author’, p. 170.
75
invokes Derrida’s concept of the sign, for ‘from the moment that there is meaning there 
are nothing but signs. We think only in signs'.43
Proudhon’s sense of the social, though, points towards Derrida’s notion that 
‘what opens meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural 
presence’.44 This notion of language is already oriented towards an other. Here the non­
origin of language has already been permeated by the absence of the referent, and hence 
signals a beyond of language that traditional logocentrism would seek to ignore. This 
beyond opens onto the realm of the other, and immediately for Derrida this signals the 
prior claim of the other on the self, or the responsibility of self to other. In a sense, 
language is already destined to an other before any speaking subject comes to form a 
phrase. To put this in Proudhonian terms, the social (the social considered as relation to 
the other) is what opens meaning and language. Therefore without the social/other, 
following Derrida, there would be no meaning or history or future. This is where the 
congruence with Proudhon comes to the fore, for the social is what makes impossible 
the concept of property title. Or to put it in an even more reduced form, if humans were 
not social then there would be no language, we would live in a world of ‘things 
themselves’ and property would be fully admissible for there would be no relation to the 
other.
This congruence is repeated in What is Property?, where Proudhon is 
elaborating a distinction between property considered as actual goods existing in the 
present, and property considered as land which holds the future promise of productive 
yields. He argues:
Destroy a bill of exchange, a promissory note, and as a paper you destroy 
almost nothing at all; but with this paper you destroy your title and, in 
losing your title, deprive yourself of your goods. Destroy the land or (what 
is the same thing) sell it; and you not only alienate one, two, or more crops, 
but you annihilate all the products that you could derive from it -  you and 
your children and your children’s children, (p. 84)
43 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 50.
44 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 159.
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Although Proudhon is attempting to highlight the difference between actual and future 
losses, his analogy is striking insofar as it engages in a metaphor that sees the land 
functioning as a sheet of paper, upon which the future will be inscribed. Thus it neatly 
ties his own critique in with the deconstructive critique, and again shows how the 
future, or the Derridean a-venir, frustrates any determination of the present.
While Proudhon’s texts seem to try to allow him a position of proprietorship, it 
is now clear that the same texts undermine the very ground upon which any claim to 
authorial title may be based. Moreover the Derridean critique only accentuates the 
impossibility of a text enjoying any ‘dominance of will’. Indeed it might be suggested 
that a body of work such as Proudhon’s, concerned with the social and liberty, ought by 
force of its own logic to put into practice -  in the one locus available to it -  a sense of 
the social with respect to its reader, that is to say to try to maintain a respect for the 
reader and not close down other avenues of interpretation. In this light (and to return to 
an earlier question), consistency can be seen as a fluctuating value. On the one hand, 
consistency could be seized upon as an excuse to attempt to predetermine a singular 
significance for a text by an author. On the other hand, a blatantly inconsistent or self­
contradictory text runs the risk of lapsing into meaningless. Yet as I cited earlier, 
Proudhon wrote that in a conflict of opposing terms, ‘truth is found, not in the exclusion 
of one of the opposites, but wholly and solely in the reconciliation of the two.’ The 
‘answer’ to the ‘question’ regarding consistency must be left open, for to do otherwise 
would be to pre-empt the reader who, following Proudhon’s thinking, would have to 
reconcile the two poles to their own satisfaction.
So while one might ostensibly find a Proudhon who is prophet of revealed truth, 
both father and proprietor of his own text, a closer reading of some of the details of his 
writing allows for a space to challenge that authorial position, and to conceive of the 
text as what Barthes calls ‘a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings,
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none of them original, blend and clash’.45 Moreover, while Proudhon’s mode of address 
to the reader would apparently involve a degree of attempted dominance over the text, 
the texts themselves provide for the undoing of the very attempt. It is clear that in 
Gemie’s terms Proudhon was trying to provide a ‘structured sociology of revolt’, and 
that his work is concerned with providing a detailed economic rebuttal of the situation 
as he found it in his day. In so doing, though, his texts at times demonstrate a logic 
which opens avenues of investigation that can point towards a plurality of readings of 
those very texts. To fail to acknowledge the plurality of these texts would be to grant 
Proudhon the author-function the authority over his texts that they occasionally seem to 
seek for him. This, though, would simultaneously construct the reader as enemy, for as 
Proudhon wrote, ‘fear of the people is the sickness of all those who belong to authority; 
the people, for those in power, are the enemy’.46 Given that his politics were based on 
his economic system, structured around his idea of contract, I would argue that his texts 
offer a contract to the reader, one based on a respect that ends in liberty, and that could 
not permit the notion of the reader as enemy. So despite the fact that the anarchist 
movement has historically looked to Proudhon as ‘the real father of anarchy’, this 
fatherhood, I would contend, is one that is neither productive nor conducive to the ends 
that Proudhon himself pursued.47 The fact that more recent commentators describe 
Proudhon as ‘a permanent contradiction’ no longer seems to be entirely a matter for 
lament.48
In addressing the work of Proudhon, this chapter has pursued a double strategy, 
one of critiquing the figure of authority as it is found within his texts, while at the same 
time elaborating an anarchism from within those same texts that permits a challenge to 
that authority. Following the conclusions of the previous chapter, I have sought a
45 Barthes, ‘The Death o f  the Author’, p. 170.
46 Cited by Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 244.
47 Cited by Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 236.
48 See, for example, J. Hampden Jackson, Marx, Proudhon and European Socialism  (London: English 
Universities Press, 1957), p. 159.
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renewed affirmation of Proudhon’s own aims, what could be said in this context to be a 
rejection of imposed inequalities between text and reader. This is not to propose some 
(positive) rights-based notion of equality, thus necessitating an entire apparatus of laws 
and constitutions to guarantee it. Rather, I would focus on the Derridean sense of the 
alterity of the other, or in this case, the reader. Any textual attempts to impose 
constraints on the interpretative freedom of the reader must, as a consequence, be 
refused. As with the previous chapter, this has been achieved after a consideration of the 
tensions between a text’s content and its form. Ali Nematollahy argues that Proudhon 
demanded ‘that form and content be united’, but this chapter has shown, rather, that in 
producing a meaning for a text, the absolute nature of the distinction between the two 
crumbles.49 This chapter can then add a point to the growing list of motivating concerns 
for an anarchist textual theory, and that would be a relentless interrogation of the figure 
and workings of authority within texts under consideration.
49 Ali Nematollahy, ‘Proudhon, from Aesthetics to Politics’, Anarchist Studies, 13 (2005), 47-60 (p. 55).
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4
Abolishing Bakunin
‘Without obedience there can be no power.’ (Michael Bakunin)1
If Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is the father of the anarchist movement, then his theory (of 
permitting a certain amount of private property to the worker or peasant) was, according
# <y
to The Economist, ‘too much’ for his successor, Michael Bakunin. The Economist, 
however, is not a magazine renowned for its coverage of anarchist theory. Its 2005 
article ‘For Jihadist, Read Anarchist’ attempts to historicise the current phenomena that 
it characterises as ‘jihadist’ terrorism -  by comparing it to anarchist violence of the 
nineteenth century -  and in so doing offers a nine-sentence precis of anarchist history 
that moves in one step from Proudhon, an ‘essentially non-violent man’, to Bakunin, ‘a 
revolutionary nationalist turned anarchist’ and apostle of destruction. Whether or not 
The Economist is concerned to have its version of anarchist history taken seriously is a 
question for another discussion, although in arguing that ‘the theoreticians for both 
movements [anarchism and jihadism] have often been bearded and angry, of course, and 
their followers have readily taken to the bomb’ one might be forgiven for suspecting 
that it was not.4 Yet The Economist is not the only recent publication that has sought to 
further demonise perceived opponents by association with anarchism -  Tariq Ali,
1 Michael Bakunin, Letter to La Liberte, 5 October 1872, in Bakunin on Anarchism , trans. and ed. by Sam 
DolgofF (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2001), p. 279. All further references in this chapter will be given 
as D olgoff with page number.
2 ‘For Jihadist, Read Anarchist’, Economist, 20 August 2005, pp. 17-19 (p. 17).
3 ‘For Jihadist, Read Anarchist’, Economist, p. 17. The comparison has not only been made by The 
Economist -  in the wake o f  the London bombings in July 2005, Philip Stephens, writing in the Financial 
Times, argues that jihadist terrorism ‘is built around the propaganda o f  the deed, the strategy o f the 19th- 
century anarchists’. See Philip Stephens, ‘Neither Force Nor Politics Alone Can Conquer Terrorism’, 
Financial Times, 8 July 2005, p. 19.
4 ‘Lessons from Anarchy’, Economist, 20 August 2005, p. 20 (p. 20).
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writing in The Guardian, has referred to the targets of Western military attacks in 
Afghanistan and Iraq as ‘Islamo-anarchists’.5 More problematic, though, was the 
(subsequently discredited) suggestion from the Australian High Commissioner in 
London, Richard Alston, that the London bombings of July 2005 were the work of a 
‘group of anti-globalisation protesters or anarchists who seem to take great delight in 
disrupting meetings of international leaders’.6
The common feature of these texts, even from this cursory glance, is that they 
derive an unproblematic and univocal significance from the conflation of anarchism and 
violence. The Economist suggests that this orientation towards violence is first 
perceptible in the nineteenth-century anarchist Michael Bakunin. The figure of Bakunin 
looms large over anarchism to this day, with his legacy being felt across the spectrum of 
radical social movements. For example, Sam Dolgoff, editor of one of the standard 
collections of Bakunin’s writings, cites some 1920s research on the Industrial Workers 
of the World trade union (IWW). In 1910 the union’s journal, Industrial Worker, had 
this to say:
We must trace the origins of the ideas of modem revolutionary unionism to 
the International [Workingmen’s Association]... Many ideas originally 
drafted for the International by the famous anarchist Michael Bakunin in 
1868 were similar to the twentieth-century slogans of the IWW.7
And from the earliest origins of syndicalism to the most controversial present-day
tactics of direct action, some have suggested that Bakunin has been the intellectual
inspiration for the ‘Black Bloc,’ the section of typically black-clad and masked
individuals on current anti-capitalist demonstrations that unapologetically sets out with
the intention of causing property destruction to targets seen as emblematic of
5 Tariq Ali, ‘The Price O f Occupation’, Guardian, 8 July 2005, available online at 
<http://www.guardian.co.Uk/attackonlondon/comment/story/0,, 1524359,00.html>.
6 ‘Alston Points Finger At “Anarchists’” , Financial Review, 8 July 2005, available online at 
<http://afr.eom/articles/2005/07/08/l 120704524463.html>. This story prompted a statement to be issued 
in the name o f  a number o f  British and Irish anarchist groups which argued that ‘terrorist actions are 
completely at odds with any struggle for a freer, fairer society’. See ‘British and Irish Anarchist Statement 
on Bombing’, available online at <http://www.anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=885>.
7 Paul Brissenden, as cited by Dolgoff, p. 156.
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contemporary capitalism. The Black Bloc Tactics Communique of 2001, issued in the 
wake of the criticism of the perceived violence of some of the actions that took place 
during protests against the World Trade Organisation (WTO) summit in Seattle, 1999, 
argues that ‘the Anarchist movement, as stated by Bakunin, is driven by “the instinct to 
rebel’” .9 These actions perhaps guarantee (as the Economist article would seem to 
attest) that today Bakunin is most remembered for his celebrated aphorism that ‘the 
passion for destruction is a creative passion, too!’ (Dolgoff, p. 57). Yet not all of those 
who still feel the influence of Bakunin would think of it as being a positive influence: at 
a Communist Party of Great Britain conference in Cardiff to debate ‘Marxism vs. 
Anarchism: Which Path to Liberation?’ Bakunin was variously described as a terrorist, 
a hypocrite, and an authoritarian, while Louis Proyect, the moderator of the ‘Marxmail’ 
website, describes Bakunin’s work as ‘vulgar opinionating worthless to anybody trying 
to make sense of European society of the mid 19th century, let alone the world we live 
in today’.10 Bakunin, it would seem, is a hard figure to leave to the annals of history. I 
want neither to appropriate Bakunin as a simple justification for trashing a McDonalds, 
nor to castigate him as the historical scapegoat for the rupture of the socialist 
movement. The question, therefore, is this: how should I begin to approach Bakunin, 
and what should be the guidelines for an examination of his life and texts?
Saul Newman argues that the current wave of global protest (sometimes known 
as the anti-globalisation movement, but perhaps better labelled the global justice 
movement) that can arguably be dated from the Zapatista uprising in the Mexican state 
of Chiapas in 1994, and which stormed onto the front pages of the world’s press during
8 For an example o f the rather polemical debate surrounding the actions o f  the ‘Black Bloc’, see On Fire: 
The Battle o f  Genoa and the Anti-Capitalist Movement ([n.p.]: One O ff Press, 2001). Despite the polemic, 
one anarchist commentator sees the Black Bloc as representing a ‘relatively trivial threat’. See Andrew 
Flood, ‘Bakunin's Idea o f Revolution & Revolutionary Organisation’, available online at 
<http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/rbr/rbr6/bakunin.html>.
9 ‘Black Bloc Tactics Communique’, available online at 
<http://www.sheffieldmayday.ukf.net/articles/blackbloc.htm>.
10 Marxism vs. Anarchism: Which Path to Liberation?, Communist Party o f Great Britain conference held 
in Cardiff, 16 June 2003. Louis Proyect, Bakunin: A Marxist Critique, available online at 
<http://www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/mydocs/state_and_revolution/Bakunin.htm>.
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the protests against the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999, is essentially ‘anarchist’. 
Newman recognises the heterogeneity of the individual agendas and manifestos of 
particular groups, be they statist, reformist, revolutionary or non-existent. Despite that, 
for him the nature of the movement, a network established by the linking of disparate 
groups that share no common ground but perceive themselves to share a common 
enemy, is de facto anarchistic. This is based, Newman argues, on a ‘refusal of centralist 
and hierarchical politics’ and an ‘openness to a plurality of different identities and 
struggles’.11 This is neatly summed up in one of the slogans to emerge from this protest 
movement: ‘one no, many yeses’.
Taking this global justice movement as a model, then, for a reading practice, I 
will look at the work of Michael Bakunin with the explicit aim of not imposing a 
unified significance on his text, nor to refute other competing interpretations of his 
work. Aileen Kelly argues that there are two faces to Bakunin, that of ‘the rebellion of 
the individual against all repressive authorities’ as well as ‘that of a scheming 
megalomaniac’. These conflicting aspects lead her to insist that ‘all studies of Bakunin 
are faced with the necessity of explaining or resolving the contradictions between 
them’.12 Nevertheless Kelly fails to demonstrate the ‘necessity’ that she describes. This 
chapter will contest that necessity, and hence will explore rather than explain the 
contradictions in Bakunin’s work, to weaken the premises of critiques that would 
establish themselves as univocal readings of Bakunin. In my analysis I will demonstrate 
how traditional biographies and critical accounts have often fallen into an embarrassed 
silence when confronted with the awkward multivalency of Bakunin’s text, or have 
opted to ignore the aspects of his work that do not square with the identity that they look 
to impose.
11 Saul Newman, ‘The Politics o f  Postanarchism’, available online at <http://www.anarchist- 
studies.org/article/articleprint/1 /-1 /1 />.
12 Aileen Kelly, ‘The Fatal Charm o f  the Millennium’, New York Review o f  Books, 22 January 1976, pp. 
43-46 (p. 43, my emphasis).
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In order to do this, I will interrogate the value of adopting a biographical 
approach to Bakunin when attempting to assess the import of his politics. His 
significance seems crucially to hang on the question of unity, or coherence, available in 
his work (including the ‘work’ of his life). This chapter will argue that the implications 
of this sought-after unity are not negligible for the anarchist critic, especially considered 
in the light of Foucault’s comments concerning the role of an author. This is inspired 
both by a desire to map this problem from a post-structuralist position and, moreover, 
by the shortcomings that can be found in the existing biographies. Having done that, I 
will then address the question of what Bakunin’s politics were. In order to do so I will 
consider both the written texts that have been left to posterity by the ‘author’ Bakunin, 
as well as accounts of Bakunin’s actions during his life. In engaging with the events of 
Bakunin’s life, however, a primary concern will be to avoid the problems of an 
uncritical biographical approach as highlighted in the first part of this chapter below. 
For this reason, I have chosen to examine Bakunin thematically and place the themes of 
his work in the surrounding context of the relevant period of his life. This has led to 
Bakunin’s life being examined as background to the texts considered, and as such this 
approach has consciously eschewed the linear chronology typically found in 
biographies. While it might appear somewhat unusual at first, this approach attempts to 
take on board some of the criticisms raised in the opening part of the chapter, and so, for 
example, if the first question is ‘who is Bakunin?’, the reader will find the discussion 
going straight for one of Bakunin’s texts written in the last years of his life. Hence my 
‘biography’ attempts to provoke by beginning at the end. In conclusion the chapter ends 
with a consideration of what can profitably be derived from Bakunin’s life-text for the 
benefit of an anarchist approach to reading and literature.
The unreality of Bakunin’s ‘flesh and blood*
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Does telling the story of a revolutionary require revolutionary storytelling? The answer 
would appear to be negative, for even a glance at the scholarship on Bakunin reveals an 
unquestioning approach to the challenge of how to tell ‘his’ story. Consequently I shall 
begin by looking at the relationship between the critical text, be it commentary or 
biography, and its putative subject.
There is a feature that is common to a good portion of these works, and that is
that the biographical accounts appear to demonstrate an obligation to comment on
Bakunin’s physical stature and personality. George Woodcock, in his history of
anarchism, writes that:
Of all the anarchists, Michael Bakunin most consistently lived and looked 
the part. [He] was monumentally eccentric, a rebel who in almost every act 
seemed to express the most forceful aspects of anarchy. [...] Physically, he 
was gigantic, and the massive unkemptness of his appearance would 
impress an audience even before he began to win its sympathies with his 
persuasive oratory.13
Of his contemporaries, the composer Richard Wagner became friendly with Bakunin 
during the latter’s stay in Dresden in 1849. Wagner later wrote in his autobiography 
that, upon meeting Bakunin, he was ‘immediately struck by his singular and altogether 
imposing personality. He was in the full bloom of manhood [...]. Everything about him 
was colossal, and he was full of a primitive exuberance and strength’.14 Bakunin’s life­
long friend and fellow Russian exile, Alexander Herzen described him thus:
His activity, his laziness, his appetite, his titanic stature and the everlasting 
perspiration he was in, everything about him, in fact, was on a superhuman 
scale. He remained as of old a blue-eyed giant with a leonine head and a 
tousled mane.15
13 Woodcock, Anarchism, p. 134.
14 Richard Wagner, as cited by Marshall Shatz in his ‘Introduction’, in Michael Bakunin, Statism and 
Anarchy, ed. and trans. by Marshall Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. ix-xxxvii 
(p. xix).
1 Alexander Herzen, as cited by Brian Morris in Bakunin: The Philosophy o f  Freedom  (Montreal: Black 
Rose Books, 1993), p. 1. All further references in this chapter will be given in the text.
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More recently, Paul Avrich in his introduction to Bakunin’s God and the State writes of 
‘his broad magnanimity and childlike enthusiasm, his burning passion for liberty and 
equality,’ while Brian Morris, in his account of Bakunin’s life and work, begins his 
description of him as ‘a giant, full of energy, who exercised a volcanic force, and often 
fascinated all those with whom he came into contact’.16
Clearly the ‘reality’ of the man exerts such gravitational pull that it leaves 
writers in a somewhat awe-struck orbit. Yet as Derrida has observed (in relation to 
Rousseau), ‘in what one calls the real life of these existences “of flesh and bone,” 
beyond and behind what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau’s text, there
1 7has never been anything but writing’. This presents a problem to the post-structuralist 
critic, for how, if at all, can one approach the ‘reality’, the ‘flesh and bone’ of a person 
from within language, regardless of the fact that that person may have died more than a 
century ago? Or to phrase the challenge in the terms that Foucault employs, how to 
write about Bakunin (the author) without endowing the proper name ‘Bakunin’ with the 
‘author-function’, or ownership of the discourse, as identified in ‘What is an Author?’ 
and without presuming to go beyond the realm of the textual towards the actual Bakunin
1 fiper se. This, as Geoffrey Bennington argues, would be premised on the automatic 
assumption that ‘the proper name ought to insure a certain passage between language 
and world, in that it ought to indicate a concrete individual, without ambiguity, without 
having to pass through the circuits of meaning’. Bennington concludes that the proper 
name must function ‘in a system of differences [...]. We are already in writing with 
proper names’.19
16 Paul Avrich, ‘Introduction to the Dover Edition’, in Michael Bakunin, G od and the State (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1970), pp. v-xii (p. vi). Morris, p. 1.
17 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 159.
18 Michel Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, trans. by Josu6 V. Harari, in M odem  Criticism and Theory: A 
Reader, ed. by David Lodge (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 197-210 (p. 202).
19 Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1993), p. 104-105.
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In the opening pages of his biography, Bakunin: The Father o f Anarchism, 
Anthony Masters offers an example that would precisely demonstrate the dangers 
inherent in this presumption of biographical proximity to the ‘real’ subject. Masters 
begins his text with the prologue ‘The Homecoming’ by relating a twenty-four hour 
period that Bakunin was permitted to spend at his family home in Premukhino. These 
twenty-four hours were all Bakunin had with his parents and siblings before embarking 
on his journey to exile in Siberia in 1857, after more than eight years in various prisons, 
principally in Russia. Masters, though, dramatises the encounter between the sickly 
Bakunin and his family, and the text adopts a narrative voice marked by a sense of its 
own omniscience: Bakunin arrives with ‘his feelings numbed and insubstantial’; the text 
tells the reader what Bakunin felt, thought and even smelt -  ‘the heavy scent of cherry 
blossom at night’. Only for a second does the narrative falter in its own sense of 
conviction, when it recounts that ‘as Michael greeted them and walked into the Spartan
Of)hallway he might have remembered the yearning homesickness [of] fifteen years ago’. 
Yet the text recovers its tone and proceeds, noting how he ‘looked upon [his family] 
with lethargy and indifference. [...] his apathy covered him like a shroud [...]’.21 
Masters’s text clearly goes beyond a mere reconstruction of the moment based on 
piecing together the textual inheritance of diaries and letters. Spivak’s concerns about 
the status of the preface, contained in her own preface to O f Grammatology, cast an 
interesting light on Masters. She argues that it ‘is clear that, as it is commonly 
understood, the preface harbours a lie’. She continues that the preface is seen ‘not as a 
literary, but as an expository exercise. It “involves a norm of truth,” although it might 
well be the insertion of an obvious fiction into an ostensibly “true” discourse’.22 If one 
accepts Spivak’s truth/fiction dichotomy, then the ‘norm of truth’ to which she refers
20 Anthony Masters, Bakunin: The Father o f  Anarchism (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1974), pp. xxi- 
xxii (my emphasis).
21 Masters, Bakunin, pp. xxii-xxiii.
22 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in Derrida, O f Grammatology, pp. ix-lxxxvii (p. x).
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becomes troubling in the case of Masters’s preface. These opening pages construct a 
fictitious proximity to the subject of the biography that would seduce the reader into 
accepting the ‘truth’ of the subject so presented. The challenge, then, that this example 
illustrates, when examining the ‘life’ (as opposed to the legacy of written texts) of a 
historical figure, is to achieve this without resorting to an unproblematic invocation of 
what the ‘reality’ of a past moment in history might have been. With this in mind, I will 
attempt to consider the accounts of Bakunin’s life, rather than discuss the events of the 
period 1814-1876, the span of Bakunin’s existence. To engage in the latter would be 
already to make a claim about the accessibility of a reality, whether past, present or 
future, to language -  a claim that is precisely what this chapter aims to render suspect.
Bakunin, it could be argued, had already pre-empted his later biographers by
demonstrating a clear sensitivity to my concerns as outlined above. God and the State
was published in 1882, six years after Bakunin died, when the manuscript, as Paul
Avrich writes in the introduction to the text, ‘was discovered among his papers by two
well-known anarchists, Carlo Cafiero and Elisee Reclus’. Unbeknown to them at that
time, the text was originally part of the longer and unfinished work The Knouto-
Germanic Empire and the Social Revolution. This text was to become the best known of
Bakunin’s works and in it he takes issue with the authority of science over human
affairs. The basis of his argument is that science, and human thought in general, can
only deal in what he calls ‘abstractions’, and therefore is already cut off from the reality
of what it is addressing. ‘The general idea,’ contends Bakunin, ‘is always an abstraction
and, for that very reason, in some sort a negation of real life.’24 He continues that:
history is made, not by abstract individuals, but by acting, living and 
passing individuals. Abstractions advance only when borne forward by real 
men. For these beings made, not in idea only, but in reality of flesh and 
blood, science has no heart [...]. (p. 58)
23 Avrich, ‘Introduction to the Dover Edition’, p. viii.
24 Michael Bakunin, G od and the State (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), p. 54. All further 
references in this chapter will be given in the text.
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Having established the gulf between external reality and human thought, he clarifies this
in relation to the question of language. He argues that ‘individuals cannot be grasped by
thought, by reflection, or even by human speech, which is capable of expressing
abstractions only; they cannot be grasped in the present day any more than in the past’
(p. 61). Since science, and by extrapolation, language and thought, are incapable of
addressing the radical heterogeneity of reality, Bakunin argues that:
it would be disastrous to entrust it with a mission which it is incapable of 
fulfilling. Since its own nature forces it to ignore the existence of Peter and 
James, it must never be permitted, nor must anybody be permitted in its 
name, to govern Peter and James, (p. 58)
This salient warning invites the reader to maintain a constant vigilance over the
pretensions of language to ground its descriptions in the unquestioned authority of a
denotative relationship to reality. Moreover, Bakunin’s particular mention of this
applying not only to the present but also to the past should surely have served as a
warning to his biographers. There can, consequently, be no ‘real’ Michael Bakunin to be
the subject of any biographical account, but rather an ‘abstraction’ of Bakunin, a textual
inheritance of accounts of a person who might once have lived but about whom no
authoritative, no definitive, no irrefutable statement can be made. Masters and the others
may want to produce what Bakunin called the ‘reality of flesh and blood’, but in
elucidating the distinction between reality and representation, Bakunin offered a lesson
that apparently has not yet been learnt by subsequent scholars.
Indeed this theoretical position is sustained by a closer examination of the 
language of some of the texts that I cited earlier. To begin with the earliest of the three 
that I wish to compare, in 1970 Paul Avrich described Bakunin’s ‘broad magnanimity 
and childlike enthusiasm, his burning passion for liberty and equality, his volcanic 
onslaughts against privilege and injustice -  all this gave him enormous human appeal in
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the libertarian circles of his day’.25 Then in 1993 Brian Morris wrote that Bakunin was 
‘a giant, full of energy, who exercised a volcanic force, and fascinated all those with 
whom he came into contact’ (p. 1). More or less simultaneously, Peter Marshall was 
writing that Bakunin’s ‘magnanimity and enthusiasm coupled with his passionate 
denunciation of privilege and injustice made him extremely attractive to anti­
authoritarians’.26 So while Morris borrows the trope of the volcano from Avrich, and 
rephrases Avrich’s ‘enormous human appeal’ as ‘fascination’, Marshall appears not to 
have troubled himself to rework the language of the earlier text. He directly employs the 
same nouns (magnanimity, enthusiasm, privilege and injustice) as are found in Avrich’s 
introduction, and modifies ‘passion’ to ‘passionate’, while ‘appeal’ and ‘libertarian’ 
become ‘attractive’ and ‘anti-authoritarian’. This, of course, might tend to suggest that 
an entire edifice of authorial rights, copyrights, legal protections and just compensations 
should be imposed all over again to prevent such inter-textual laxity, but nothing could 
be further from my purpose. The examples are cited to demonstrate the impossibility, as 
argued above, of escaping the paper chain and producing the ‘real’ biographical subject. 
To paraphrase Bakunin, one must not permit the biographer to attempt to govern the 
reality of Bakunin himself.
Freeing Bakunin
Now that the problems of engaging with the ‘reality’ of a historical subject have been 
delineated, the question returns (within the paradigmatic scepticism outlined above) to 
what ‘Bakunin’ can be said to mean. How does one begin to shape an identity for text or 
for its author? On an anecdotal level, one could probably write that Michael Bakunin 
was bom in 1814 into a comfortable Russian family of the minor aristocracy. One could 
probably also go on to mention that James Guillaume, who Dolgoff describes as
25 Avrich, ‘Introduction to the Dover Edition’, p. vi.
26 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 263.
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‘Bakunin’s friend and comrade-in-arms’ wrote a ‘Biographical Sketch’ of Bakunin that, 
according to Dolgoff, ‘is a primary source not only on the life of Bakunin, but also on 
the most significant events in the socialist movement of that period’ (p. 22). Hence one 
could cite Guillaume’s recollection that Bakunin’s father had been ‘a career diplomat’, 
who married at forty and had a family of ten children on his large estate at 
Premukhino.27 One could also observe that Morris suggests that the family ‘had liberal 
tendencies’ (p. 5) and his early life seems to have been comfortable and enjoyable. He 
was sent to military academy at the age of fifteen, but had left the army by 1836, 
stultified by the lack of intellectual stimuli. Bakunin moved to Moscow and for six 
years lived there, studying the philosophy of Fichte and Hegel. One could doubtless 
write all of the above without, I imagine, stirring up much controversy.
These bald details point in two different directions in terms of embarking on a 
journey of exploration of the significance of ‘Bakunin’. Firstly, and most obviously, 
they clearly offer the seductive prospect of a straightforward and uncomplicated 
narration of the ‘facts’ of the life of a subject known as Michael Bakunin. Nevertheless, 
hidden within that tempting proposition is the unarticulated assumption that these facts 
can be considered as something akin to immutable relay batons, being passed from each 
narrator, hand to hand, without so much as the trace of a fingerprint being left visible on 
their surface. Secondly, and more challengingly, the brief introduction above is already 
cloaked in paper, such as recalls Proudhon’s ‘papyraceous formation’ from the previous 
chapter, and makes no attempt to escape it -  a birth certificate to convalidate the arrival 
of a son, an account by a friend to paint the picture of a family background, a 
biographer’s story of a frustrated soldier to illustrate the early years. The short 
paragraph written above has straightaway plunged the reader into a world of second­
27 James Guillaume, ‘Michael Bakunin: A Biographical Sketch’, in Bakunin, Bakunin on Anarchism, pp. 
22-52 (p. 23). Marshall adds that the family’s estate had five hundred serfs. Marshall, Demanding the 
Impossible, p. 266.
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hand accounts where the brute fact seems to have always already been referred to, and is 
never simply evident.
So the question seems no closer to finding an easy answer. Indeed Bakunin
himself asked much the same question in his late text ‘The Paris Commune and the Idea
of the State’. Bakunin begins the text by rhetorically questioning himself over his own
identity: ‘who am I?’ he asks. This approach seems to echo the imagined conversation
in What is Property? that led to Proudhon’s declaration of being an anarchist. Bakunin
offers the answer that he is ‘a fanatical lover of liberty’ (Dolgoff, p. 261) and freedom is
one of the key concepts that remained constant in his thought throughout his life. What
stood in the way of the realisation of freedom, for Bakunin, was primarily the state,
which as a result became the major target of his anarchist critique. Nevertheless Engels
asserted that this meant a lack of focus on the problem of capitalism. Engels argued that
for Bakunin it was:
the state which has created capital, that the capitalist has his capital only by 
the grace o f the state. As, therefore, the state is the chief evil, it is above all 
the state which must be done away with, and then capitalism will go to 
blazes of itself.29
This, however, is not an accurate portrayal of Bakunin’s thought, and certainly it 
was precisely the question of the social, taken to include the economic inter­
relationships in society, over and above the question of the strictly political, in the sense 
of governmental power, that drove Bakunin to his anarchism. It is not, as Engels would 
have it, that Bakunin neglected the economic question in favour of an exclusive focus 
on the state. Bakunin stated that ‘we also recognise the inevitable linking of economic 
and political facts in history’.30 Indeed, his notion of ‘social liquidation’ (‘the phrase,’
28 See chapter three above.
29 Letter from Engels to Theodor Cuno, 24 January 1872. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic 
Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. by Lewis S. Feuer (New York: Fontana, 1969), p. 481.
30 Michael Bakunin, Marxism, Freedom and the State, trans. and ed. by K. J. Kenafick (London: Freedom 
Press, 1998), p. 21.
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he said, ‘that makes the bourgeoisie tremble’ (Dolgoff, p. 172)) went beyond the mere
political. In God and the State he argued that:
the abolition of the organised political exploitation of the majority by any 
minority whatsoever [would be equivalent to] the direct and complete 
satisfaction of the needs and aspirations of the people, which would be 
equivalent to the complete liquidation of the political and economic 
existence of the bourgeois class, or again, to the abolition of the State, (p.
84)
It is clear that while Bakunin believed that economic freedom was inextricable from the 
abolition of the state, he did not privilege the latter at the expense of the former. Indeed 
he linked the two together in another of his celebrated aphorisms, from the text of 
‘Federalism, Socialism, Anti-Theologism’, when he concluded that ‘liberty without 
socialism is privilege, injustice; and that socialism without liberty is slavery and 
brutality’ (Dolgoff, p. 127).
Freedom, therefore, was a core value for Bakunin and it would be secured
because there was, for him, ‘in men an inborn irresistible urge -  the source of all
freedom -  to rebel against any arbitrary measure, even if imposed in the name of
liberty’ (Dolgoff, p. 194). Indeed Bakunin suggests in God and the State that the two
‘faculties’ that Adam and Eve were endowed with were ‘the power to think and the
desire to rebeV (p. 9). This notion, of an innate urge to revolt, also found expression in
his enthusiasm, shared with Proudhon, for Satan as a role model. In God and the State,
he describes Satan as:
the eternal rebel, the first freethinker, and the emancipator of worlds. He 
makes man ashamed of his bestial ignorance and obedience; he 
emancipates him, stamps upon his brow the seal of liberty and humanity, in 
urging him to disobey and eat of the fruit of knowledge, (p. 10)
A query could immediately be raised against the logic of this sentence, for surely in
‘urging [man] to disobey,’ Satan could be construed to be issuing an instruction, which
is then dutifully followed -  obeying the injunction to disobey. The inversion of the logic
of command does not reduce the binding force of its logic.
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This freedom, for Bakunin, would be conditional on the structure of the society 
surrounding the individual. Hence a starting premise is one that was offered as a critique 
of Rousseau’s theory of the state, in that for Bakunin ‘liberty is indivisible; one cannot 
curtail a part of it without killing all of it’ (Dolgoff, p. 129). This principle is then 
extended to the fullest extent across society, so that one subsequently finds the 
statement that ‘I am truly free only when all human beings, men and women, are 
equally free. The freedom of other men, far from negating or limiting my freedom, is, 
on the contrary, its necessary premise and confirmation’ (Dolgoff, p. 237). Bakunin, 
here, is clearly trying to resolve the perennial opposition between the individual and the 
social that haunts all political discourse. In a sense he resolves it by integrating the two 
terms, and synthesizing a version of freedom that is equally dependent on both sides of 
the opposition.
This focus, though, on the individual, led Bakunin to one of the tenets of his 
thought that most radically differed from Marx’s ideology. Bakunin saw the urban 
proletariat as already having some degree of investment in the capitalist system, and so 
their dependence on it would not necessarily make them the first in line to bring about 
its downfall. On the other hand, the elements of society considered marginal in Marx’s 
theory come centre stage for Bakunin, for example the rural peasantry and urban 
Lumpenproletariat. Having least to lose from the abolition of capitalism, these groups 
would not be the ‘benighted and primitive barbarians, the bulwark of counterrevolution’ 
as was commonly thought at the time, but rather the most likely sources for capitalism’s 
overthrow.31 Bakunin conceded that they were not ‘by nature evil,’ but rather that they 
were ‘ignorant’ (Dolgoff, p. 189). This presented Bakunin with the challenge of how to 
radicalise these same people, and he was, as Avrich notes, very much ‘a revolutionist of 
the deed’.32 Thus in his ‘Letters to a Frenchman’ Bakunin writes of the need to ‘talk to
31 Paul Avrich, ‘The Legacy o f Bakunin’, Russian Review, 29 (1970), 129-142 (p. 131).
32 Avrich, ‘The Legacy o f Bakunin’, p. 130.
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the peasants in simple language suitable to their sentiments, their level of
understanding’ (Dolgoff, p. 189). This leads to the suggestion that words themselves
will prove insufficient for the cause:
Let us talk less about revolution and do a great deal more. Let others 
concern themselves with the theoretical development of the principles of 
the Social Revolution, while we content ourselves with spreading these 
principles everywhere, incarnating them into facts. (Dolgoff, p. 195)
Bakunin inaugurates a discourse of action, rather than words, but one that will have no
less signifying power. Citing the preamble to the International’s statutes, he argues that
‘the emancipation of the workers is the task of the workers themselves’, but that ‘the
workers know little about theory and are unable to grasp the implications of this
principle. The only way for the workers to learn theory is through practice:
33emancipation through practical action’ (Dolgoff, p. 167).
One comes, then, to a challenging juncture in the thought of Bakunin in terms of 
addressing his text as theory. As his texts proclaim the equivalence of action and word, 
as discussed earlier, how then should those actions be integrated into a textual analysis 
of Bakunin’s work? And given that it has already been recognised that there is a lack of 
an overarching system to Bakunin’s thought, what value can be placed on the 
commensurability -  or lack of it -  between these actions and the words?
Firstly, the same precautions would apply to a consideration of the ‘actions’ of 
Bakunin as were applied to the consideration of his life, that is to say that to attempt to 
discuss the actions as such would necessarily seek to ground the discussion on an a 
priori truth of what those actions were. In a sense, therefore, the actions themselves are 
always already lost, even at their moment of happening, for even as they take place, 
they acquire their significance from a system of differences, without, as Saussure said,
33 For the full text o f  the International’s rules, see ‘Rules and Administrative Regulations o f the 
International Workingmen’s Association (1867)’, available online at 
<http://mia.marxists.org/history/intemational/iwma/documents/1867/rules.htm>.
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there being any ‘positive terms’.34 Again it is worth repeating the caveat that this does 
not mean that one writes off the facticity of actual events, be they trees falling in the 
woods or bombs on tube trains, but rather that the moment they -  the unnameable actual 
events -  enter language, they are governed by the play of differences, which for Derrida
"X ^is ‘the possibility of conceptuality’.
With this in mind it is clear to see that even from the outset, the ‘reality’ of any 
of Bakunin’s actions was not really the issue at stake even during his own lifetime, for 
the actions themselves, whether real or imagined, alleged or committed, came to exert 
more influence by the manner in which they were presented than by their actual 
repercussions. To start with, one could look at the ‘supposed’ actions of one of the 
several Bakunins that begin to emerge from the textual inheritance surrounding this life, 
that is to say the actions of Bakunin the Russian agent. According to Masters, these 
rumours were started by the Russian ambassador Count Kiselev, who suggested that 
Bakunin was a Russian agent who had been ‘planted among the emigres and refugees in
'X f sorder to betray them’. They found fertile soil amongst the Polish emigre population in 
France who had difficulty accepting the assistance of a Russian aristocrat with no 
discernible source of income. In 1848 Marx’s newspaper, the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, 
published the allegations (which had until then only been spread by word of mouth) that 
George Sand had documents showing Bakunin to be an agent, although upon Bakunin’s 
protestations, the paper subsequently published Sand’s own denial of this. Carr suggests 
that Marx ‘must be acquitted’ of any suggestion of malice in this. Masters argues that 
although Marx was less than ‘scrupulous’ in publishing unsubstantiated rumours, ‘it is 
unlikely that direct malice was the reason behind the publication’.38 Guillaume, though, 
provides a more acerbic opinion. After quoting Sand’s own letter that the allegations
34 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 118.
35 Derrida, ‘Difference’, p. 140.
36 Masters, Bakunin, p. 84.
37 E. H. Carr, Michael Bakunin (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 163
38 Masters, Bakunin, p. 99.
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were ‘entirely false’, Guillaume cites Marx’s comment that he had ‘fulfilled the 
obligation of the press [and] given M. Bakunin the opportunity to dispel suspicions 
which have been current in certain Paris circles’. Guillaume’s observation on this was 
that ‘it is useless to elaborate on the singular theory that it is the duty of the press to 
publish false and libelous [szc] accusations without attempting to verify the facts!’.
Yet these rumours dogged Bakunin’s steps all his life, and Guillaume records 
how even just days after his death, a Zurich paper, the Tagwacht printed the comment 
that Bakunin ‘was regarded by many fair-minded men and good socialists as a Russian 
agent. This suspicion, doubtless erroneous, was aroused by the fact that Bakunin greatly 
harmed the revolutionary movement; it was the reaction which benefited most from his 
activity’.40 Interestingly, the original premise of the rumour, the suggestion that 
Bakunin was in the pay of the Russian government, has now been lost from sight. The 
paper somewhat disingenuously reports the opinion of unnamed individuals, which, 
however well founded or justifiable it may or may not have been, remained in fact their 
opinion. It then qualified this with the epithet of ‘suspicion’, before returning to the 
‘fact’ of Bakunin having harmed the revolutionary movement. This, also, is somewhat 
contentious, for if Bakunin indeed spent much of his life hurrying from insurrection to 
insurrection, it is clearly an ideological judgement to come to the conclusion that he 
‘harmed’ the revolutionary movement, and therefore not a ‘fact’ as such. On balance, 
then, the two short sentences balance two (supposed) facts against one suspicion, and 
Bakunin (posthumously) comes off the worse for it.
Yet while the actions of ‘Bakunin the Russian agent’ might be considered to be 
imagined actions, there are other actions whose accounts seem to have a firmer rooting 
in the records of Bakunin’s life. One element from this life that has proved more 
difficult for commentators to reconcile with Bakunin’s politics is the constant
39 Guillaume, ‘Michael Bakunin: A Biographical Sketch’, p. 28.
40 Guillaume, ‘Michael Bakunin: A Biographical Sketch’, p. 52.
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enthusiasm for secret societies, something that was to be the ostensible motive for his 
expulsion from the International. Yet Dolgoff warns against viewing this obsession with 
secrecy out of context. He notes that ‘when dissent is outlawed, revolutionaries are 
forced to organize secret societies. Bakunin was not alone; everybody conspired -  the 
Poles, the Italians, the Russians, the Blanquists, and the nascent unions camouflaged as 
“social clubs’” (Dolgoff, p. 74).
The first evidence of this enthusiasm comes in Bakunin’s Confession, perhaps 
one of his most anomalous texts. After having been arrested in Germany in 1849, 
Bakunin passed the following year in prison there and was condemned to death only to 
have the sentence commuted to life imprisonment. He was subsequently extradited to 
Austria and underwent the same process -  condemned to death, and then extradited 
once more. This time he was sent to Russia, eventually arriving in the fortress of Peter 
and Paul in St. Petersburg in 1851. Bakunin was to spend the next six years in prison, 
and it was there that he composed the Confession, a text written to the Tsar in the 
apparent hope of securing release.41
This text has proved something of a challenge to commentators on Bakunin’s 
life and work. On the one hand, at first glance the idea of a ‘confession’ does not fit well 
with the image of a life-long revolutionary. Hence it has provided material for critics of 
Bakunin, such as Proyect, who describes the text as a ‘self-debasing document [which] 
was not wrested out of torture, but was a ploy to win early release through flattery’.42 If 
it was a ploy, then it certainly failed as such, for Bakunin languished in Russian prisons 
for years, at great cost to his health. On the other hand, if it was a genuine confession, 
then it would also seem to have failed, for the Tsar himself, in notes added to the 
margins of the original manuscript, wrote that by refusing to divulge the names of his
41 Janko Lavrin writes that ‘abject servility, calculating flattery, even “piety,” unexpected frankness, as 
well as arrogantly self-assertive criticism o f the police-ridden Russian regime -  all this is mixed up in that 
unique deposition’. See Janko Lavrin, ‘Bakunin the Slav and the Rebel’, Russian Review, 25 (1966), pp. 
135-149 (p. 143).
42 Proyect, Bakunin: A Marxist Critique.
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fellow-travellers, Bakunin ‘destroys all confidence: if he feels all the weight of his sins, 
then only a PURE, complete confession, and not a CONDITIONAL one, can be 
considered a confession’.43
In his Confession Bakunin describes to the Tsar the sort of revolutionary society
that he wanted to see organised in Bohemia for the liberation of the Slavs. The content
of this text borders on the incredible when contrasted with the central tenets of the rest
of Bakunin’s work, and so makes the task of establishing a place for it in the context of
his life all the more difficult. Bakunin writes that:
The society was to consist of three separate societies, independent of one 
another and unknown to one another. [...] Each was to be subordinate to a 
strict hierarchy and to unconditional discipline [...]. These societies were to 
be limited to a small number of people, including -  as far as possible -  all 
the talented, learned, energetic, and influential people, who, obeying 
central directions, would in their turn act invisibly, as it were, on the 
crowd.44
Bakunin continued that the society’s three sections would be linked to a central
committee, which would have five members -  himself, a Czech revolutionary by the
name of Emanuel Arnold, and three others who ‘would have to be chosen’.45 He also
expresses the hope that this model would be copied by the Bohemian Germans, and thus
without participating in the central committee, he would become:
its secret leader so that, if my project had been realized, all the main 
threads of the movement would have been concentrated in my hands and I 
could have been assured that the contemplated revolution in Bohemia did 
not stray from the course I had prescribed for it.46
As astonishing as this text is, it is easy to demonstrate where it is in clear 
contradiction with other parts of Bakunin’s work. For example, in the much later work,
43 Michael Bakunin, The ‘Confession ’ o f  Mikhail Bakunin: With the Marginal Comments o f  Tsar Nicholas 
I, trans. by Robert C. Howes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 33. D olgoff also offers an 
unreferenced citation o f  the Tsar’s son, Alexander, saying that he didn’t ‘see the least sign o f repentance’ 
(p. 32).
44 Bakunin, Confession, pp. 118-119.
45 Bakunin, Confession, p. 119.
46 Bakunin, Confession, p. 119.
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Statism and Anarchy, Bakunin offers the following, more typical, definition of his 
vision:
anarchy, meaning the free and independent organization of all the units and 
parts of the community and their voluntary federation from below upward, 
not by the orders of any authority, even an elected one, and not by the 
dictates of any scientific theory, but as a result of the natural development 
of all the varied demands put forth by life itself.47
Yet the accusation of anarchism being based on invisible control by a manipulative elite
is one that has consistently been thrown at the movement -  even the cultural critic
Slavoj Zizek has recently repeated this cliche in an interview with the magazine Bad
Subjects, when he stated that for him, ‘the tragedy of anarchism is that you end up
having an authoritarian secret society trying to achieve anarchist goals.’
The notion of the secretive conspirators is one that is found in Bakunin’s work,
without necessarily being the defining characteristic of it. Is it, though, a ‘tragedy’ as
Zizek asserts? In Zizek’s phrase, anarchism’s tragedy is that ‘you end up having an
authoritarian secret society’. This suggests that there is no other option open to
anarchism, and indeed in the same interview Zizek casually reiterates a simplistic
endorsement of the Marxist-anarchist binary that is not an accurate representation of the
complexities of influence that Marx had over both Bakunin and the anarchist
movement: ‘Marx was right when he drew attention to how anarchists who preach "no
state no power" in order to realize their goals usually form their own society which
obeys the most authoritarian rules.’49 What happens if one turns to Bakunin’s work to
look for an answer to these allegations?
Bakunin secured his eventual freedom after the Tsar offered him the choice of
remaining in prison or accepting permanent exile in Siberia in 1857. After being
transferred to Siberia, Bakunin married, and he and his wife, Antonia Kwiatkowski,
47 Michael Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, trans. and ed. by Marshall S. Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), p. 198.
48 Doug Henwood, ‘I am a Fighting Atheist: Interview with Slavoj ZiZek’, B ad Subjects, 59 (2002), 
available online at <http://eserver.org/bs/59/zizek.html>.
49 Henwood, ‘I am a Fighting Atheist’.
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then moved to Irkutsk, where Bakunin was able to plan a spectacular escape that 
included a marathon round-the-world voyage and has been described as ‘highly 
complicated and [showing] great initiative’.50 Leaving his wife behind in Siberia, he 
made his way to Japan, and from there to the United States, arriving in San Francisco in 
October 1861. He then continued to New York (via Panama) and finally departed for 
the United Kingdom in December of that year. He headed straight to London to be 
reunited with his friend Herzen and to launch himself back into the work of revolution.
While the Polish insurrection of 1863 gave Bakunin the opportunity to return to 
the sharp end of revolutionary activity, its failure, according to Morris, left him ‘highly 
disillusioned with the cause of the revolutionary nationalism’ (p. 27). Bakunin moved to 
Italy, although en route he passed through London, meeting Marx again. There appears 
to be some dispute as to whether Marx actually invited Bakunin to join the newly 
constituted International Working Men’s Association, although Carr argues 
convincingly that Marx’s later account of the inauguration of Bakunin into the 
International ‘is open to grave suspicion, being manifestly designed to magnify the 
turpitude of Bakunin’s subsequent attack on the International by emphasising his 
obligations to it’.51 In any case Bakunin had come away from the Polish experience with 
a resolution to ‘confine himself to participation in the Socialist Movement’ (Marx, as 
cited by Masters, pp. 163-164) and he seemed enthused with the idea of the 
International -  although his support immediately took the form of organising secret 
societies that seemed often to have had more substance in his imagination than in the 
world around him.
One such venture, the International Brotherhood, was set up in Florence in 1864. 
Yet this enterprise seems in retrospect to have been rather a fantastical affair: Bakunin
50 Masters, Bakunin, p. 131.
51 Carr, Michael Bakunin, p. 307.
52 For specific incidents o f Bakunin’s secret societies and clandestine missions, see, for example, Masters, 
Bakunin, p. 142; and Carr, Michael Bakunin, p. 309 and p. 317.
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wildly inflated his accounts of its international support and membership in letters to 
Herzen, and Carr suggests that he ‘made up for its shortcomings by magnificent make- 
believe’.53 This period produced some of the most illuminating documents of Bakunin’s 
thoughts on how to organise for the coming revolution. Specifically these were 
‘Program of the International Brotherhood,’ ‘Revolutionary Catechism,’ and ‘National 
Catechism’. Daniel Guerin, in his anthology of anarchism, cites H. E. Kaminski, an 
earlier biographer of Bakunin, who hailed them as ‘the spiritual foundation of the whole 
anarchist movement’.54 In moving away from a more restricted focus on the situation 
facing the Poles, towards a more comprehensive vision of social revolution, Dolgoff 
suggests that these texts mark Bakunin’s ‘transition from revolutionary nationalism to 
the mature revolutionary anarchism expounded by him toward the end of his eventful 
life’ (p. 73). Yet the documents could be seen as being both foundational and 
problematic in equal measure.
Although Morris goes to some pains to defend Bakunin from hostile criticism, 
he recognises that ‘his advocacy of a secret revolutionary society does not accord well 
with his anarchism’ (p. 145).55 For example, Bakunin concludes the principles of the 
‘National Catechism’, written in 1866, with the instruction that ‘in order to prepare for 
this revolution it will be necessary to conspire and to organise a strong secret 
association coordinated by an international nucleus’ (Dolgoff, p. 101). Yet perhaps a 
point worth underscoring in this quotation is that Bakunin says the association is for the 
purposes of ‘preparing’ for the revolution. This does not jar quite so much with the 
sentiments expressed three years later in ‘The Program of the International 
Brotherhood’, where Bakunin writes of the ‘conviction that revolutions are never made 
by individuals or even by secret societies. They make themselves; they are produced by
53 Carr, Michael Bakunin, p. 316.
54 Kaminski as cited by Guerin. See No Gods, No Masters: An Anthology o f  Anarchism, ed. by Daniel 
Gu6rin, trans. Paul Sharkey, 2 vols (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1998), I, p. 133.
55 For an example o f  this hostile criticism, see Aileen Kelly, Mikhail Bakunin: A Study in the Psychology 
and Politics o f  Utopianism  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
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the force of circumstances, the movement of fact and events’ (Dolgoff, p. 155). It could
be argued that, on its own terms, this interpretation of the world would lead to a
quietistic materialism constrained from intervening in the course of events as they
unfold. Rob Knowles suggests that Bakunin theorised his way out of this apparent
conundrum by arguing that:
The intimate nature or the substance of a thing [...] recognises itself 
through the sum of the different manifestations or all o f  the actions which 
it carries out external to itself... in a word, its action and its being are one.56
Thus in seeing the actions of a thing, or a society, or elements within that society, as
integral to its being, Bakunin does not resign his agency in the face of the ‘movement of
fact and events’ as cited above. So ‘The Program of the International Brotherhood’
continues, holding that an association such as itself can only be:
A sort of revolutionary general staff, composed of dedicated, energetic, 
intelligent individuals, sincere friends of the people above all, men neither 
vain nor ambitious, but capable of serving as intermediaries between the 
revolutionary idea and the instincts of the people. (Dolgoff, p. 155)
For this task, Bakunin writes, ‘one hundred revolutionaries, strong and earnestly allied,
would suffice for the international organization of all of Europe’ (Dolgoff, p. 155).
Yet this more open proposal for the preparation for the revolution is again
contradicted by a different text, written in 1870, just one year after the ‘Program’. This
was a letter to Albert Richard, a French anarchist and a member of Bakunin’s Alliance.
The letter itself verges on outright self-contradiction at times, as at one point Bakunin
argues that ‘the Revolution emanating from all points should not, and must not, depend
on a single directing center. The center must not be the source, but the product; not the
cause, but the effect of the revolution’ (Dolgoff, p. 180). Yet in the same text Bakunin
writes that the role of the revolutionary activist is one where:
We must bring forth anarchy, and in the midst of the popular tempest, we 
must be the invisible pilots guiding the Revolution, not by any kind of 
overt power but by the collective dictatorship of all our allies [members of
56 Bakunin, as cited by Rob Knowles, ‘“Human Light”: The Mystical Religion o f Mikhail Bakunin’, 
European Legacy, 7 (2002), 7-24 (p. 10, my emphasis).
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the anarchist vanguard organisation International Alliance of Social 
Democracy {Dolgoff s note)], a dictatorship without tricks, without official 
titles, without official rights, and therefore all the more powerful, as it does 
not carry the trappings of power. This is the only dictatorship I will accept. 
(Dolgoff, pp. 180-181)
However much one tries to gloss this paragraph, the problem seems to remain
the same, that this is a vanguard by any other name. Morris struggles with this problem,
recognising that in the ‘Revolutionary Catechism’ Bakunin ‘advocates a hierarchical
structure and almost unlibertarian stress on internal discipline’ (p. 33), yet can only
come up with the unsatisfactory mitigation that Bakunin’s ‘pilots’, rather than being a
vanguard, would be ‘midwives’ to the revolution (p. 34). Indeed, in the paragraph
following the above quotation, Bakunin tells his comrades that if they manage to build
‘this collective and invisible power you will triumph; the well-directed revolution will
succeed’ (Dolgoff, p. 181). It seems difficult to comprehend why the text entertains the
notion of a ‘well-directed revolution’, with its inevitable requirement of a director,
rather than a ‘self-directed revolution,’ which would have been more in keeping with
Bakunin’s federalist sensibilities, as found, for example, in the text of ‘The Paris
Commune and the Idea of the State’. Composed in 1871, a year after the letter to
Richard, Bakunin describes his more usual vision of social organisation:
The future social organisation should be carried out from the bottom up, by 
the free association or federation of workers, starting with the associations, 
then going on to the communes, the regions, the nations, and, finally, 
culminating in a great international and universal federation. It is only then 
that the true, life-giving social order of liberty and general welfare will 
come into being, a social order which, far from restricting, will affirm and 
reconcile the interests of individuals and of society. (Dolgoff, p. 270)
This ‘bottom up’ approach is more typical of Bakunin’s theory. This also served 
as the premise for his critique of Marx, for Bakunin fundamentally disagreed with the 
notion that a free society could be procured with authoritarian means. In responding to 
the ‘rabid anti-authoritarians’ in his 1874 essay ‘On Authority’, Engels was open about
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the authoritarianism that his and Marx’s theory would necessitate. He bluntly admits 
that:
A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act 
whereby one part of the population imposes its will on the other part by 
means of rifles, bayonets, and cannon [...] and if the victorious party does 
not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the 
terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries.57
Yet when critiquing Marx’s insistence on the necessity of the conquest of political
power as a step on the road to the emancipation of the proletariat, Bakunin wrote that
‘liberty can be created only by liberty’.58 It was Bakunin, then, who raised the
means/ends dilemma in his work. Yet in opposing Engels’ type of ‘imposition’, it could
be concluded that Bakunin’s critique of Marx’s theory can equally well be applied to his
own theory. While maintaining a means/ends critique of the use of non-libertarian
means for supposedly libertarian ends (in Marx), Bakunin failed to see the naked
contradiction in his own work. The guidance of revolutionary ‘pilots’ does not sit well
with a ‘bottom up’ approach to organisation.
So Bakunin’s work, in terms of both his texts and his life, defies easy
homogenization. That is not to say that there are not clear, and at times dominant,
themes. Yet Peter Marshall’s first sentence on Michael Bakunin describes him as a
‘paradoxical thinker, overwhelmed by the contradictory nature of the world around
him’.59 This would seem to intimate that a consideration of Bakunin’s political thought
will produce a similar critique as was levelled at Proudhon in the preceding chapter; that
is to say that there is an unavoidable conflict between form and content in his work.
Marshall goes on to suggest that Bakunin was ‘a “scientific” anarchist, who adopted
Marx’s economic materialism and Feuerbach’s atheism only to attack the rule of science
and to celebrate the wisdom of the instincts’.60 I have already detailed the basis of
57 Friedrich Engels, ‘On Authority’. See Marx and Engels, Basic Writings, p. 522.
58 Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, p. 179.
59 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 263.
60 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 263.
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Bakunin’s attack on the authority of science, but is it really accurate to describe his 
anarchism as ‘scientific’? I find it a difficult description to sustain, especially given that 
some critics see a lack of systematicity in Bakunin’s thought.61 It might be more 
reasonable to suggest that this conflict within Marshall’s own appraisal of Bakunin is 
symptomatic of the general critical inability to tolerate the plurality -  at times 
contradictory plurality -  of the Bakunin text. Moreover, in relation to Marshall’s 
criticism, surely it might be argued that one can entertain the notion of an economic 
materialism without it becoming a determining science? Marshall Shatz cites Marx’s 
criticism of Bakunin’s late work Statism and Anarchy that voluntarism underpinned 
Bakunin’s politics: ‘will, [...] not economic conditions, is the basis of his social 
revolution’.62 Yet as Shatz adds, what Marx ‘did not perceive so clearly was that 
precisely the opposite criticism might be leveled against him’.
Finally, abolishing Bakunin
A perusal of related texts has produced Bakunin the Russian agent, Bakunin the 
secretive dictator, Bakunin the international revolutionary, Bakunin the father of 
anarchism, Bakunin the scientific anarchist and Bakunin the wilful voluntarist. Is the 
critic’s task merely to pick one and nail his or her colours to that particular mast? It 
would be my hope that that should not be the case, and that all these Bakunins are not 
mutually exclusive. What it is fair to say is that Bakunin’s thought developed through 
various stages, from his early philosophical Hegelianism (which continued to inform his 
later thought), to his pan-Slavism, to his fully-fledged anarchism. Yet to differentiate 
these various eras in his theoretical development would seem, in one way, to reinforce
61 See, for example, Avrich, ‘The Legacy o f  Bakunin’, p. 130, or Aileen Kelly, Mikhail Bakunin, p. 184. 
An opposing view is given by Rob Knowles who argues that the ‘paradoxical’ Bakunin is a result o f the 
influence o f Isaiah Berlin’s essay on Herzen and Bakunin, an essay that he characterizes as ‘trivializing’ 
Bakunin’s ‘seriously studied and argued belief in “freedom”’. See Knowles, ‘Human Light’ (p. 8), and 
Isaiah Berlin, ‘Herzen and Bakunin on Individual Liberty’, in Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers, ed. by 
Henry Hardy and Aileen Kelly (London: Penguin, 1994), pp. 82-113.
62 Marx, as cited by Shatz, ‘Introduction’, p. xxxi.
63 Shatz, ‘Introduction’, p. xxxi.
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what Foucault warned of as seeing the author as the ‘basis for explaining not only the
presence of certain events in a work, but also their transformations, distortions, and
diverse modifications’. This traditional use of the author, for Foucault, meant that
criticism found therein ‘the principle of a certain unity of writing [...]. The author also
serves to neutralize the contradictions that may emerge in a series of texts’. 64 This
neutralizing of contradictions is exactly the opposite of what I have attempted in
relation to Bakunin’s work. What now remains in the remainder of this chapter is to
examine the results of this disavowal of the principle of unity.
Bakunin openly rejected the notion of absolute truths, particularly in relation to
his spat with Marx over the direction of the International:
from the moment that the absolute does not exist, there cannot be any 
infallible dogma for the International, nor consequently any official 
political and economic theory, and our Congress must never claim the role 
of General Church Councils, proclaiming obligatory principles for all 
adherents and believers.65
Again, in God and the State, he rejects the notion of universal values. He finds himself
forbidden ‘to recognise a fixed, constant, and universal authority, because there is no
universal man, no man capable of grasping in that wealth of detail, without which the
application of science to life is impossible’ (p. 33). Bearing this in mind, can it really be
fair to seek to derive an absolute, fixed notion of a ‘Bakunin’ from his work? On the
one hand, this premise is what lies behind the critical works, such as Berlin’s essay and
Kelly’s biography, the sense that Bakunin’s text (taken to mean both his written work
and his life’s events) is internally incoherent. On the other hand, defenders of Bakunin
would apparently cleave to the same notion, and thus one finds Morris and Knowles
trying to argue for a coherent ‘Bakuninist’ theory of freedom, anarchism and revolution.
What can be stated with confidence is that encountering Bakunin one encounters
a mass of contradictions. For example, which Bakunin? The one portrayed by the
64 Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, p. 204.
65 Bakunin, Marxism, Freedom and the State, pp. 42-43.
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defenders, or the one portrayed by hostile critics? Even this dichotomy is not watertight, 
for Peter Marshall apparently takes a defensive line with respect to Bakunin, arguing 
that he ‘made a major contribution to anarchist and socialist theory’. Yet at the same 
time he describes Bakunin as having used ‘dissimulation and fraud rather than reasoned 
argument and free choice in open association’ and for these reasons, undermined ‘his 
personal authenticity and moral example’. As if this were not damnation enough, 
Marshall concludes that ‘he was so thoroughly corrupted by the love of power that he 
singularly failed to see that the dangers he described in Marx’s revolutionary 
dictatorship were equally applicable in his own’.66 As Daniel Guerin has commented, 
until some future event sees the realisation of Bakunin’s vision, in the meantime his 
theories leave anarchists ‘more or less imprisoned by contradiction’. This 
contradiction, then, would appear to leave anarchists in need of employing secretly 
authoritarian means, and Zizek would be vindicated in proffering this as anarchism’s 
‘tragic flaw’.
This is not, though, the position that I want this chapter to conclude with. As 
might be suspected from Bakunin’s comments on the authority of science, as cited 
earlier, there is, I would contend, enough leeway in his work neither to have to damn 
him for the cracks and inconsistencies, nor to have to paper over them. Nevertheless in 
considering the work of Bakunin I will not follow the example that he set in terms of his 
own theoretical coherence. I shall instead attempt to remain within the logic of 
Foucault’s questioning of the author that I referred to at the beginning of this chapter. 
Yet how is one to theorise Bakunin’s apparent mass of contradictions? Is contradiction 
to be valorised for its own sake?
Bakunin certainly had a holistic approach to freedom. Yet it seems unduly 
reductive to suggest that this holism extends to the totality of his thought, or that it can
66 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 307.
67 Guerin, Anarchism, p. 37.
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be reduced to a single plan or manifesto. Rob Knowles demonstrates this when he 
argues that Bakunin’s vision of the future was ‘a thoroughly humanist and non-
/ o
authoritarian vision, without reservations’. My contention is that this conclusion is not
supported by the dizzying array of conflicting positions to be found within Bakunin’s
work, and that such a homogenising conclusion is symptomatic of the majority of
critical work on this writer, work which seeks to establish first an unequivocal Bakunin
to which one either pays homage or exposes the clay feet. Bakunin himself recognised
the contradictory nature of constructed subjecthood when in the unpublished Knouto-
Germanic Empire he wrote that:
The real individual is from the moment of his gestation in his mother’s 
womb already predetermined and particularized by a confluence of 
geographic, climatic, ethnographic, hygienic, and economic influences, 
which constitute the nature of his family, his class, his nation, his race. [...]
There are rudimentary faculties without any content. Whence comes their 
content? From society... impressions, facts, and events coalesced into 
patterns of thought, right or wrong, are transmitted from one individual to 
another. (Dolgoff, pp. 240-241)
Again, in ‘The Program of the International Brotherhood’, Bakunin contends that ‘every
human individual is the involuntary product of a natural and social environment within
which he is bom, and to the influence of which he continues to submit as he develops’
(Dolgoff, p. 149-150). Cultural influences clearly do not function in a single, linear,
fashion, on the subject of culture. Our subject positions are inherently contradictory, yet
in recognising that, it seems that the question immediately arises as to the ideological
investment in denying Bakunin the possibility of a contradictory subject position. The
answer that I would offer, based on this chapter’s readings of Bakunin’s life and works,
is that the construction of a unified and univocal subject is the first step on the path
towards establishing the authority of the critic to write about that very subject.
Questioning this critical authority should be considered a matter of urgency for 
anarchist (literary) theory. This is evident from several examples. James Joll has written
68 Knowles, ‘Human Light’, p. 19.
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that for Bakunin ‘the act of destruction was sufficient in itself, for there was in his view 
a fundamental goodness in man and a fundamental soundness in human institutions 
which would automatically be released once the existing system was overthrown’.69 All 
of the discussion in this chapter should prove sufficient to show that this 
characterisation is grossly reductive and very far from an accurate portrayal of 
Bakunin’s thought. Yet these judgements -  once expressed -  tend to become solidified 
into a discourse.70 Foucault describes this as ‘a complex operation which constructs a 
certain rational being that we call “author.”’71 Yet even the most astute commentators 
on anarchism still find space for passing off this rather questionable characterization. 
For example, Saul Newman, while discussing the contributions that Foucault’s work 
could make to contemporary anarchist theory, flatly states that a ‘universal human 
subject’, a subject ‘whose natural human essence is repressed by power’ is ‘central to 
anarchism’.72 This chapter clearly demonstrates that such a description, and this from an 
author sympathetic to anarchism, is not borne out by an attentive reading of the texts 
described as the ‘spiritual foundation’ of the anarchist movement. The ‘postanarchism’ 
online discussion group recently debated, furiously, whether or not classical anarchism 
was essentialist (as both Joll’s and Newman’s texts clearly propose). The most apposite 
comment came from the American academic Jesse Cohn, who argued that ‘the problem 
isn't essentialism so much as it is reification -  the forcible imposition of fixity (via 
certain "spurious" categories, rules, norms, etc.) onto what is actually fluid, changing,
69 James Joll, The Anarchists, 2nd edn (London: Methuen, 1979), pp. 69-70.
70 With respect to this, D olgoff attempts to finesse somewhat Bakunin’s use o f  the term dictatorship, by 
suggesting that what he envisaged would not qualify as a dictatorship when measured against Lenin’s 
requirement o f ‘institutionalised power to enforce its policies’ (p. 182). How, though, can one measure 
the power o f a discourse? And what would count as an institution o f a discourse? Surely the 
overwhelming power o f the ‘always-already’, the fact that there can be no exterior to language, means 
that there can likewise be no easy excision from discourse o f a text already written. Hence Joll’s text may 
not qualify as an institution o f Bakuninist discourse, without power to enforce its reading, but at the same 
time it contributes to the coalescence o f  powers around the hegemonic approach o f offering univocal 
readings o f Bakunin (for however opposed those readings may be to each other).
71 Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, p. 203.
72 Newman, ‘The Politics o f Postanarchism’, p. 4.
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developing, undecided’. While Cohn’s words look to the future, the same logic is 
equally applicable to the past, in that attempting to present a univocal reading of 
Bakunin can no longer be acceptable.
This returns the focus to the question of coherence. Is coherence to be 
abandoned altogether as the vestigial remnant of a totalitarian reading practice now 
overthrown by Black Bloc activists with copies of Foucault and Derrida, rather than 
bricks and Molotov cocktails, in their hands? Would an anarchist textual theory find 
itself obliged to endorse incoherence as a guiding value? This is an unsatisfactory 
conclusion, not least for the simple fact that an inversion of the binary opposition of 
coherence-incoherence will do nothing to challenge the authority of such Manichaean 
modes of thinking. Hence my conclusion here is that Bakunin’s text consistently 
frustrates any attempt to impose a singular reading on it, and this should now be seen as 
a strength, not a limitation. As such it would serve as an inspiration to an anarchist 
reading practice, to resist the urge to find a satisfyingly conclusive single meaning to a 
text, such as when the Italian anarchist Alfredo Bonanno argues that ‘being an anarchist 
does not mean one has reached a certainty’.74
Bakunin at times saw conflict as ‘both inevitable and necessary’ (Dolgoff, p. 
64), and also that ‘order without struggle is death’ (Dolgoff, p. 271). The same spirit 
should, in my view, be applied to his work. One of Bakunin’s more famous phrases was 
a reversal of Voltaire’s aphorism, when Bakunin wrote in God and the State that 'ifGod  
really existed, it would be necessary to abolish him’ (p. 28). Taking a lead from that 
example, perhaps it might rather be ventured that if Bakunin really existed, it would be 
necessary to abolish him instead.
73 Jesse Cohn, ‘Re: Clarifying Essentialism's Relation to Anarchism’, posted 5 June 2003, previously 
available online at <http://lists.village.virginia.edu/cgi-
bin/spoons/archive_msg.pl?file=postanarchism.archive%2Fpostanarchism.0306&msgnum=36&start=367
1>.
74 Bonanno, ‘The Anarchist Tension’.
The Individual, Society and 
Emma Goldman
Ironically it would seem that Emma Goldman is more famous for something that she 
never said than for anything she ever did. Mention the name of Emma Goldman, and for 
those familiar with her life and work the first words that come to mind are a variant of 
the ‘If I can’t dance, I don’t want to be in your revolution’ aphorism. From t-shirt 
slogans to inspiring contemporary rock bands, these words have taken on a life of their 
own.1 Yet despite being perhaps the best known of Emma Goldman’s words, they turn 
out to have little basis in her work. The Goldman scholar Alix Kates Shulman 
‘confesses’ to having had a hand in the origins of the non-quotation when she recalls 
summarizing, for the benefit of an anarchist printer who wanted an idea for a fund­
raising t-shirt, an incident that Goldman mentions in her autobiography.2 Goldman 
recounts spending an evening at a dance around 1890. At this time she had been 
involved in organising support for a strike of cloakmakers in New York, and in her 
autobiography she describes her enthusiasm for recruiting more workers to the strike’s 
cause. The passion she brought to her oratory carried over to her recreational activities, 
and at the dances she portrays herself as ‘one of the most untiring and gayest’.3 During 
the evening concerned, her abandon drew a reprimand from a cousin of her lifelong
1 For an example o f one o f the many Emma Goldman t-shirts available that use this ‘quotation’, see this 
image from the AK Press catalogue: <http://www.akpress.org/images/cms/430_popup.jpg>. For 
providing musical inspiration, see ‘The (International) Noise Conspiracy’s Protest Dancing’, available 
online at <http://www.chartattack.eom/damn/2001/l l/0802.cfm>.
2 Alix Kates Shulman, ‘Dances with Feminists’, available online at 
<http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/Goldman/Features/dances_shulman.html>.
3 Emma Goldman, Living My Life, 2 vols (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), I, p. 56. All further 
references in this chapter will be given in the text as volume number and page number.
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soulmate and one-time lover, the anarchist activist and writer Alexander Berkman. The 
unnamed cousin suggested, according to Goldman, that ‘it did not behoove an agitator 
to dance’ and that her ‘frivolity would only hurt the Cause’. Goldman reacted with 
anger at the comment, and wrote that she ‘did not believe that a Cause which stood for a 
beautiful ideal, for anarchism, for release and freedom from conventions and prejudice, 
should demand the denial of life and joy’ (I, p. 56). This response is typical of her work, 
and the texts that I will consider in this chapter seem to throw out a radical challenge to 
the parameters that have traditionally limited the concept of the political. Goldman’s 
texts advocate what might be styled as a militantly holistic approach to life, and her 
work has been seen as one of the earliest formulations of the feminist affirmation that 
the personal is the political.4
One feels an excitement about approaching the work of Emma Goldman, 
perhaps a hope that her texts will display a similar defiance of their own ‘conventions 
and prejudice’. Indeed in the very first piece in the collection Red Emma Speaks, 
entitled ‘What I Believe’, Goldman writes encouragingly that “‘What I believe” is a 
process rather than a finality. Finalities are for gods and governments, not for the human 
intellect’.5 Perhaps with Goldman the anarchist canon might finally come to a body of 
work that manages to fulfil Barthes’s sense of the open, writerly text, with this clear 
disavowal o f ‘finalities’.
This excitement finds a reflection in Goldman’s own account of her first 
experiences of attending anarchist meetings in the United States, in the preface to her
4 See Anna Rotkirch, ‘Emma Goldman’, in Encyclopedia o f  Life Writing, ed. Margaretta Jolly (London: 
Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), pp. 385-386, available online at
<http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/stafFrotkirch/goldman.html>. Jim Jose argues that Goldman’s ‘status as a 
political theorist is marginal [despite] her clearly acknowledged standing within the anarchist tradition 
and her almost cult-like status within American popular culture at the end o f  the twentieth century’. Jose, 
though, insists on her importance as a political theorist, and suggests that her ‘critique o f patriarchy has 
been seen [...]  as her original contribution to anarchist theory’. Jim Jose, “‘Nowhere at Home”, Not Even 
In Theory: Emma Goldman, Anarchism and Political Theory’, Anarchist Studies, 13 (2005), 23-46 (p. 24, 
P. 31).
Emma Goldman, Red Emma Speaks: An Emma Goldman Reader, ed. by Alix Kates Shulman, 3rd edn 
(New York: Humanity Books, 1998), p. 49.
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collection Anarchism and Other Essays. She describes how she listened to ‘the 
inimitable John Most,’ impressed with his ‘wonderful eloquence’ and his ‘enthusiasm 
and fire’, and recounts how her ‘one great longing then was to be able to speak with the 
tongue of John Most, -  that I, too, might thus reach the masses’.6 The question that this 
chapter will consider is exactly how did Emma Goldman speak to the masses -  will this 
initial excitement prove to be misplaced? Or will there be any evidence of a textual 
strategy that might indeed free the reading process from what the previous two chapters 
have already pointed towards as contradictorily authoritarian textual constructions 
within anarchist discourse?
Who, though, was Emma Goldman? Although I will be addressing her 
autobiography more directly in a later chapter, it will be helpful here to have some 
historical detail, bearing in mind the caveats that were elaborated in the consideration in 
the previous chapter of Bakunin’s life story. Bom into a Jewish family in 1869 in 
present-day Lithuania, Goldman’s autobiography recalls a stormy and at times violent 
relationship with her father, whose presence she describes as ‘terrifying’ (I, p. 11). 
Significantly, though, her autobiography begins not with the usual familial 
recollections, but rather with her arrival in New York in 1889. By this stage Goldman 
had already been living in the United States for several years, having emigrated to 
America with her sister when she was sixteen. She sketches in her life prior to this 
moment as retrospective supplementary detail to the events that follow on from this 
date. Hence by choosing this point to begin the narrative of her life story, the text can be 
seen to make a striking intervention in how Goldman is framed for the reader -  a 
putatively ‘natural’ frame such as birth, genealogy, or first memory, is eschewed in 
favour of a dramatic intervention in the temporal linearity in order to begin the story 
when she was twenty years old. The moment that Goldman is bom for us on the pages
6 Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays, p. 41. All further references in this chapter will be given in the 
text.
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of her autobiography is the moment that she begins her conversion to becoming an out- 
and-out anarchist -  the text presents Goldman from the moment when she comes 
directly into contact with the organised anarchist movement in New York, and in
n
particular, with Johann Most.
This clearly poses what Laura Marcus calls a ‘crucial question’ with regard to 
the status of autobiography and ‘the relationship between identity, narrative and
• • 8 rT' •biographical time’ in her discussion on autobiographical discourses. The text displays a 
strategy of eschewing the chronological origins of autobiography in favour of a point in 
time chosen for its obvious significance. This can be read as a striking narrative 
assertion of Goldman’s own conscious sense of identity in opposition to accepting the 
convention of birth as the putatively natural starting point for an autobiography. My 
concern here, though, is whether such an active intervention can be read as a challenge 
to or as a reinforcement of existing structures. Helene Cixous confronts these structures 
in ‘Sorties’, structures that she identifies as functioning by binary opposition. She calls 
this the ‘two-term system’ that eventually ‘subjects the entire conceptual organization to 
man’. For Cixous, the binarism always relates back to the opposition 
‘activity/passivity’.9 If Goldman’s text makes such a dramatic (active) intervention in 
the conventional linearity of biographical time, if it escapes the (passive) conditions that 
Cixous sees as being traditionally ascribed to the feminine, does that mean that it is 
condemned to be relocated on the opposing pole of the binary? I would not want, as 
Cixous puts it, to fall ‘complacently or blindly into the essentialist ideological 
interpretation’.10 Yet to ignore the question might mean, in Marcus’s words, to ascribe 
to the text a ‘universal selfhood’ which she argues ‘is in fact gendered male because all
7 Although Goldman refers to Most in the earlier quotation from the preface to Anarchism and Other 
Essays as ‘John’, it can be taken as an Anglicisation o f the original German ‘Johann’, which is used by 
most other commentators, as well as by Goldman herself in the autobiography.
8 Laura Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses: Theory, Criticism, Practice (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1994), p. 197.
9 H616ne Cixous, ‘Sorties’, trans. by Ann Liddle, in Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader, ed. by 
David Lodge (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 287-293 (p. 287, p. 288).
10 Cixous, ‘Sorties’, p. 289.
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agency and identity are seen as masculine’. 11 Toril Moi warns that if Cixous’s ‘analysis
is correct, for a feminist to continue advocating binary thought, implicitly or explicitly,
would seem to be tantamount to remaining inside patriarchal metaphysics’.12 On the one
hand, it might be argued that Goldman’s text perhaps challenges the conventional
hierarchy of the binary. It thus heeds Marcus’s warning about attempting to identify
1 ^‘“innate” gender differences’. On the other hand what it does not do, at least not in this 
one gesture under consideration, is problematize the binary qua binary, and so Moi’s 
concerns remain. This initial consideration of Living My Life raises questions about the 
implications of the text’s narrative strategy, and therefore frames my discussion which, 
for the time being, will focus on the way Goldman’s text calls upon a certain binary 
logic.
Goldman’s arrival in New York soon brought her into contact with Johann Most, 
and, at his urging, she did indeed seek to emulate his fiery oratory, taking up the task of 
public speaking to advance the cause of anarchism. Yet her experiences were mixed: at 
her first meeting she describes quite a Wordsworthian spontaneous overflow -  ‘words I 
had never heard myself utter before came pouring forth, faster and faster [...] the 
audience had vanished, the hall itself had disappeared; I was conscious only of my own 
words, of my ecstatic song’ (I, p. 51). After her second meeting, though, she leaves with 
the feeling that she has cheated the audience, by simply giving the gist of a text that 
Most had prepared for her. Moreover she characterises this as ‘committing a crime 
against [herself] and the workers by serving as a parrot repeating Most’s views’ (I, p. 
52). She comes away from the experience with ‘a valuable lesson. It cured me 
somewhat of my childlike faith in the infallibility of my teacher and impressed on me
11 Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses, p. 67.
12 Toril Moi, ‘Feminist, Female, Feminine’, in The Feminist Reader: Essays in Gender and the Politics o f  
Literary Criticism , ed. by Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press,
1997), pp. 104-116 (pp. 110-111).
13 Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses, p. 67.
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the need of independent thinking’ (I, p. 53). This lesson is one that I hope to be able to 
apply to Goldman’s own work later in this chapter.
Goldman came to national public prominence with the attempt of her lover, 
Berkman, to assassinate Henry Clay Frick, the chairman of a steel company where 
private security had killed some eleven strikers. Although Berkman failed in his attempt 
to demonstrate that, as Goldman calls it, ‘the proletariat of America had its avengers’, 
her notoriety was guaranteed (I, p. 87). In the ‘Biographic Sketch’ that precedes the 
collection Anarchism and Other Essays, her colleague and contemporary Hippolyte 
Havel wrote that ‘the police exerted every effort to involve Emma Goldman in the act of 
Alexander Berkman. The feared agitator was to be silenced by all means’.14 In the 
course of her career she was indeed arrested and served a number of prison sentences: 
for incitement to riot; for the distribution of birth control literature; and for anti-war 
agitation. Yet she continued her propagandists work as enthusiastically as she could, 
and Peter Marshall records that in the wake of the publication of Anarchism and Other 
Essays ‘she undertook a tour during which she spoke 120 times in 37 cities to 25,000 
listeners’.15 One of the founders of the American Civil Liberties Union, Roger Baldwin, 
described a revelatory experience upon hearing Goldman speak: ‘never before had I 
heard such social passion, such courageous exposure of basic evils, such electric power 
behind words, such a sweeping challenge to all values I had been taught to hold 
highest.’16 Yet this radicalism earned both Goldman and Berkman powerful enemies, 
and eventually J. Edgar Hoover directed their deportation to Russia, after having
14 Hippolyte Havel, ‘Biographic Sketch’, in Emma Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays (New York: 
Dover, 1969), pp. 1-40 (p. 18).
15 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 399.
16 Baldwin, as cited by Alix Kates Shulman, ‘Biographical Introduction’, in Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, 
pp. 20-40 (p. 27).
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described them as ‘beyond doubt, two of the most dangerous anarchists in this 
country’.17
Goldman and Berkman were deported, along with 247 other radicals deemed 
unwelcome by the United States government, to Lenin’s Russia in 1919. Initially both 
Goldman and Berkman were excited at the prospect of participating in the work of the 
revolution, especially in the land of their birth. Yet inevitably the authoritarianism that 
Bakunin had warned was inherent in Marx’s ideology surfaced in post-revolutionary 
Soviet Russia, with direct consequences for the anarchists there. As Alexandre Skirda 
pithily puts it, Russian anarchists ‘came to realize [...] that the heads of Lenin and his 
faithful followers were still crammed with the centralist and statist outlook’.18 Goldman 
and Berkman were in Russia when the violent repression of the anarchist-led Kronstadt 
uprising took place. Marshall writes that ‘within three years, the Bolsheviks had 
succeeded in wiping out by military means the anarchist movement completely’.19 After 
only a short time in Russia the pair left, and Goldman subsequently became a vocal 
critic of the Bolsheviks.
From there she and Berkman moved to Western Europe. After a number of years 
spent constantly on the move with only temporary visas to count on, in 1925 Goldman 
married a Welsh miner, James Colton, in order to procure a British passport. With that 
she was able to make a speaking tour of Canada, and then joined Berkman in the south 
of France, where she dedicated herself to writing her autobiography. Despite the blow 
of Berkman’s suicide in 1936, Goldman threw herself into the cause of the Spanish 
anarchists in the struggle against Franco. Her agitation was cut short by a stroke, 
however, and she died in 1940 at the age of seventy.
17 See J. Edgar Hoover’s memo, available online at 
<http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/Goldman/Exhibition/eg27b.jpg>.
18 Alexandre Skirda, Facing the Enemy: A History o f  Anarchist Organisation from  Proudhon to May 
1968, trans. by Paul Sharkey (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2002), p. 112.
19 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, p. 473.
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The work that Emma Goldman produced during her life spans various categories 
of writing, but can be easily summarised. Of her political output, most of her work was 
in the form of essays, dictated by the fact that her pieces were destined for publication 
in magazines, principally the one she founded, Mother Earth. This journal first saw the 
light of day in New York in 1906, and continued publication until 1917, when it was 
brought to a close by wartime censorship.20 A brief issue of the Mother Earth Bulletin 
continued until 1918, but Goldman and Berkman’s prison sentences and subsequent 
deportation put a final stop to the publication of the magazine. In New York in 1910 
Goldman collated a dozen of the essays from Mother Earth into the collection 
Anarchism and Other Essays. More recently a selection of her writings and speeches 
were anthologised in 1972 as Red Emma Speaks, and 2001 saw the publication of 
Anarchy!: An Anthology o f Emma Goldman’s Mother Earth, which gives a sample from 
the wide range of contributors to the original magazine, including from Goldman 
herself. Goldman’s range was broad indeed: she published The Social Significance o f 
Modern Drama in 1914, as well as her two-volume autobiography, Living My Life, in 
1931. Besides that, in 1923 she wrote of her time in Russia, in My Disillusionment in 
Russia, and a volume of the letters that she and Berkman exchanged, Nowhere at Home, 
was published in 1975.
Goldman’s ‘ignorant masses*
To begin to consider Emma Goldman’s political theory, I will turn firstly to her 
collection Anarchism and Other Essays. Even in the preface to the text, Goldman 
reiterates the sentiments she had already expressed in ‘What I Believe’ with regard to 
the future as a measure of libertarian intentions. As cited above, she had eschewed
20 For an account o f the fortunes o f  Goldman’s journal, see Peter Glassgold, ‘Introduction: The Life and 
Death o f Mother Earth’, in Anarchy!: An Anthology o f  Emma Goldman’s ‘Mother Earth ', ed. by Peter 
Glassgold (Washington: Counterpoint, 2001), pp. xv-xxxvi.
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‘finalities’ as being ‘for gods and governments’. In Anarchism and Other Essays she 
contends that:
the things every new generation has to fight, and which it can least 
overcome, are the burdens of the past, which holds us all as in a net. 
Anarchism, at least as I understand it, leaves posterity free to develop its 
own particular systems, in harmony with its needs. Our most vivid 
imagination can not foresee the potentialities of a race set free from 
external restraints. How, then, can any one assume to map out a line of 
conduct for those to come? (p. 43)
It should be clear by now that this is a familiar anarchist trope, the notion of leaving the
future to look after itself, a refusal to plan for it. Goldman reiterates this sentiment later
in the essay, writing that ‘anarchism is not, as some may suppose, a theory of the future
to be realized through divine inspiration’ (p. 63). Indeed, on closer examination,
Goldman’s text above demonstrates an even greater degree of caution and
circumspection, for she qualifies her own statement about anarchism with the proviso
‘at least as I understand it’.
Nevertheless the inspiration that these words offer is called into question by the
first essay in the text. Entitled ‘Anarchism: What It Really Stands For’, the subtitle
immediately holds out the promise of establishing a foundational value for the doctrine
to be expounded by Goldman. This is reinforced by the poem ‘Anarchy’ that precedes
the essay. In this poem, by the contemporary anarchist writer John Henry Mackay, one
encounters the lines:
[...] To them that ne’er have striven 
The truth that lies behind a word to find,
To them the word’s right meaning was not given.
They shall continue blind among the blind, (p. 47)
Despite this portent of revealing a truth behind ‘a word’ -  or rather, the word, ‘anarchy’
-  in the pages that follow, the text adopts a different tack, and indeed avoids starting
from an a priori premise by addressing what the current understanding of anarchism is.
Goldman writes that ‘to deal even remotely with all that is being said and done against
Anarchism would necessitate the writing of a whole volume’ and so proposes to deal
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with ‘two of the principal objections’, those being the supposed impracticality of 
anarchism, and the notion that it signifies ‘violence and destruction’ (p. 48-9). Goldman 
identifies an ignorance surrounding the notion of anarchism, and locates the origins of 
this ignorance thus: ‘Rather than to go to the bottom of any given idea, to examine into 
its origin and meaning, most people will either condemn it altogether, or rely on some 
superficial or prejudicial definition of non-essentials.’ The methodology, then, is that 
‘anarchism urges man to think, to investigate, to analyze every proposition’ (p. 50). So 
far, perhaps, so good. The redoubtable Goldman appears prepared to defy convention 
and strike out in a new direction.
Goldman recognises in the history of the world around her that ‘the individual 
and society have waged a relentless and bloody battle for ages, each striving for 
supremacy, because each was blind to the value and importance of the other’ (p. 51). 
Yet in distinction to Marx, for example, who wrote in the preface to Capital that 
‘individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic 
categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests’, Goldman sees 
the revolutionary salvation of society beginning with the individual not the class.21 The 
essay identifies three ‘phantoms’ that have held humanity captive -  religion, property, 
and the state (p. 52). Hence, for her, anarchism urges the individual to ‘break your 
mental fetters [...] for not until you think and judge for yourself will you get rid of the 
dominion of darkness, the greatest obstacle to all progress’ (p. 53). This move locates 
all agency for social change in the individual, and only once the individual has found 
freedom ‘will he realize the true force of the social bonds which knit men together, and 
which are the true foundations of a normal social life’ (p. 61). Leaving aside the 
question of the significance of the essentializing terms that Goldman employs (true, 
normal), she sees a path to liberation that begins with the individual: ‘anarchism stands
21 Marx and Engels, Basic Writings, p. 177.
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for a social order based on the free grouping of individuals for the purpose of producing 
real social wealth’ (p. 62).
In her attempt to reconcile the competing demands of individual and society, and 
to privilege neither over the other, Goldman can be seen to be attempting to fuse two 
strands of anarchism that are generally thought of as being in opposition to one another.
On the one hand there is the radical individualism of Max Stimer, the influential
0 0  «German individualist anarchist and author of The Ego and Its Own. Stimer argued that
‘the individual is unique [and] enters freely into association and equally freely reclaims
his freedom’.23 One study of Stimer has described him as ‘the foremost exponent of
extreme individualist anarchism’, with his belief in ‘the metaphysical priority of the ego
[and] the necessity and desirability of egotistic action’.24 On the other hand, there is the
more communistic anarchism of Peter Kropotkin, who saw cooperation and not
Darwinian competition as an intrinsic feature of human society. In Mutual Aid
Kropotkin insists on the ‘immense part’ that mutual aid played ‘in the evolution of both
the animal world and human societies’.25 Yet it would not be accurate to represent this
as a diametrically opposed position to that of Stimer. Kropotkin also acknowledges a
parallel current in the course of human history, and that is:
the self-assertion of the individual, not only in its efforts to attain personal 
or caste superiority, economical, political, and spiritual, but also in its 
much more important although less evident function of breaking through 
the bonds, always prone to become crystallized, which the tribe, the village 
community, the city, and the State impose upon the individual.26
Goldman’s fusion of the two is not so much a reconciliation of radical opposites as a
question of locating the individual in the process of revolutionary change. Her espousal
of Stimer emphasizes Kropotkin’s notion of the individual’s function of ‘breaking
22 Max Stimer, The Ego and Its Own, trans. by Steven Byington, ed. by David Leopold (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
23 Guerin, No Gods, No Masters, I, p. 19.
24 Clark, Max S tim er’s Egoism, p. 15.
25 Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor o f  Evolution (London: Freedom Press, 1987) p. 232.
26 Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, p. 231.
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through’ the arbitrary limits established by external authorities, but specifically makes 
this process a necessary and conscious precedent to the realisation of the ‘social bonds 
which knit men together’. I shall return to the import of this particular focus on the 
individual in the light of the following considerations of the mode of address of 
Goldman’s text.
What initially seemed to be a promising beginning to Anarchism and Other 
Essays quickly finds itself compromised. As the quotations above illustrate, Goldman 
seems happy to make sweeping generalizations about ‘most people’. The disquiet, 
though, that this provokes is only multiplied when the text invokes the figure of ‘the 
ignorant mass’. Goldman attempts to address the opposition to anarchism, arguing that 
it ‘brings to light the relation between so-called intelligence and ignorance’ (p. 48). The 
text apparently maintains the equitable idea that ‘the opposition of the uneducated to 
Anarchism deserves the same consideration as that of the intelligent man’ (p. 48) and 
similarly that ‘the intelligent man and the ignorant mass judge not from a thorough 
knowledge of the subject, but either from hearsay or false interpretation’ (p. 49). Yet the 
terms that the text employs reveal a distinct hierarchy. On the side of intelligence, for 
example, the metonymic figure put forth by the text is the ‘intelligent man’, displaying a 
certain degree of metaphoric specificity. In opposition to this, one finds ‘the ignorant 
mass’, without even an attempt to disguise its reductive cartoon-like qualities. Indeed 
this mass, according to Goldman, acts ‘as it always does, by mere impulse, its reasons 
are like those of a child’ (p. 48). The infantilising simile is all the more striking in 
contrast with the figure of the ‘intelligent man’, with the (positive) value of maturity on 
the side of the (gendered masculine) intelligent individual. The gendering of the 
opposition seems even clearer if one considers the essentializing (‘always’) impulsivity
97of ignorance, recalling one of Cixous’s exemplary pairs, ‘head/heart’.
27 Cixous, ‘Sorties’, p. 287.
123
So while the ‘Anarchism’ essay aims to dispel popular misunderstandings of 
anarchism, Goldman concedes that ‘the emotions of the ignorant man are continuously 
kept at a pitch by the most blood-curdling stories about Anarchism’ (p. 49), yet 
simultaneously manages to link ignorance to the (feminine) term of emotionality. If the 
attentive reader is to follow Goldman’s urging ‘to think, to investigate, to analyze every 
proposition’, not only do figures such as ‘the ignorant mass’ and ‘the ignorant man’ 
come to seem utterly reductive, but the discursive field surrounding them begins to 
appear heavily compromised in terms of a gender analysis. Moreover the sentence that 
urges the analysis of ‘every proposition’ continues in the following fashion: ‘but that the 
brain capacity of the average reader be not taxed too much, I also shall begin with a 
definition’ (p. 50). While ‘average’ is perhaps an ambiguous term, even allowing it the 
putatively neutral value of ‘representative’ or ‘typical’ still leaves the phrase evincing a 
desire to alienate the very readership to which it claims to appeal, with its 
condescending disdain for not taxing its ‘brain capacity’.
Thus it seems hard to avoid the perception of a dismissive tone in the text, yet 
Goldman goes on to cite Emerson and conclude that ‘the individual instinct is the thing 
of value in the world’ (p. 52). Although Goldman premises her aspirations for the future 
on a notion of the liberated individual, it becomes clear that this premise relies on the 
textual construction of an already existing human mass that does not warrant a more 
nuanced treatment. The text’s own logic would seem to suggest that if the thing of value 
is the individual instinct, the obverse of this is that the ‘ignorant mass’ (of any potential 
audience/readership) is without any value, or at best a latent or dormant value.
The examples quoted above amply demonstrate a textual failure to attempt to 
engage with the heterogeneity of Goldman’s own audience (or the audience that she 
might have aspired to). Indeed in ‘Minorities Versus Majorities’ she constructs a 
‘uniform, gray, and monotonous as the desert’ homogeneity for a certain section of the
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community that is being written of, the majority that she in fact repudiates ‘as a creative
force for good [...] as a compact mass it has never stood for justice or equality’ (p. 78).
This is all the more surprising given that Goldman astutely differentiated between
varying types of oppression, for example when she recognised the specific oppression
that women suffered as women. In the essay ‘The Traffic in Women’ in the same
collection, she turns her attention to the question of prostitution, and asks: ‘What is
really the cause of the trade in women? Not merely white women, but yellow and black
women as well. Exploitation, of course; the merciless Moloch of capitalism that fattens
on underpaid labor’ (p. 178). Yet despite the opportunity to homogenize the economic
exploitation of the prostitute as just another variant of capitalistic exploitation, Goldman
seeks to distinguish it, and continues that ‘nowhere is woman treated according to the
merit of her work, but rather as a sex’ (p. 179). Again, though, this more careful
treatment of the subject of her critique seems to be effaced by her characterisation of the
wider reading public. The essay was written in response to a media uproar about the
‘white slave traffic’ and Goldman begins the text with an appropriately sarcastic tone,
wondering how it is that ‘an institution, known almost to every child, should have been
discovered so suddenly?’ (p. 177). Although she suggests that there is something of a
smokescreen about the sudden media exposure of the business of prostitution (to divert
‘the public mind [...] from a great social wrong’ (p. 177)), she then adopts a harshly
critical tone that seems to blame the very readers themselves for allowing such a
smokescreen to be put up in the first place:
Only when human sorrows are turned into a toy with glaring colors will 
baby people become interested -  for a while at least. The people are a very 
fickle baby that must have new toys every day. The ‘righteous’ cry against 
the white slave traffic is such a toy. (p. 178)
The reference to ‘baby people’ is strikingly unsympathetic, and invites comparison to
another essay, on the subject of ‘The Child and its Enemies’. Here Goldman takes issue
with the prevailing mode of schooling, which she sees as being in conflict with the
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innate individuality of the child. Hence she offers the opposition of ‘whether the child is 
to grow from within, whether all that craves expression will be permitted to come forth 
toward the light of day; or whether it is to be kneaded like dough through external 
forces’.28 It would appear, then, that while Goldman is prepared to rail against societal 
forces that would treat a child like a lump of dough, she is prepared to treat her readers 
in comparable fashion when characterising them as ‘baby people’.
The sense that Goldman’s text tends to remonstrate with sections of society for 
the position in which they find themselves is borne out by other aspects of her work. 
Towards the end of the essay ‘Anarchism: What It Really Stands For’, she sets up an 
opposition between ‘the masses’ and ‘the true lovers of liberty’. Citing Stimer, 
Goldman suggests that ‘man has as much liberty as he is willing to take’ (p. 65). This 
tendency to censure others, what Shulman calls ‘a peculiar mix of understanding and 
blame’, is again expressed in her autobiography. While returning from a visit to the 
recently incarcerated Berkman, convicted for his attempt on Frick’s life, she passes 
some steel works, and her eye is caught by the workers, Tike galley-slaves of an era 
long past’ (I, p. 113). Goldman seems angered by the disparity between what she sees as 
Berkman’s sacrifice and the failure of the American proletariat to realise that this 
sacrifice had been made on its behalf. She writes that Berkman ‘had given his life to 
bring joy to these slaves, but they had remained blind and continued in the hell of their 
own forging’. ‘Their souls are dead,’ she commented to her companion at the time (I, p. 
114).
Baby people -  divorcing the reader from the referent
Goldman’s treatment of what she calls, in the essay ‘Minorities Versus Majorities’, ‘the 
mob’ (p. 72) is characteristic of a textual strategy that seeks to establish a hierarchy in
28 Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, p. 131.
29Alix Kates Shulman, ‘Emma Goldman’s Feminism: A Reappraisal’, in Emma Goldman, Red Emma 
Speaks, pp. 3-19 (p. 13).
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the tri-partite relationship between text (Goldman-as-author, presence of meaning for 
attentive reader), reader (Stimer-esque individual) and referent (inattentive mass, vainly 
spoken to, and therefore written about). Obviously it is not tenable (or useful) to 
consider these terms as either discrete units or mutually exclusive categories. 
Nevertheless in its mode of address the text can be seen to interpellate the reader as 
‘non-mob’. The way in which it constructs a disjunction between the reader and other 
sections of the community leads in a direction that is problematic for the wider 
dissemination of her own politics. Arguably this institutes an internally contradictory 
hierarchy among the three terms, but what I would insist upon is that it clearly points 
towards a discursive blockage in the flow of information that would be required to 
waken ‘the mass’ from its oppressive slumber as the ‘omnipresent tyrant [...] a mass of 
cowards’ (p. 73).
To comprehend this it is necessary to return to a curious statement that Goldman 
makes at the beginning of the preface to Anarchism and Other Essays. Bearing in mind 
that the comments were written after a long career as one of the fieriest orators in the 
United States, Goldman prefaces her collection with the admission that her ‘great faith 
in the wonder worker, the spoken word, is no more. I have realized its inadequacy to 
awaken thought or even emotion’ (pp. 41-42). She eschews the usual privileging of the 
spoken word that is the subject of so much of Derrida’s critique in the first part of Of 
Grammatology, for example when he writes that the voice has been considered ‘closest 
to the self as the absolute effacement of the signifier’.30 Goldman opts for the more 
typically under-privileged term in the opposition, writing. ‘Oral propaganda,’ she 
claims, ‘leaves no lasting impression’ (p. 42). I would like to correlate this image of 
Goldman, metaphorically leaving the stage for the confines of the written text, with the 
comments above regarding ‘most people’, ‘baby people’ and ‘the mob’. My contention
30 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 20.
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is that there is a parallel movement in the two scenes, the literal (autobiographical) and
the textual (political): one the one hand, Goldman withdraws from direct contact with a
living audience, while on the other hand, she constructs a text that appears to address
itself to an individual/reader that is seen in contradistinction to the ‘majority’. Despite
the fact that Goldman inverts the traditional speech/writing binary, she does not
abandon the logocentric privilege granted to presence. Following on from her
renunciation of the spoken word, she writes that:
The relation between the writer and the reader is more intimate. True, 
books are only what we want them to be; rather, what we read into them.
That we can do so demonstrates the importance of written as against oral 
expression, (pp. 42-43)
What Goldman not unreasonably fails to notice is that her comments on the 
polysemous nature of the written sign apply equally as well to the spoken sign -  in fact 
her comments on the shortcomings of a living audience even point in that direction, 
when she laments the ‘restlessness of the crowd’, a restlessness which could just as 
likely be motivated by the audience’s reflection on the spoken text, restlessness as 
synonym for the ceaseless play of signification. Nevertheless, Goldman’s statement 
quoted above seems to both reinstate the presupposition of the presence of the final 
signified of her written text and indicate the impossibility of that very state of affairs -  
‘true, books are only what we want them to be; rather, what we read into them.’ Indeed 
it could be perceived in this quotation that Goldman senses that the presence of the 
speaker, in his or her traditional role as guarantor of meaning, limits the interpretative 
autonomy of the audience, and for this reason she plumps, after years of public 
speaking, for the medium of the written word in order to allow greater independence to 
the reader.
In spite of this seemingly conscious move towards an attempt to open up greater 
interpretative space to the reader, Goldman’s text simultaneously adopts a position that 
closes down the reader’s freedom in the same gesture with which it apparently proffers
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it. Without overlooking what I have already identified as the way in which Goldman’s 
texts construct the (individual) reader as ‘non-mob’, supposedly distinct from the mass 
beyond the text, I would like to reconsider the ‘What I Believe’ essay cited in the 
opening pages of this chapter. Here Goldman states that “‘What I believe” is a process 
rather than a finality. Finalities are for gods and governments, not for the human 
intellect’.31 Typographical errors notwithstanding, the above quotation puts a small 
letter ‘b’ at the beginning of the word ‘believe’, and hence it can be understood that the 
quotation refers to what the author believes, and not the essay itself (when Goldman 
refers to the essay itself several paragraphs further on, she capitalizes all three words of 
the title). Apparently whatever Goldman’s beliefs are, they will be a ‘process’, but the 
text will not, frozen as it is in time on the page. Yet given my considerations above on 
her comments on the written word (books being ‘what we read into them’), it is clear 
that, at least at one point, Goldman does entertain the concept of the reader’s 
participation in the production of the text’s significance.
If this is to be the case, it might not be an unreasonable expectation to hope that 
the text reflects this concept in some fashion. Yet despite the focus shifting slightly 
towards the text-reader axis, upon turning the page, one finds the text espousing such 
sentiments as ‘anarchism is the only philosophy that can and will do away with this
T9humiliating and degrading situation’. It strikes me that to posit anarchism as the ‘only’ 
philosophy to undertake a specific task is most definitely a certainty: it seeks to pre­
empt any debate or discussion -  if it is the only philosophy that will do this, it moves 
into the predictive with regard to the future, that it ‘can and will do away with’ 
capitalism. Therefore Goldman presents the reader not only with a textual ultimatum, 
that is to say, if you take issue with this degrading and humiliating situation (as she
31 Goldman, R ed Emma Speaks, p. 49.
32 Goldman, R ed Emma Speaks, p. 50.
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describes it), anarchism is the only answer to that, but she also offers the guarantee that 
it will do away with that situation.
What can be understood as the process? How are we to reconcile the idea of the 
text-reader relationship (as a process) with such unequivocal statements about the 
present and the future, of what is and what will be? The inability to recognise in her 
own text a certain posture that she so readily criticises in others (for example, the 
contrast between her defence of the child and her remarks about ‘baby people’) would 
seem to establish a fundamental contradiction between Goldman’s mode of address to 
the ‘what is’ and to the ‘what ought to be’. By this I mean that she struggles for a world 
where individuality will be unfettered by government and state -  ‘the individual is the 
true reality in life’ she writes in ‘The Individual, Society and the State’.33 Yet her means 
of struggle towards that goal seem to rely on denying the heterogeneity of the very 
readers of her texts. Although my argument might be seen to be premised on the 
positive content of the appellation ‘individual’ for those readers of Goldman’s texts that 
she seems to dismiss so easily, I am not interested in constructing a positive value for 
‘the individual’ here. I would, instead, like to offer a negative critique of the actual 
individual that the text constructs as its subject. In contradistinction to that critique 
perhaps the plurality and heterogeneity of Goldman’s audience might begin to be 
liberated from the restrictive interpellation of the reader.
My contention, then, is that there runs through Goldman’s texts a certain, clearly 
identifiable vein of univocality, where despite the emphasis on human liberation, the 
greater number of humans seem to get left behind by the theory. This is perhaps most 
clearly seen in the essay ‘The Individual, Society and the State’. In this text Goldman 
argues that ‘civilization has been a continuous struggle of the individual or of groups of 
individuals against the State and even against “society,” that is, against the majority
33 Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, p. 111.
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subdued and hypnotized by the State and State worship’.34 Given that a central tenet of 
anarchist theory has been the critique of the Marxist-Leninist concept of the 
revolutionary vanguard, Goldman’s admission that the struggle of the individual has at 
times been against ‘society’ seems to open up a realm of conflict where the self­
liberated individual comes to occupy the locus of a vanguard. Bearing in mind 
Goldman’s move away from the spoken word, which in effect would mean that she no 
longer had, literally, to face up to a multitudinous audience, I would argue that there is a 
move towards a reification of the individual in her work. Goldman offers a definition of 
her concept of individuality that would apparently transcend time and human 
understanding. She claims that:
The State and social institutions come and go, but individuality remains 
and persists [...]. The living man cannot be defined; he is the fountain-head 
of all life and all values; he is not a part of this or of that; he is a whole, an 
individual whole, a growing, changing, yet always constant whole.
This move towards the entrenching of the individual as a transcendental value in 
Goldman’s texts has much significance. Firstly, the danger presents itself that the self­
liberated (anarchist) individual, growing frustrated at the gulf between his or her 
understanding of the world and the continuing ‘hypnosis’ of the masses, falls into the 
temptation to wreak some dramatic act that will effect radical social change in and of 
itself. This, inevitably, seems to mean acts of violence, and it could be argued that the 
very order of the essays in Anarchism and Other Essays reflects the progression of this 
logic -  the first essay is on ‘Anarchism’, the second on ‘Minorities Versus Majorities’, 
and the third discusses ‘The Psychology of Political Violence’. It might also be noted, 
in passing, that this order also reflects the early events of the lives of Goldman and 
Berkman, with the attempt on the life of Frick, and Berkman’s subsequent incarceration.
34 Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, p. 111.
35 Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, pp. 111-112.
36 While not wanting to overstate the importance of this observation, it could also be noted that the essay 
on political violence is then followed by an essay discussing prisons.
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Secondly, though, there is the danger of creating a de facto vanguard by any 
other name. While Goldman the orator withdraws from engaging with the plurality of a 
public audience, her texts simultaneously construct a reified figure of the attentive 
individual who ‘has always been and necessarily is the sole source and motive power of 
evolution and progress’.37 These individuals would seem to be but a variant on 
Bakunin’s ‘invisible pilots’ (as discussed in the previous chapter) who would guide the 
revolution.38 This exposes the circular logic of Goldman’s idea of liberation, for 
although she acknowledges in ‘The Individual, Society and the State’ that ‘no 
government can exist without the consent of the people’ and that consent is ‘inoculated 
and indoctrinated by what is called “education,” at home, in the church, and in every 
other phase of life’, breaking with the domination of government surely requires the 
withdrawal of that consent, and that, presumably, requires the active participation of the
39masses.
Thirdly, it could be said that this figure of the reified individual answers the 
question that I posed at the beginning of this chapter, of how Goldman came to speak to 
the masses -  in short, she appears to excise them from any participation as readers of 
her text. In this sense the decisive framing of her autobiography also seems, in Marcus’s 
terms, to signify that Goldman’s text comes to occupy a masculine locus for having so 
curiously tried to disempower this section of its readership, not only in the explicit 
content of her text, but also in the re-assertion of the (gendered) binary of 
active/passive. The internal logic of her text is that Goldman the activist author makes a 
call to an active Stimer-esque individual who is differentiated from the passive masses 
(conceived of as a millstone around the neck of progress). Even though Goldman wrote 
that she wanted to leave ‘posterity free to develop its own particular systems’, in this 
reading it can be seen that she most definitely re-inscribes a system of thought that
37 Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, p. 111.
38 Bakunin, Bakunin on Anarchism, p. 180.
39 Goldman, Red Emma Speaks, p. 113.
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would make the achieving of her vision a more difficult task. While the gender 
implications of this strategy are not the focus of my concerns, Cixous notes that the 
oppositions are ‘a universal battlefield’ where ‘relationships of authority’ struggle. For 
Cixous, moreover, the ‘victory’ of one term of an opposition over the other ‘always 
amounts to the same thing: it is hierarchized’.40
To rephrase this question in more literary terms, the issue is how a text can 
address a reader without isolating that reader from his or her environment. In terms of 
the tri-partite relationship that I identified earlier, is it possible to conceive of a purely 
dialogic relationship between text and reader-w-s/Yw, a reader that has no experience of 
a separation between themselves and the community of which they are a part? Is it 
possible to address a community rather than an individual reader? Or alternatively, is it 
possible to conceive of a textual address to a reader that does not construct a third- 
person (referent) position for the community beyond the page, that does not construct an 
object status for it as something to be manipulated? Perhaps the concept of ‘address’ is 
what should be interrogated, not the person/thing addressed. After her first speaking 
dates, Goldman wrote of her sense of having committed a ‘crime against [herself] and 
the workers by serving as a parrot’ for Johann Most. This concern would apparently 
signal an implicit recognition of what I have highlighted as the text’s logic of a tri­
partite and hierarchical relationship: it would exist here between the text (Most), the 
speaker (Goldman), and the audience (Goldman’s listeners). While Goldman’s 
comments are seemingly based on an assumption of the moral requirement of the 
psychological unity of author and text, it can also be seen that she is aiming for a 
situation where there is only a dialogic relationship between text (unproblematized by 
the psychological division between author and orator) and audience. So while she 
carried that as an ambition in her public speaking, I have shown that conversely she
40 Cixous, ‘Sorties’, p. 288.
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opens up a tri-partite relationship in her written work. The shortcomings of this strategy 
would immediately become apparent if one imagines someone from ‘the mass’ (in 
Goldman’s terms) picking up a Goldman text. This hypothetical reader would 
simultaneously find her or himself interpellated by the text as not-mass, and yet 
repudiated by the same text for not yet being a (self-)liberated individual.
Up until now we have seen, with Proudhon, how anarchist writing has tried to 
establish ownership of a text’s meaning and yet has simultaneously provided the logic 
with which to undo that attempted ownership. With Bakunin we have seen how a body 
of work can challenge the entrenched concept of the authorial unity of the work, without 
the work losing its significance as a result. With Goldman what we see is perhaps the 
most challenging textual strategy in terms of its implications for interpretative freedom. 
As I have attempted to show, there is a construction of a reified reader that would 
severely restrict the ‘mass’ (that the text putatively seeks to liberate) from participating 
in the reading process. Yet if Goldman’s texts are to be of any pedagogical value to 
their readers, the lesson, as she herself learnt (after her first speaking tour) and 
elucidated it, is not to accept the ‘infallibility’ of the teacher.
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Facts and Faith: 
Anarchist Lives vs. Anarchist Stories
The trouble is the recognition of a fact does not make it easier to reconcile 
oneself to it.
(Emma Goldman, letter to Alexander Berkman, 18 November 1931)1
Upon their separate releases in 1919 after serving a two-year jail sentence for anti-war 
activism, Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman were immediately asked for bonds 
of $15,000 ‘pending enquiries by the Immigration Bureau’. In the climate of 
reactionary hysteria that followed the assassination of President McKinley in 1901 by 
Leon Czolgosz, a young man who had fleetingly met Goldman at one of her speaking 
dates, the United States government had passed an anti-anarchist law in 1903. Among 
other powers, this law permitted the government to deport foreign-born radicals. As 
Berkman was a Russian exile and Goldman had long since been stripped of her US 
citizenship (acquired through an early and quickly forgotten marriage), both were 
vulnerable to the law’s sanction.4 After a number of weeks on bail, they were brought 
before what Goldman called a ‘revival of the ancient days of the Spanish Inquisition’.5 
The investigation, as Berkman saw it, was to determine their ‘attitude of mind’, and thus 
they refused to cooperate or defend themselves, given that they had not been charged
1 Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, Nowhere at Home: Letters from  Exile o f  Emma Goldman and 
Alexander Berkman, ed. by Richard and Anna Maria Drinnon (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), p. 49.
2 Goldman, Living My Life, II, p. 693. All further references in this chapter will be given as volume and 
page number.
See Living My Life, I, pp. 289-290, p. 300. For an account o f the genesis o f  this law and international 
reaction to anarchist violence, see Richard Bach Jensen, ‘The United States, International Policing and the 
War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900-1914’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 13 (2001), 15-46.
4 Goldman realised that she had been stripped o f her acquired citizenship in anxious anticipation o f an 
opportunity to keep her out of the United States as long before this as 1909, resulting in her having to 
cancel a planned tour o f  Australia. See Living My Life, I, p. 449.
5 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 10.
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with any offence. As Berkman succinctly put it, ‘no opinion a law -  no opinion a 
crime’.6 Within a matter of weeks they were ordered to surrender and, along with 247 
other ‘reds’, were hustled out of Ellis Island at the dead of night, just four days before 
Christmas, onto the US Buford, and a few days later found themselves on the open seas, 
en route to the new post-revolutionary Russia.
In her autobiography, Goldman records the excitement that the two of them felt, 
despite the forced deportation, about the chance to take part in the work of the 
revolution in Russia. This excitement was shared in radical circles worldwide. While 
Berkman and Goldman were imprisoned in the US for their anti-war activism, in 
London the German exile Rudolf Rocker, a leading anarcho-syndicalist and anti­
militarist, had ironically been imprisoned by the British authorities as an ‘enemy alien’, 
despite his opposition to the Kaiser’s regime. Rocker also writes of his joy at the news 
of the revolution, and of his frustration at not being able to join the exodus of Russian 
and other radical exiles, travelling to Russia to take up the work of the revolution for 
which they had striven for so long.7 They believed, perhaps naively although not 
unreservedly, that the revolution would be the incarnation of all their dreams. Despite 
decades working for the social revolution in a foreign country, Berkman and Goldman 
still considered Russia their homeland, what Goldman called their ‘Matushka RossiycC -  
even though neither of them could now speak the language (II, p. 637).
Berkman’s loyalty initially seemed uncompromising. He noted in his diary that 
‘all forces must be bent, first of all, to secure the complete victory of the workers. 
Bourgeois resistance within must be crushed; interference from without defeated.
• • oEverything else will come later’. Yet within two years Goldman and he would 
desperately be trying to find a way out of Bolshevik Russia. Once abroad, they went on
6 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 10.
7 See Rudolf Rocker, The London Years (London: Robert Anscombe & Co. Ltd., 1956), pp. 325-328. All 
further references in this chapter will be given as LY  with page number.
8 Alexander Berkman, Life o f  an Anarchist: The Alexander Berkman Reader, ed. by Gene Fellner (New 
York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1992), p. 170.
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to spend their last years together working to publicise what they had experienced in 
Russia, earning for themselves the repudiation of most Western radicals enamoured 
with what was believed to be the birth of a new society.9 What dominated (and perhaps 
explained) this episode in their lives were the dangers of taking facts for granted, the 
difficulties of interpretation and the unsustainable nature of any presumption of 
narrative objectivity. Berkman and Goldman despaired of rousing an international 
audience to what they believed to be the horrors committed by Lenin’s regime, and 
often lamented that if only people were aware of the ‘facts’, a campaign could be 
mounted against the excesses of the Bolsheviks.10 Yet perhaps the ‘facts’ in and of 
themselves are never enough. Despite having been in Russia themselves, despite having 
seen events with their own eyes, despite relating this evidence to others once abroad, to 
their amazement, this (autobiographical) story that they were telling at the time was not 
believed. Goldman touches on the kernel of the problem when she wrote, in a letter to 
Havelock Ellis in 1925, that there was ‘a great confusion of mind and unwillingness or 
inability to face the fa c ts \n Although it could be reasonably surmised that Goldman’s 
letter took the ‘facts’ for granted, and sought to redress the ‘inability’ to face them, the 
quotation works against itself. While the inability that Goldman and Berkman struggled 
to combat was volitional, if there is an ‘inability’ to face the facts, then the ‘facts’ 
themselves become to a certain degree irrelevant, confronted with the impossibility of
1 9their ever being known as such. As Linda Anderson has written, citing Regenia 
Gagnier, perhaps ‘truth is less the issue than “the purpose an autobiographical statement
9 See Emma Goldman, My Disillusionment in Russia, available online at 
<http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/goldman/disillusion/toc.html>.
10 Berkman subsequently wrote in 1922 in The Russian Tragedy that opinions were ‘based on very 
incomplete and unreliable, frequently entirely false, information about the Russian Revolution [...] 
founded, as a rule, on insufficient or wrong data’, and entertains the notion that a ‘correct estimation’ can 
be made o f events there. Alexander Berkman, ‘The Russian Tragedy’, available online at 
<http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bright/berkman/russiantragedy.html>.
11 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 70, my emphasis.
12 It might also be noted, in passing, the apposite use of the verb ‘to face’ -  implying, among its various 
significances, the physical presence o f  the person ‘facing’ the fact. Though as soon as cognisance is taken 
of this fact as such, much less communicated to another, the ‘as such’, as such, disappears.
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serves in the life and circumstances of its author and readers”’. In this sense, Berkman 
and Goldman’s relation to the Russian Revolution seems emblematic of the relationship 
between a reader and the ‘facts’ contained within the text of an autobiography. If this 
relationship is, as I will suggest below, problematic, what then is one to believe?
The nature of this relationship, and the status of autobiography as a genre, has 
been of anxious concern to literary critics from the beginning of a recognition of the 
genre’s existence. James Olney, in his introduction to the influential collection 
Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical, quasi-religiously suggests that ‘in the 
beginning, then, was Georges Gusdorf .14 If Gusdorf is indeed the beginning, his essay 
commences with the confident assertion that ‘autobiography is a solidly established 
literary genre, its history traceable in a series of masterpieces’ -  masterpieces that are 
then listed, in an unembarrassedly canonical gesture, as written by ‘heads of 
government or generals, ministers of state, explorers, businessmen’, with the genre 
being both ‘peculiar to Western man’ and displaying a Christian aesthetic, commencing 
with St. Augustine.15 Yet Gusdorf then sets out to establish a posteriori the ‘conditions 
and limits’ of the genre, a move that suggests less confidence about its condition than 
his opening sentence would imply. Whether Gusdorf is a tenable starting point is moot, 
for Laura Marcus outlines a field of scholarship that pre-dates Gusdorf by more than a 
century and a half. In her extensive review of the theory, criticism and practice of 
autobiography, Marcus cites one of the earliest commentators, John Foster in 1805 
suggesting that an autobiography should ‘[endeavour] not so much to enumerate the 
mere facts and events of life, as to discriminate the successive states of the mind, and so
13 Linda Anderson, Autobiography (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 91.
14 James Olney, ‘Autobiography and the Cultural Moment: A Thematic, Historical and Bibliographical 
Introduction’, in Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical, ed. by James Olney (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 3-27 (p. 8).
15 Georges Gusdorf, ‘Conditions and Limits o f Autobiography’, in Autobiography: Essays Theoretical 
and Critical, pp. 28-48 (pp. 28-29).
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trace the progress of what may be called the character’.16 The life recounted, according 
to another critic, A. O. Prickard some fifty years later, ought to be of ‘great thinkers, 
who have either moulded the opinions of the age, or have at least awakened our
17sympathy by the remarkable changes which their own minds have undergone’. From
that, one might deduce the rough outline of a genre that characteristically offers a
developmental account of a noteworthy person. Gusdorf can be seen to follow a certain
pattern within the tradition of autobiographical criticism, when he writes that:
The author of an autobiography gives himself the job of narrating his own 
history; what he sets out to do is to reassemble the scattered elements of his 
individual life and to regroup them in a comprehensive sketch [...] the 
autobiographer strains toward a complete and coherent expression of his 
entire destiny.18
Within these comments some basic tenets of the generic definition of 
autobiography are clear -  the idea that the account offered is of the life of the author, 
that it should be complete (and, as a consequence, honest) and that it should not be self- 
contradictory. ‘Autobiography,’ he continues, echoing the developmental factor 
identified a century earlier, ‘requires a man to take a distance with regard to himself in 
order to reconstitute himself in the focus of his special unity and identity across time.’19 
Yet Gusdorf s account immediately prompts a series of questions: which version of the 
events ought to be taken as the true version? An account of the events that can be 
historically verified? Or the phenomenological account of the events as perceived by the 
self? Or more simply, perhaps just the memory of the events that the self can honestly 
offer? Gusdorf perhaps anticipates these challenges, for although his argument is 
premised on an untroubled concept of the self, the ‘true person’ as seen from the inside 
(a concept that would require a more detailed consideration than can be given here), he
16 John Foster, as cited by Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses, p. 19.
17 A. O. Prickard, as cited by Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses, p. 39.
18 Gusdorf, ‘Conditions and Limits o f Autobiography’, p. 35.
19 Gusdorf, ‘Conditions and Limits o f Autobiography’, p. 35.
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ends on a less contentious note, writing that ‘every man is the first witness of himself;
•  20yet the testimony that he thus produces constitutes no ultimate, conclusive authority’.
The question of honesty and authority become intertwined in Elizabeth Bruss’s
attempt to define the genre. She writes that the:
only valuable definition [of the genre] would be one that reflects a literary 
category that actually ‘exists,’ in the sense that it can be experienced as 
something that constrains or directs the acts of reading and writing, or at 
least provides readers and writers with an interpretation of their actions.21
Bruss’s formulation would seem to be exactly what Derrida had in mind when he
described the approach that ‘utterly ignores the demands of a text which it tries to
control with the most traditional determinations of what constitutes the limits of the
written, or even of “publication”’.22 Robert Elbaz makes even clearer the political
investment in imposing a definition on a genre. For him, genre is ‘an ideological grid
forced upon consciousness’, and ‘generic classification is a hegemonic phenomenon
which restricts literary practice to approved, institutionalised forms of expression’.
While I would follow Derrida’s rejection of the traditional imposition of limits, Bruss,
in her study of the ‘changing situation’ of the genre, comes up with a rules-based
approach to defining autobiography, premised on Searle’s speech act theory. As a
consequence the honesty, or lack of it, becomes key when one conceives of a contract
between author and reader. That there is an authority lurking behind this legalistic sense
of contract becomes apparent when Bruss writes that ‘an autobiographer can be
convicted of “insincerity”’, citing the case of Clifford Irving, who was imprisoned for
(falsely) claiming to be the editor of Howard Hughes’s autobiography.24 Yet if honesty
or sincerity was to become the yardstick, then one would simultaneously need an
20 Gusdorf, ‘Conditions and Limits o f Autobiography’, p. 36, p. 48.
21 Elizabeth W. Bruss, Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation o f  a Literary Genre (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 1.
22 Jacques Derrida, The Ear o f  the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation: Texts and 
Discussions with Jacques Derrida, trans. by Peggy Kamuf and Avital Ronell, ed. by Christie McDonald 
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1988), p. 5.
23 Robert Elbaz, as cited by Felicity A. Nussbaum, The Autobiographical Subject: Gender and Ideology 
in Eighteenth-Century England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 9.
24 Bruss, Autobiographical Acts, p. 11.
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indicator of authorial intention, and moreover perhaps a secondary set of witnesses to 
concur on the autobiographer’s presence at a particular moment in history. An 
unpromising prospect if ever there was one.
From the canon to the contract, the figure of authority seems to be intimately 
bound up with the attempt to answer the questions regarding how autobiography should 
be defined. If autobiography is the story of the self, even Gusdorf s notion of the ‘true 
person’ comes under intense scrutiny. For example, the self itself can be a site of 
struggle and contestation. In her account of eighteenth-century autobiographies, Felicity 
Nussbaum brings the work of Emile Benveniste into play, to elaborate the ‘distinction 
between the “I” who speaks and the “I” who is spoken. For Benveniste, language 
constructs subjectivity, and in turn subjectivity writes language’. This concept of the 
split subject allows Nussbaum to use the work of Foucault to argue that ‘the “self’ of 
autobiography is an effect of ideology and a mediation of its conflicts, and that a
sy/T
politics of writing and reading is implicit within it’. Nussbaum challenges dominant 
notions in autobiographical criticism: on the micro level, the developmental notion of 
‘the attainment of true self, while on the macro level the idea that there can be one 
developmental line of autobiographical evolution, where ‘eighteenth-century self­
writing can only be an attempt to strive toward nineteenth-century models and notions 
of self, and our attempts to read it will be constrained by that view’.27
So the problem of generic identity remains for the critics. On the one hand, both 
Gusdorf and Bruss prompt the question of whether the genre can be said to ‘exist’ prior 
to the definition, or if it is rather the definition that brings the genre to birth. On the 
other hand, more recently Candace Falk has written that ‘autobiography is indeed 
everywhere one cares to find it’.28 How is one to discern something that is perhaps
25 Nussbaum, The Autobiographical Subject, p. 31.
26 Nussbaum, The Autobiographical Subject, p. xxi.
27 Nussbaum, The Autobiographical Subject, p. 8, p. 9.
28 Candace Falk, as cited by Linda Anderson, Autobiography, p. 1.
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everywhere? Paul de Man sums up the dilemma when he writes that ‘attempts at generic
29definition seem to founder in questions that are both pointless and unanswerable’.
Moreover the pursuit of a binding generic definition then further complicates
itself in the attempt to distinguish between autobiographies, memoirs, and other forms
such as letters and diaries. This seems, invariably, to be bound up with hierarchical
notions of worth. Laura Marcus suggests that:
the autobiography/memoirs distinction -  ostensibly formal and generic -  is 
bound up with a typological distinction between those human beings who 
are capable of self-reflection and those who are not. This opposition is still 
current, often correlated with class and cultural capital.30
In rejecting this hierarchy (by not limiting the scope of this chapter to high or
low forms of life-writing), I am not seeking to ignore the question of the generic
definition of autobiography, but rather than answer it, I will examine its implications.
From there, I will turn to authority, the central concern of this thesis. I will seek to
identify where the figure of authority can be seen to function within anarchist
autobiography, and to what purpose. In so doing, I will examine the autobiographies,
memoirs and letters of various figures from anarchist history, while at the same time
noting how they can be seen to exemplify (the disputed) generic norms, or alternatively
challenge them, or even both.
The notion of the exemplar, of course, is itself a contentious area within
autobiographical criticism, for as Marcus notes, it:
remains a constant preoccupation, both in overtly moral and didactic terms 
(in which the roles of biography and autobiography lie in their national and 
institutional functions in transmitting the achievements of one generation to 
the next) and in an ‘anthropological’ context, in which ‘great’ 
autobiographies, the expression o f ‘great’ individuals, become the materials 
from which ostensibly ‘universal’ laws can be drawn.31
29 Paul de Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, MLN, 94 (1979), 919-930 (p. 919). Although Laura 
Marcus describes De Man’s essay as ‘influential’ (p. 203), it seems impossible to cite his work without 
acknowledging, at least in passing, the troubling questions raised by the posthumous discovery o f his 
war-time journalism. For a brief discussion o f these in relation to the themes o f  autobiography, see 
Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses, pp. 211-213.
30 Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses, p. 21.
31 Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses, p. 49.
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The subjects for this chapter’s discussion are all in varying degrees anarchists, refugees, 
revolutionaries and convicts (and one artist), and it might be reasonable to assume that 
they are not the sort of ‘great individuals’ of whom the ruling arbiters of taste might 
look to make exemplars. Yet it will be seen how, within the reduced world of the 
anarchist milieu, the notion of the exemplar was very much alive, and bears greatly on 
the production of these life stories.
Emma Goldman -  believing the story
One of the ‘rules’ that Elizabeth Bruss comes up with for the generic definition of 
autobiography ‘necessitates that some shared identity bind author, narrator, and 
character together; no matter how vague, no matter how great the tension or disparity, 
the relationship itself is inescapable’. At various times Emma Goldman’s 
autobiography, Living My Life, displays the gaps between the three disparate functions 
that Bruss identifies. Even the very title is worth comment, for it would seem to 
entertain the possibility of living a life in the sense of a theatrical role, or the possibility 
of living someone else’s life, and hence that one’s own life was lived as if it was a 
matter of choice to live that life and not any other. Indeed the elision of the active 
subject from the title, the absence of the ‘Me’ who is ‘Living My Life’ (in the way one 
might expect a truncated title below a family snapshot -  ‘Me playing football, age 8’) 
leaves open the possibility that the expanded title might have been ‘You living my life’ 
or ‘Mary living my life’, none of which would be grammatically, even if logically, 
unacceptable. This immediately illustrates the split between the author and the narrator, 
for in a sense the narrator is telling the story of the author having lived the life of Emma 
Goldman, but at times the (‘real’) Emma Goldman (author) seems strangely distant 
from the pages of this text.
32 Bruss, Autobiographical Acts, p. 12.
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It would definitely be stretching a point, though, to suggest that Emma Goldman 
the character narrated is in any way substantially absent from the pages of her 
autobiography. The text runs to two volumes, totalling nearly one thousand pages, and 
details, in what is at times a welter of minutiae, the day to day happenings in the life of 
one of the pre-eminent anarchist propagandists and activists of the turn of the last 
century. The narrative begins as Goldman arrives in New York in 1889 at the age of 
twenty, nearly four years after she had landed in America as an immigrant from 
Lithuania. In her discussion of Frankenstein, Barbara Johnson wonders, in relation to 
Nancy Friday’s text My Mother/My Self, if autobiography is ‘somehow always in the 
process of symbolically killing the mother off by telling her the lie that we have given 
birth to ourselves?’33 Goldman’s text does not seem to be overly concerned with the 
role of her mother; in fact in the first chapter she warrants only two mentions, the most 
descriptive of which states that her mother ‘while less violent [than her father] with the 
children, never showed much warmth’ (I, p. 11).34 Indeed it is not until halfway through 
the second volume of the text that her mother is mentioned in any detail at all. Goldman 
gives a brief portrait of her mother at age eighty-one, and casually mentions that 
‘whenever I visited Rochester, Mother had new conquests to report’ (II, p. 696). 
Curiously, these are visits and reports that have merited but a few scarce pages in the 
text (I, pp. 208-211). The portrait is of her mother as an activist, organising to assist the 
orphans of the local Jewish population. Strikingly, Goldman highlights a particular 
moment when her mother, speaking at one of the ‘numerous lodges’ of which she was a 
member, was told that she had exceeded her allotted time. Despite having been absent 
from the meeting in question, Goldman dramatises the moment with a first person 
account. ‘Drawing herself up to full stature, my mother defiantly announced: “The 
whole United States Government could not stop my daughter Emma Goldman from
33 Barbara Johnson, A World o f  Difference (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 147.
34 In a letter to Mary Leavitt, 2 November 1932, Goldman characterised her childhood as ‘ghastly’. 
Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 175.
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speaking, and a fine chance you have to make her mother shut up!’” (II, p. 697). The 
scene demonstrates a clear inversion of (chronological, or perhaps ‘natural’ 
genealogical) precedence, with Goldman’s prowess as a free-speech activist 
determining the articulation of her mother’s identity. It is debatable whether Goldman is 
indeed ‘killing her mother o ff, in Johnson’s words, for she would not appear, at least 
by the text’s account, to have been a major authority figure in Goldman’s formative 
years. Yet on the other hand, the temporal framing of Living My Life displays, in the 
narrator’s attempt to give birth to Goldman the character as anarchist activist, what 
Linda Anderson calls the desire ‘of becoming, within the realm of the symbolic, one’s 
own progenitor, of assuming authorship of one’s own life’. Perhaps to achieve this it 
is necessary that the genealogical progenitor of Goldman’s story be removed from the 
scene.
From the opening, the narrative employs what seems to be a curiously religious 
vein of language. While St. Paul upon maturation put childish things away, Goldman 
writes that her younger self ‘was now left behind me’. The text next conjures a 
metaphor of a snake shedding its skin, when it continues to say that what was behind 
Goldman was ‘cast off like a worn-out garment’. The religious imagery threading its 
way through this prose is then made explicit with the text’s description of Goldman 
being in possession of ‘a passionate ideal’. Goldman’s story has become orientated, 
already by the end of the first paragraph, within the discourse of narratives of faith, with 
a hostile material world being portrayed as a test of her beliefs -  ‘A new world was 
before me, strange and terrifying. But I had youth, good health, and a passionate ideal. 
Whatever the new held in store for me I was determined to meet unflinchingly’ (I, p. 3).
It is perhaps significant that Goldman’s ‘passionate ideal’ is stated as present 
before it is actually described for what it is or might be, for the ‘passionate ideal’ that
35 Anderson, Autobiography, pp. 67-68.
145
motivates Goldman during the course of the life described in Living My Life takes more
than one form. The text’s starting point is Goldman’s entry into the world of anarchist
activism in New York. The prompt for this is her reaction to the episode of the
Haymarket martyrs: after a series of violent confrontations between the Chicago police
and strikers had culminated in the death of several strikers, a meeting was called to
protest these deaths. That meeting ended with a bomb being thrown which killed several
police. Eight men were convicted of this bombing, and four of them were subsequently
hanged.36 The text describes how Goldman, as a teenager still in Rochester with her
sisters, travelled to a meeting organised as part of a campaign to try to save the accused
men from their fate. Goldman suggests that it was ‘the violence of the press, the bitter
denunciation of the accused, the attacks on all foreigners’ which turned the sympathies
of her and her sister to the arrested men (I, p. 7). The speech that she heard, though, she
characterises as a ‘passionate indictment against the forces that were about to destroy
eight human lives’ (I, p. 7, my emphasis). Whether or not Living My Life is a ‘lie’ that
the text tells to Goldman’s mother to kill her off is one thing, but it would seem clear
that the text seeks to give birth to its own author through this encounter with faith. It is
unequivocal about her reaction to the news of the eventual hanging of four of the men.
Goldman describes being overwhelmed by the news of the deaths, continuing:
I was put to bed, and soon I fell into a deep sleep. The next morning I woke 
as from a long illness, but free from the numbness and the depression of 
those harrowing weeks of waiting, ending with the final shock. I had a 
distinct sensation that something new and wonderful had been bom in my 
soul. A great ideal, a burning faith, a determination to dedicate myself to 
the memory of my martyred comrades, to make their cause my own, to 
make known to the world their beautiful lives and heroic deaths. (I, p. 10)
36 The suspicion lingers to this day that it was the work o f an agent provocateur, for the trial o f the union 
leaders themselves was widely regarded as a travesty o f justice, and the three imprisoned men were 
subsequently pardoned by the govenor o f Illinois in a ruling that vindicated the sweeping criticisms that 
had been made o f  the trial judge, the packing o f the jury and the behaviour o f the Chicago police. See the 
text o f Governor John P. Altgeld’s pardon, ‘Reasons for Pardoning Fielden, Neebe and Schwab’, 
available online at <http://www.chicagohs.org/hadc/books/b06/B06.htm>. For a discussion o f the 
background to the Haymarket incident, see Paul Avrich, The Haymarket Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984).
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Hence the reader encounters Emma Goldman, reborn in spirit, and birthed in the
text within the frame of the judicial murder of the Chicago martyrs.37 Indeed, Goldman
would be more explicit about it ‘years’ later (in narrative time), when in the wake of her
arrest in connection with Czolgosz’s assassination of McKinley, she found herself
detained in Chicago. She writes:
Peculiar and inexplicable the ways of life, intricate the chain of events!
Here I was, the spiritual child of those men, imprisoned in the city that had 
taken their lives, in the same jail, even under the guardianship of the very 
man who had kept watch in their silent hours. Tomorrow I should be taken 
to Cook County Jail, within whose walls Parsons, Spies, Engel, and Fischer 
had been hanged. Strange, indeed, the complex forces that had bound me to 
those martyrs through all my socially conscious years! And now events 
were bringing me nearer and nearer -  perhaps to a similar end? (I, p. 307)
Goldman’s narrative can be forgiven for sounding somewhat melodramatic, for 
by both her and Berkman’s accounts, in the aftermath of McKinley’s assassination the 
press and popular opinion were baying for her blood, and many of her friends thought 
she was giving her own life away by voluntarily surrendering to the police in order to 
clear her name. The quotation, and perhaps even the act of surrender, both demonstrate 
the intimate link between faith and mortality -  Goldman had such faith in her own 
innocence that she was prepared to face death. And yet it was the deaths of the Chicago 
martyrs that brought about the ‘life’ (as recounted) that she lived and which thus 
occasioned this particular standoff with mortality. This prompts its own set of problems 
with regard to the autobiography - how does one give face to a faith? How can a text put 
into words that which must necessarily transcend the constraints of language? How does 
this imply, as I suggested above, an absence of the ‘real’ Emma Goldman author from 
the pages of the text?
If one follows Paul de Man’s understanding of autobiography, he suggests that 
the genre thinks of itself as ‘a discourse of self-restoration’, and that particularly for
37 The text/birth cycle would seem to come to a certain sense o f completion in later years with the launch 
o f Goldman’s own journal Mother Earth, which she describes as ‘the expected child’, complete with 
christening and ‘foster-parents’ (I, pp. 377-378).
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Wordsworth, it was ‘restoration in the face of death’.38 What one finds here in 
Goldman’s text is the restoration of the self as a subject willed (or self-willed) into 
existence, in the face of the death of the Chicago martyrs (and, both metonymically and 
literally, by her use of the term ‘martyred comrades’ for those she had never met; by her 
self-identification with their ‘cause’; and by the possible sharing of their fate by all 
those who struggle against injustice, including herself). This movement, though, would 
seem to simultaneously mask the ‘real’ Emma Goldman. De Man argues that 
autobiography cannot offer ‘reliable self-knowledge’, for it ‘demonstrates in a striking 
way the impossibility of closure and of totalization (that is the impossibility of coming
- I Q
into being) of all textual systems made up of tropological substitutions’. Just as 
prosopopeia is for De Man ‘the trope of autobiography, by which one’s name [...] is 
made as intelligible and memorable as a face’, the use of language to achieve this means 
the loss of the referent, the life, and so ‘the restoration of mortality by autobiography 
(the prosopopeia of the voice and the name) deprives and disfigures to the precise extent 
that it restores’.40 In trying to put her faith, her ‘passionate ideal’, into words, it appears 
that ‘the real’ Goldman only moves further beyond the grasp of the text.
This last comment, though, would seem to conflate Goldman with her faith. A 
closer scrutiny of her faith, though, will show that there is a more complex relationship 
at work here. If Goldman’s faith is prompted by the death of the Chicago martyrs, then 
it takes on more than one form, as I suggested above. The most central of these, in the 
context of the autobiography, is her relationship to Alexander Berkman, or Sasha as she 
affectionately referred to him. The very same day that the narrative opens, she meets 
Berkman for the first time, and again the import of this textual framing cannot be
38 De Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, p. 925.
39 De Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, p. 922.
40 De Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, p. 926, p. 930.
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overlooked.41 Goldman’s encounter with Berkman, also a Russian exile and anarchist 
activist, would mark both their lives indelibly. Decades later Goldman was to write to 
Berkman, just some months before his suicide (in what he in turn described as ‘the most 
beautiful letter, perhaps’ that she had ever written to him), that the ‘secret’ of her life 
was that:
the one treasure I have rescued from my long and bitter struggle is my 
friendship for you [...] no one ever was so rooted in my being, so ingrained 
in every fiber, as you have been and are to this day.42
In 1889, though, the narrative of Living My Life plunges the reader into the 
world of revolutionary exiles, sitting round tables in Sach’s cafe on the East Side of 
New York. Goldman is introduced to Berkman, although the text offers no commentary 
on the innocuous beginning of such a dramatic companionship. (This lack of 
commentary points up one of the textual artifices of Living My Life, which is that the 
events unfold on the page as if they are being recorded contemporaneously, rather than 
some forty years later.) I have detailed the events of their lives elsewhere, but in brief 
they became lovers, and threw themselves into the cause of anarchism with impressive 
dedication and energy. Influenced by the writings of Johann Most, the leading figure of 
the day in the anarchist movement in New York, they believed at this time in the power 
of the attentat, an act of political violence (the infamous ‘propaganda by deed’) that 
would inspire the masses to revolution. The brutality of the Homestead strike, in which 
workers had been killed by a privately hired ‘security’ force, led them to feel that an 
attentat would be justified in the case. As a result Berkman set off to Pittsburgh to 
assassinate Henry Clay Frick, the company manager held responsible for the strikers’ 
deaths.
41 It might also be noted that the second volume o f Living My Life opens with a reiteration of the same 
themes. On the first page, after the death o f Voltairine de Cleyre, Goldman goes to Chicago to visit her 
grave, located, by De Cleyre’s request, near the graves o f the four hanged martyrs. On the second page, 
one encounters Berkman, working on the manuscript o f his Prison Memoirs (II, pp. 504-505).
42 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 248, p. 246.
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Berkman’s failed attempt to kill Frick led to him being imprisoned for 14 years, 
one positive outcome of which was his Prison Memoirs o f an Anarchist, discussed 
below. In the context of Goldman’s story, though, the incident is the reason for 
Berkman’s enforced absence from her narrative for the greater part of its first half. From 
the very moment of the mutual conception of the need for the attentat against Frick, the 
issue is portrayed by the text in religious terms. Goldman writes that as Berkman 
declares his intention to kill Frick, ‘his clarity, his calmness and force, the sacred fire of 
his ideal, enthralled me, held me spellbound’ (I, p. 87). The link that is already evident 
between Goldman’s faith and mortality, be it her own or that of the Chicago martyrs, is 
transformed in the light of Berkman’s imprisonment. By way of the familiar trope of the 
prison as alternatively a ‘living death’ for Berkman (I, p. 106), a ‘living tomb’ (I, p. 
107), and a ‘grave’ (I, p. 249), the figure of the incarcerated Berkman becomes death-in- 
life for Goldman, and thus evolves into her motivating force. ‘There was only Sasha -  
Sasha in convict’s clothes, captive behind stone walls -  Sasha with his pale set face 
pressed to the iron bars, his steady eyes gazing intently upon me, bidding me go on’ (I, 
p. 107). After Goldman’s own year of incarceration for incitement to riot, a letter from 
him upon her release prompts her to reflect that ‘Sasha’s spirit, fortunately, however, 
always hovered over me, helping me to forget everything personal’ (I, p. 152). Later 
again, Goldman describes him as ‘a shining meteor on the dark horizon [...] a white 
light that purged one’s soul, inspiring even awe at his detachment from human frailties’ 
(I, p. 177). This religious metaphor is extended further with a visit to the exterior of 
Berkman’s penitentiary, where Goldman runs her hand over the ‘rough surface’ of the 
prison wall, conjuring lapidary images of a graveyard (I, p. 213).
This faith, though, undergoes a series of challenges, not least of which is 
Goldman’s actual meeting with Berkman in prison. Apart from one short visit 
immediately in the wake of his trial, disguised as his sister, Goldman had to wait nine
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years to see Berkman again. Once more disguised as his sister, she enters the prison 
‘with fast-beating heart’. She recounts seeing the guard, and ‘beside him a man in a grey 
suit, the same greyness in his face. Could it really be Sasha, so changed, so thin and 
wan?’ Despite the nine years of enforced estrangement (or perhaps because of it), 
‘Sasha made no sound. [...] I, too, was mute’ (I, p. 295). Berkman’s appalling physical 
condition was due to his extended periods of time in solitary confinement and the harsh 
treatment meted out by the prison authorities. Yet the silence of the meeting seems 
eloquent on another level. Faced with the incarnation of her ideal, Goldman is 
(uncharacteristically) reduced to muteness. The image appears to substantiate De Man’s 
warning about the ‘latent threat that inhabits prosopopeia, namely that by making the 
death speak, the symmetrical structure of the trope implies, by the same token, that the 
living are struck dumb, frozen in their own death’.43
There is a fundamental alterity inscribed in the heart of Goldman’s text, an 
inscription of the death, or absence, of that which prompts her faith 44 This would be 
borne out by the letter that I cited earlier, in which Goldman describes Berkman as 
‘rooted in my being, so ingrained in every fiber’. Berkman is both part of Goldman and 
yet not of her. Nevertheless this apparently textbook definition of alterity is unsettled by 
the prison meeting with Berkman inasmuch as it is in fact Goldman’s own inscription of 
the absence of Berkman that motivates her. The ‘true’ other, the living Berkman reduces
43 De Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, p. 928.
44 Derrida argues in The Gift o f  Death  that ‘this concern for death, this awakening that keeps vigil over 
death, this conscience that looks death in the face is another name for freedom’. The death in question, 
though, is the death o f the self. Although Goldman’s constant awareness is o f the sacrifice o f the 
Haymarket martyrs, it might be argued that bearing in mind her prison cell experience of the proximity of  
‘their’ death, her text conflates her own death with theirs. See Jacques Derrida, The Gift o f  Death, trans. 
by David Wills (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1995), p. 15.
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her to silence, challenging in his corporeal actuality the fragility of her authorised 
version of him.45
This challenge multiplies itself. Goldman portrays Berkman as a martyr in 
religious terms, referring to the imprisonment as his ‘Calvary’ (I, p. 367). Berkman, 
along with Czolgosz and the Chicago martyrs, are ‘Christs’, crucified by an indifferent 
people on whose very behalf they had sought to act (I, p. 304).46 The Christ imagery, 
though, has already experienced a fatal undermining, and by Goldman’s own hand. 
Goldman closes the chapter relating Berkman’s attempt on Frick and his subsequent 
arrest with a vow to herself -  ‘I would rescue my boy, I would bring him back to life!’ 
(I, p. 107). Again, his release is described as a ‘resurrection’ (I, p. 382). Yet was Christ 
in fact willed back to life by the strength of belief of his faithful? Scripture suggests not, 
and so once more Goldman’s faith would seem to be more closely related to her own 
volition. That Berkman was indeed the object of her will and not her faith seems to 
become clearer with the metamorphosis of the imagery surrounding him -  after his 
release from prison, and his subsequent fall into depression, she later upbraids herself 
for having been overly protective of him, motivated by ‘the mistaken belief, usual with 
mothers, that they know best what is good for their children’ (II, p. 541). Just as 
Berkman transubstantiates from Christ to child, Goldman writes of the jealous
45 Even at their first meeting Goldman records that once they were prohibited from speaking in their 
‘beloved Russian’, they both sat mute (I, p. 112). Strikingly, at each visit she describes an image of 
Berkman playing with her watch-chain. Goldman’s chain links Berkman to time, and thus death, yet his 
living presence would seem to frustrate this textual urge for her. At the same time, she quotes a sub rosa 
(illegally smuggled) letter from Berkman in the wake of the second visit, where he tries to explain his 
‘strange behaviour’. It would seem that for Berkman as well, Goldman’s watch-chain comes to signify 
time, and thus life, as opposed to his living death. He writes that:
The sight o f your face after all these years completely unnerved me. I could not think, I 
could not speak. It was as if  all my dreams o f freedom, the whole world o f the living, were 
concentrated in the shiny little trinket that was dangling from your watch-chain. I couldn’t 
take my eyes o ff it, I couldn’t keep my hand from playing with it. It absorbed my whole 
being. (I, p. 322)
46 The image o f  (anarchist) martyrs as Christ-like is later repeated for the thousands slaughtered by the 
Bolshevik forces led by Trotsky at the Kronstadt uprising (II, p. 889). The image o f the prisoner being 
crucified by an inhuman system also runs through the collection o f essays Under the Yoke o f  the State: 
Selected Anarchist Responses to Prisons and Crime, Vol. 1, 1886-1929, ed. by Dawn Collective (London: 
Kate Sharpley Library, 2003).
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accusation of one of her longest lovers, Ben Reitman -  ‘Sasha, he declared, was my 
god, Sasha’s life and work my religion’ (II, p. 581).
My argument is that Goldman’s faith is not so much a belief in some 
transcendental other but rather the product of her own will. Her will, in my reading, 
produces the passionate ideal that gives her the authority to live her own life, the life of 
Emma Goldman the anarchist activist. This closes a causal circle that requires no further 
linkage to the ‘reality’ of an external world, nor the ‘spirituality’ of a next world. It is 
not the case that this should be a problem in and of itself, but it does highlight the 
source of Goldman’s textual authority to embark upon her journey as Goldman. This is 
the meaning behind my earlier suggestion that the ‘real’ Emma Goldman seems at times 
to be distant from the pages of her autobiography.
This reading would be reinforced by the events of the Russian Revolution,
which initially come to occupy the locus of the new vessel for Goldman’s faith. Despite
being composed several years after she and Berkman departed from Russia, the text
ostensibly attempts to recount their arrival there and introduction to the revolution
without the rancour that one might expect hindsight to have brought her. The
description of their arrival in Russia opens on a positively evangelical note, following
the already established thread of religious imagery that runs through Living My Life:
Soviet Russia! Sacred ground, magic people! You have come to symbolize 
humanity’s hope, you alone are destined to redeem mankind. I have come 
to serve you, beloved matushka. Take me to your bosom, let me pour 
myself into you, mingle my blood with yours, find my place in your heroic 
struggle, and give to the uttermost to your needs! (II, p. 726)
At the same time, though, the text struggles not to show its hand too early. 
Within a few days of their arrival, Goldman and Berkman meet a former anarchist 
comrade from the U.S., Bill Shatoff, now an active member of the government. Despite 
Goldman recording that ‘the faith and fervour of [Shatoff] swept me along to ecstatic
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heights’, she continues that ‘I could not entirely free myself from an undercurrent of 
uneasiness one often feels when left alone in the dark’ (II, p. 731).
The text embarks on a carefully charted course which describes the slow loss of
faith in the revolution as seen at first hand by Goldman and Berkman. Goldman attends
a (clandestine) meeting of anarchists in Petrograd, and rapidly finds dissenting voices -
they scorn her for her ‘wilful blindness’, telling her that Shatoff has become a
‘“Sovietsky” anarchist’ and is hiding ‘facts’ from her (II, p. 734). A few pages later the
text makes the stakes of this wilfulness clear:
Thus I reasoned with myself, determinedly refusing to see the reverse side 
of Russia’s face. But its scarred and twisted countenance would not be 
ignored. It kept calling me back, urging me to look, forcing me to view its 
suffering. I wanted to see only its beauty and radiance, longed passionately 
to believe in its strength and power, yet the very hideousness of the other 
side compelled with an irresistible appeal. (II, pp. 737-738)
Here the text embodies Roy Pascal’s contention that ‘autobiography is a shaping 
of the past’ and that it ‘imposes a pattern on a life, constructs out of it a coherent 
story’.47 The text eschews any attempt to present the ‘facts’ as they occurred, and 
increasingly Goldman’s unease takes control of the direction of the narrative. In a 
meeting with the American journalist John Reed, Goldman learns that the shooting that 
she had heard at night, and that she had been told was the ‘target practice of kursanty 
(Communist students at the military training-school for officers)’ was in fact the sound 
of summary executions (II, p. 740). She describes an interview with Maxim Gorky, who 
had been her ‘idol’, but ends with a retrospective observation that she ‘would not see his 
feet of clay’ (II, p. 745). Eventually the narrative recognises that Goldman’s ‘old values 
had been shipwrecked’ and that she had been ‘thrown overboard to sink or swim’ (II, p. 
813). Her struggle with the facts of the revolution eventually comes to a climax in an 
illuminating passage in which Goldman opposes the desire for faith against will:
47 Roy Pascal, as cited by Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses, p. 163.
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Alexandra Shakol [a Russian anarchist] had once told me that she would 
forgo half her life to wake up a Communist, so as to give herself 
unreservedly to the party’s demands and service. Now I understood what 
she had meant. I felt that I would also give anything to be able to take 
Vetoshkin’s [an enthusiastic Bolshevik functionary] hand and say: “I am 
with you. I see your cause with your eyes and I will serve with the same 
blind faith as you and your sincere comrades.” Alas, there was no such 
short and easy way out of the mental anguish for those who seek for life 
beyond dogma and creed. (II, p. 831)
The narrative comes to its logical conclusion soon after when Goldman writes that ‘only
a year had passed, and nothing was left but the ashes of my fervent dreams, my burning
faith, my joyous song’ (II, p. 860).
The sense that Goldman the activist was brought to life in the text by the passion 
of her ideal is reinforced by this loss of faith, for it culminates in a dramatic loss of 
voice. This happens during an emergency meeting of the Petrograd soviet to discuss the 
protest of the Kronstadt sailors in solidarity with a strike being held in the city. 
Goldman writes that in comparison with an anti-war meeting in the United States, 
where likewise the ‘spirit of vengeance and hate had run amuck’, but where she had 
spoken out against ‘the war-drunk patriots’, in Petrograd the atmosphere of ‘passion and 
hate’ had ‘crept into my being and held me by the throat’ (II, p. 881). If this is perhaps 
Goldman’s personal nadir, she rouses herself from it immediately and the same night 
she and Berkman send a letter in support of the doomed Kronstadt sailors.
What is more curious, though, is that the text moves on from this nadir to turn
the language of religious fervour back against the Bolsheviks. Trotsky’s resolution to
exterminate the Kronstadt rebels prompts Goldman to write that ‘daring to question the
divine right of rulers was again to be punished by death’ (II, p. 883). Moreover the
arrival of various union activists known to Goldman and Berkman in Moscow for a
‘Red Trade Unions’ congress prompts a scenario of public betrayal that brings images
of Judas to mind. Goldman writes scathingly that:
I felt that this treachery was not so much the fault of [those] who were on 
their knees before the holy shrine of the Kremlin. It was rather the
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appalling superstition, the Bolshevik myth, that duped and ensnared them, 
as it had also formerly done to us.
Soviet Russia had become the modem socialist Lourdes, to which the 
blind and the lame, the deaf and the dumb were flocking for miraculous 
cures. (II, p. 916)
Unsurprisingly, her eventual exit from Russia is described as with her ‘dreams 
crushed, my faith broken, my heart like a stone’ (II, p. 927). Yet what does this 
language of faith achieve? The rapid volte-face in the text’s treatment of the notion of 
ideological faith would seem to undo the possibilities for any easy confidence in the 
enduring, even transcendental, nature of faith. The text, it would appear, wants to have 
the reader accept Goldman-the-activist as a character possessed of a burning idealism, 
one which propelled her into a life of struggle. Yet at the same time, the text then stages 
several encounters with the ‘reality’ of the objects of her faith, and she is repeatedly left 
silenced, in her prison meetings with Berkman and in the face of Bolshevik scheming. 
What is more the faith of others, in this case the Bolsheviks, comes in for open scom on 
her part, this after having been held up as an erstwhile object of desire.
This sense of contestation extends beyond the limits of this one text, though. The 
very notion of ‘Goldman’ becomes more complex when one turns to the volume of 
letters. In place of the image of a glassy-eyed zealot that her ‘faith’ might lead one to 
construct, the letters offer a portrait of a subject in conflict. For example, in the letter 
that Goldman and Berkman wrote from Ellis Island, shortly before the departure of the 
Buford with its cargo of deportees, they write that ‘he who ascends to the greatest 
heights of faith is often hurled into the depths of doubt’.48 This doubt is accentuated 
with the passage of the final years of their lives, and Goldman wrote in 1931 that ‘I too 
have come to the conclusion, bitter as it is, that hardly anything has come of our years 
of effort’.49 She compares herself, in terms of her incessant railing against injustice, to
someone suffering from ‘an incurable disease’ but who visits every doctor regardless of
48 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 12.
49 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 49.
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the impossibility of a cure, and then wonders if her efforts are not quixotic, and if she is 
not ‘a fool to keep pegging away at windmills’.50 Indeed the letters even reveal absences 
within the text of the autobiography -  for example in a letter to Berkman she discusses 
having ‘left out quite a number of episodes’ from her love life, considering the men 
concerned not to be of sufficient relevance to her story to merit inclusion.51
These ‘Goldmans’ must be ranked alongside the various Goldmans of the 
autobiography and indeed of the political texts. My contention would be that this 
plurality of Goldman’s work consistently undermines the very motivating notion of 
faith supposedly offered within it, and in so doing can be seen to undermine the 
foundation of any authority that would spring from it. In this I would concur with 
Linnie Blake’s argument that a life such as Goldman’s ‘may appear incomplete, 
contradictory, unstable, derivative or too eclectic to form a rational system of thought. 
But that [...] is its strength’.52 This is no faith in a transcendental other, but rather a faith 
that shifts and slips, a faith that struggles and that can be made and unmade in the face 
of challenges from the ‘facts’ of her life -  challenges that it fails to measure up to. This 
failure should, though, be read as a source of inspiration, for despite Goldman’s 
insistence on the necessity of facing the facts, with its apparent sense of the facts 
speaking for themselves, what her text demonstrates is a radical act of interpretation.
Her faith is not that of the unswerving fundamentalist but rather the pragmatic realist
committed to a notion of tolerance that would allow all faiths but enshrine none.
Alexander Berkman -  learning the story
The fractured subject that can be seen to emerge from Emma Goldman’s life writing 
establishes a fascinating contrast with the subject that emerges from Alexander
50 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 50, p. 59.
51 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 146.
52 Linnie Blake, ‘A Jew, A Red, A Whore, A Bomber: Becoming Emma Goldman, Rhizomatic 
Intellectual’, Angelaki, 2.3 (1997), 179-190 (p. 182).
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Berkman’s Prison Memoirs o f an Anarchist. While Goldman’s subject ostensibly 
maintains her ‘faith’ through the course of her life, yet emerges from her text as a 
subject that has undergone many a transformation, Berkman’s subject apparently 
undergoes a radical conversion as a result of the experiences described in his Memoirs. 
Goldman’s text tries (and fails) to maintain her ‘faith’ in the face of all odds, thus 
eschewing one of the traditional models of autobiography, that being the delineation of 
the development of the self during the course of one’s life. Berkman’s text, though, in 
clearly focussing on one particular moment in his life (albeit a moment of over fourteen 
years in prison), manages to plot a development all the more startling for the brevity of 
the section of lifespan that it covers. I will plot the course of this development before 
considering its significance in the light of Hayden White’s essay ‘The Value of 
Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’.
Goldman’s involvement in the planning of the assassination on Frick was such 
that when she came to write her autobiography, she was advised by an American lawyer 
to excise all mention of the episode in order not to imperil her chances of a possible 
return to the United States. For example, at one point, in a rather desperate attempt to 
find the money necessary to purchase a revolver, she tried her luck as a prostitute on the 
streets of New York (to no avail, according to her own account). Yet Berkman’s 
opening chapter leaps from the arrival of ‘the Girl’ (as he always refers to Goldman in 
the Memoirs) with a newspaper giving details of the massacre of the striking Homestead 
workers, to a scene where he is travelling on the train towards Pittsburgh, removing all 
detail of the support of the others that he received in planning and executing the attempt 
on Frick’s life.
Perhaps the framing of the narrative in these terms is more understandable given 
that Berkman’s text does not pretend to be a complete autobiography as such, but rather,
53 Hayden White, ‘The Value o f Narrativity in the Representation o f Reality’, Critical Inquiry, 7 (1980), 
5-27.
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as the title highlights, the memoirs from his time in prison. The opening chapters swiftly
bring Berkman to his fateful confrontation with Henry Clay Frick, weaving in
‘flashback’ details from his past life in Russia before emigrating to the United States,
including his radicalisation as a student in St. Petersburg. In the train Berkman reflects
on his motives, feeling supremely confident of his righteousness in joining the
Homestead proletariat in their struggle -  ‘This is my natural mission. [...] No shadow of
doubt crosses my mind.’54 While Goldman’s faith fails to make her sound like a
fundamentalist, Berkman takes on the tones of a steely assassin:
Could anything be nobler than to die for a grand, a sublime Cause? Why, 
the very life of a true revolutionist has no other purpose, no significance 
whatever, save to sacrifice it on the altar of the beloved People. And what 
could be higher in life than to be a true revolutionist? It is to be a man, a 
complete MAN. A being who has neither personal interests nor desires 
above the necessities of the Cause; one who has emancipated himself from 
being merely human. (PMOA, p. 11)
Berkman’s attempt at transcendence of the ‘merely human’ sounds an austere 
note indeed, one that Goldman’s account of his clashes with their co-conspirator Fedya, 
over the frivolous spending of money that would have been better destined to serve the 
movement, would seem to reinforce. Berkman reminisces about the place of the Russian 
Nihilists in his early days, with their slogan of ‘go to the People’, and from the opening 
chapters it is clear (even from the quotation above, with its ‘altar’) that in his universe 
the ‘People’ have been deified (PMOA, p. 15). The ‘grand, mysterious, yet so near and 
real, People...’ he writes, before going on to picture the ‘People’ as Atlas, supporting 
the weight of the world on his shoulders (PMOA, p. 9). Thus the opening chapters 
apparently offer an insight into the thinking and motivation of Berkman the character at 
the time he was planning the assassination, and serve as an important point of reference 
given the subsequent directions his thought will take.
54 Alexander Berkman, Prison Memoirs o f  an Anarchist (New York: New York Review Books, 1999), p. 
10. All further references in this chapter will be given as PMOA with page number.
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It is clear that his self-image of cold-blooded revolutionist displays a troubling 
emotional distance from the human world around him. The fact of his consecration of 
the ‘People’ (always capitalized, as if to emphasize its higher metaphysical status) 
seems to lead to a dramatic separation from ‘real’ people. This is most clear from 
Berkman’s attitude to himself -  he compares himself with the revolutionary hero of a 
Russian novel, who goes through a ‘system of unspeakable, self-inflicted torture to 
prepare himself for future exigencies’. Berkman considers this notion of preparation ‘a 
sign of weakness’. ‘Does a real revolutionist need to prepare himself, to steel his nerves 
and harden his body?’ he asks himself, and adds, ‘I feel it almost a personal insult, this 
suggestion of the revolutionist’s mere human clay.’ {PMOA, p. 13) Again the human is 
reduced to ‘mere’ alongside the Olympian stride of the passing revolutionist, but the 
text is already working to undo the naive belief in the superhuman status of the 
revolutionist. For example, with the integration of the scenes from his childhood, one 
might be prompted to paraphrase Simone de Beauvoir in response to Berkman, that one 
is not bom a revolutionist but becomes one. Hence the family background serves to 
highlight the all-too-human roots of Berkman the revolutionist, however much the 
narrative apparently seeks to persuade the reader of the opposite.
The merely human Berkman, it would seem, has not been completely banished
by the self-authored revolutionist. After the climax of the first section, Berkman’s
attempt on Frick’s life, Berkman lies stmggling on the floor of Frick’s office. The
wounded factory boss is lifted to his feet:
He stands in front of me, supported by several men. His face is ashen gray; 
the black beard is streaked with red, and blood is oozing from his neck. For 
an instant a strange feeling, as of shame, comes over me; but the next 
moment I am filled with anger at the sentiment, so unworthy of a 
revolutionist. {PMOA, p. 38)
Despite his best (narrative) intentions, Berkman cannot completely impose the 
revolutionist on his human self. The tension between these two poles continues in the
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first section of the text, and is staged in a much more dramatic fashion when Berkman is
in prison awaiting trial. The gulf between ‘the People’ and mere ‘people’ begins to
widen inexorably. In a night-time vision, Berkman visualises a carpenter preparing him
a scaffold, and then imagines that it is the same man who overpowered him in Frick’s
office. ‘If he only knew what he had done. He is one of the People: we must go to them,
enlighten them. [...] He doesn’t know his real friends.’ {PMOA, p. 40) Berkman’s
action is already plagued with misinterpretation in his eyes. This misinterpretation
comes to life with his first encounter with other prisoners, who fail to understand
Berkman’s motives or action. His reflections on this incomprehension bring the first
textual admission of the widening gap:
Why can’t they understand the motives that prompted my act? [...] Not a 
striker myself, I could and should have had no interest in the struggle [...].
In the purpose of the act they refused to see any significance,- nothing 
beyond the mere physical effect. [...] It is, of course, consoling to reflect 
that neither of those men can properly be said to represent the People. 
{PMOA, pp. 52-53)
Berkman excitedly pins his hope for understanding on another prisoner, a 
Homestead worker who has been arrested on charges of throwing dynamite at the 
Pinkerton private security militia that had attacked the strikers. In his cell, Berkman 
precipitously begins to imagine an entire bond with the man to whom he has as yet to 
speak:
he will understand: he is of the real People. My heart wells up in 
admiration of the man [...]. He is of the true spirit; the embodiment of the 
great, noble People: the giant of labor grown to his full stature, conscious 
of his strength. Fearless, strong, and proud, he will conquer all obstacles; 
he will break his chains and liberate mankind. {PMOA, p. 53)
The narrative has established an oscillating pattern of setting up expectations of 
its characters, only to frustrate them. This time, though, it does so quite mercilessly. 
When Berkman manages to speak to the Homestead man the next morning, the 
‘fearless’ giant does not want to be seen talking to him for fear of prejudicing his 
upcoming trial. When they manage a whispered conversation over his shoulder, with
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Berkman walking behind him, the striker comments “‘Too bad you didn’t kill him.
Some business misunderstanding, eh?’” . Berkman attempts to explain that he was acting
on behalf of the striker’s people, but is angrily interrupted. He is told that the strikers
‘don’t believe in killing; they respect the law’ and that while ‘Frick deserves to die. He
is a murderer’, the strikers ‘will have nothing to do with Anarchists’ (PMOA, p. 55).
Berkman’s reaction to this is unsurprising. In his cell that night, the narrative
records his anger -  ‘My hero of yesterday, the hero of the glorious struggle of the
People,- how contemptible he has proved himself, how cravenly small!’ {PMOA, p. 56)
Yet his emotional estrangement from ‘mere humanity’ leads him to a disturbing
conclusion regarding the fate of this one particular striker:
The Judas-striker is not fit to live. Perhaps it would be best they should 
hang him. His death would help to open the eyes of the People to the real 
character o f  legal justice. [...]
The thought somewhat soothes my perturbation. At least the cause of the 
People will benefit to some extent. The man himself is not to be 
considered. He has ceased to exist: his interests are exclusively personal; he 
can be of no further benefit to the People. Only his death can aid the Cause.
It is best for him to end his career in the service of humanity. I hope he will 
act like a m an on the scaffold. {PMOA, pp. 58-59)
The text does not record if Berkman proposed his plan to the Homestead striker. One
can only wonder at what the outcome of such a conversation might have been.
Berkman is forced to adopt a position where he comes to categorise people as to
whether or not they are ‘People’, depending on their reaction to his act against Frick.
The opening o f Prison Memoirs is peppered with instances where various people are
excluded from the ‘People’ -  Berkman anticipates his trial, where ‘the jury won’t
understand. They, too, belong to the capitalist class’ {PMOA, p. 58). He reacts against
the warden of the prison placing him under suicide watch -  ‘it outrages me that even a
bourgeois should so meanly misjudge the aspirations of an active revolutionist.’
{PMOA, p. 59) This people/People opposition, though, is clearly a question of
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interpretation, one which comes to dominate the narrative once Berkman is convicted 
and sentenced.
Shortly after his arrival at the Pennsylvania state penitentiary, Berkman receives
a clandestine communication from another prisoner. Unaware of the provenance of the
note, Berkman ‘vaguely’ surmises its meaning, an attempt at escape. But the prison
slang that the note employs to warn him to be on his guard defeats his comprehension:
I must read the note again. It contains so many expressions I don’t 
understand. I should ‘keep my lamps lit.’ What lamps? There are none in 
the cell; where am I to get them? And what ‘screws’ must I watch? And the 
‘stools,’-  I have only a chair here. Why should I watch it? {PMOA, pp. 
108-109)
Berkman’s narrative borders on self-deprecation with the barrage of naive 
questions. Yet the missive serves as a powerful analogy for his entire period of 
incarceration, and his development across the pages of the Prison Memoirs is one of 
learning to read this note, of learning to find his place within a ‘people’ now left 
uncapitalized. Not long after receiving the note, he talks one morning to the ‘rangeman’, 
a prisoner who has been trusted with the privilege of sweeping the ‘range’ of cells. 
When his interlocutor warns Berkman not to speak too loudly for ‘the screw’s got long 
ears’, he immediately notices the unknown word. ‘A wild hope trembles in my heart. 
The “screw”! The puzzling expression in the mysterious note,- perhaps this man wrote 
it.’ {PMOA, p. 122) The rangeman explains further prison slang to Berkman, enjoying 
his role as educator, noting that the new prisoner is ‘not long on lingo’ {PMOA, p. 123).
The centrality of interpretation can be seen again in the result of Berkman’s 
attempt at escape. Eight years into his sentence, and with his hopes waning of ever 
surviving his incarceration, his health ravaged after repeated periods in solitary and on 
bread and water diets, Berkman conceived of a plan of escape where rather than tunnel 
out of the prison, others would dig a tunnel in for him. As a precaution, he had 
elaborated a code, ‘based on a discarded system of German shorthand’, to guarantee the
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security of his communication with the diggers on the outside (PMOA, p. 362). When 
the tunnelling begins, a letter comes from the outside informing him of this: it is 
ostensibly a personal letter, but Berkman writes that ‘I scan each word and letter, 
seeking hidden meaning, analysing every flourish and dash, carefully distilling the 
minute lines, fusing the significant dots into the structure of meaning’ (PMOA, p. 375). 
The act of interpretation has now become central to his very escape and survival faced 
with the living death that he confronts in the prison. The plan came within a fraction of 
success, for despite difficult digging conditions and various changes of route to which 
Berkman had not consented and which he blamed for the eventual failure of the tunnel, 
months of work ended with the tunnel entrance lying just beneath the surface of one of 
the inner yards in the prison. Unfortunately for Berkman, on the day of his planned 
flight, workmen had dumped a pile of building material right on the spot where he 
expected to be able to pull up the earth covering the tunnel entrance, and so his escape 
was frustrated. Eventually the authorities discovered the tunnel, but they were unable to 
divine its provenance. In the house from where the tunnel began the police found an 
encrypted note. No other evidence pointed to who might have been responsible for the 
tunnel. Berkman was named as a prime suspect in the case, but the Warden’s clumsy 
attempt to trick him into deciphering the note failed, and Berkman recounts how the 
various authorities vied for the goal of identifying the culprits. Eventually he was 
cleared of involvement for lack of evidence (but punished regardless). The tunnel lay 
silent, incomprehensible to those who would attribute meaning and responsibility to it. 
It undermined the very foundation of the prison, ran under its walls and compromised 
its integrity. As a referent it is indisputable -  it was an escape tunnel. As a sign, it was 
illegible to the authorities, along with the discovered note. No one could be held to 
account for it, for its significance could not be established.
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Things no longer just ‘are’, but rather have to be read. This returns the notion of
the exemplar, as mentioned above, to the discussion. The narrative of the Prison
Memoirs not only argues for the correctness of Berkman’s cause, but also for the use of
his life (and possible death) as an example to be held up to both the movement and the
world at large for reading. This depends, simultaneously, on the greater space for
interpretative freedom in the text, which goes hand in hand with a closing of the
emotional distance that Berkman originally felt towards humanity, including himself.
The value of human life (not, though, in simple repentant relation to Frick) undergoes a
substantive revision in the light of Berkman’s experiences. Initially Berkman had
arrived in custody with a capsule of nitro-glycerine secreted in his clothing. Part of
Berkman’s concept of attentat is that the act should be rounded off with the suicide of
the attentater. If the ‘People’s Cause’, he writes before he makes his attempt on Frick’s
life, ‘demand his life, so much the better.’ {PMOA, p. 11) He even manages,
subsequently, to distinguish between the involuntary sacrifice of the Chicago martyrs
and what he expects his suicide to be:
To give a young life, full of health and vitality, to give all, without a 
thought of self; to give all, voluntarily, cheerfully; nay, enthusiastically -  
could any one fail to understand such love? [Chicago] lacked the element 
of voluntary Anarchist self-sacrifice in the interests of the People. {PMOA,
p. 60)
Nevertheless even in the moment of its articulation, the exemplary suicide of the 
attentater is beset by self-doubt -  ‘could anyone fail to understand such love?’ -  the 
implicit worry being that someone could indeed fail to understand. Berkman’s 
calculating coldness towards his own life is reflected in his authoritarian arrogance in 
seeking to persuade the other Homestead prisoner to forfeit his own life in service to the 
Cause.
Yet the question of interpretation just will not leave these issues to settle 
themselves -  these are never self-explanatory acts, but symbolic gestures, requiring
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careful reading, even explication. Berkman conceives of his prison suicide, once he has 
had his moment in court to explain his actions, as being of further propaganda benefit to 
‘the Cause’; he senses that his first letter from Goldman presumes to ‘reproach me with 
my failure to suicide’ {PMOA, p. 116). Yet slowly the ‘meaning’ that might be derived 
from this action changes in the light of the circumstances in which Berkman finds 
himself. In fact the ‘Cause’ itself (or its narrative articulation) proves to be more 
flexible in its demands: in a moment of despair in solitary confinement, Berkman 
ponders suicide, but feels that ‘on the threshold of Nirvana life recoils; in the very 
bowels of torment it cries out to be \\ He conceives of the prison authorities as ‘the 
vampire gloating over its prey’ and thus resolves that ‘I shall not disgrace the Cause, I 
shall not grieve my comrades by weak surrender!’ {PMOA, p. 220). Later in the 
narrative, Berkman conjures an imagined scene of his suicide, and again ‘the thought of 
the enemy’s triumph fans the embers of life. It engenders defiance, and strengthens 
stubborn resistance’ {PMOA, p. 404). In this sense, Prison Memoirs comes to share with 
Goldman’s Living My Life the characteristic of a trial of faith. Berkman’s life moves 
from being an alienated piece of fleshy property to be disposed of as he, or the Cause, 
sees fit, to being the intimate property of the narrator.
The closing of this emotional distance between Berkman and human life comes
to a striking conclusion when he finally articulates a position that is in stark opposition
to the thoughts that he set down upon first entering prison. Reflecting on the
assassination of the King of Italy by an anarchist, he ponders on the inevitable death of
Bresci, the assailant:
I feel that the individual, in certain cases, is of more direct and immediate 
consequence than humanity. What is the latter but the aggregate of 
individual existences -  and shall these, the best of them, forever be 
sacrificed for the metaphysical collectivity? {PMOA, p. 403)
Whereas the newly incarcerated Berkman had exulted in the opportunity to give up his
life for a ‘metaphysical collectivity’, he has now rethought his position on many issues.
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No longer the aloof revolutionist sharing nothing in common with fellow convicts, he 
writes that ‘I marvel at the inadequacy of my previous notions of “the criminal.” [...] 
Daily association dispels the myth of the “species,” and reveals the individual’ (PMOA, 
p. 242). In the workshop he had once accused his assistant, Boston Red, of being 
‘disgusting’ for speaking of homosexual love (in that passage the other prisoner had to 
explain the slang of having a ‘kid’), claiming that ‘I don’t think there can be such 
intimacy between those of the same sex’. Red presciently replies ‘you’ll know better 
before your time’s up, me virtuous sonny’ (PMOA, pp. 170-171). Years later, discussing 
the matter with another prisoner, Berkman writes that ‘I think it a very beautiful 
emotion. Just as beautiful as love for a woman’ and relates his own experience of love 
for a fellow convict (PMOA, p. 445). Where once the young Berkman had been 
mystified at the slangy content of a smuggled note, by the middle section of the 
narrative he confidently expounds on prison life, giving the reader a lesson in convict 
jargon, explaining who and what the ‘con man’, the ‘yegg’ and the ‘gun’ are (PMOA, 
pp. 272-278). Berkman’s text takes on the contours of a Bildungsroman, where he 
gradually comes to a reworked appreciation of those around him. Even the tunnel, 
which had previously been conceived of as an empty space, is suddenly populated by 
the men digging it:
Half-naked they had labored through the weary days and nights, stretched 
at full length in the narrow passage, their bodies perspiring and chilled in 
turn, their hands bleeding with the terrible toil. [...] How little thought I 
had given to my comrades, toiling underground, in the anxious days of my 
own apprehension and suspense! (PMOA, pp. 396-397)
But rather than treat Berkman’s text as novelistic fiction, I will consider it in the 
light of Hayden White’s essay. Berkman’s text moves from a simple acceptance of the 
untroubled categorical status of real things, be they people (or ‘People’) or objects, to a 
more nuanced approach to interpreting them. In so doing, it demonstrates White’s 
concern over narrativity, the ‘problem of how to translate knowing into telling’. White
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writes th a t4real events should not speak, should not tell themselves. Real events should 
simply be’.55 Central to White’s analysis is the notion of authority, demonstrable in 
historical writing in the difference between the annals form and chronicles or history 
proper, as he calls it. In White’s account, the annalist has ‘no need to claim the authority 
to narrate events since there is nothing problematical about their status as manifestations 
of a reality that is being contested. [...] It is because there was a contest that there is 
something to narrativize’.56 Now Berkman’s situation is one that is clearly highly 
contested -  a believer in freedom incarcerated, an advocate of workers’ control forced 
into prison slavery, the list could be multiplied at length. Indeed, bearing in mind 
White’s observation that ‘narrative in general, from the folktale to the novel, from the 
annals to the fully realized “history,” has to do with the topics of law, legality, 
legitimacy, or, more generally, authority’, it would seem redundant to add that
e n
Berkman’s imprisonment could not be a clearer instance of an encounter with law. Yet 
is Berkman the simple object of judicial authority? From White’s analysis, it would 
seem not, for a narrative springs from the need to establish a victor in competing ‘moral 
orders’ -  in Berkman’s case this could be translated in many fashions (anarchism/state, 
justice/injustice, etc.), but perhaps the most pertinent oppositions would be ‘the People’ 
(or ‘the Cause’) versus ‘the merely human’, or the prison death versus liberated life. 
Berkman’s text is clear about the passage from death to life upon his release -  the last 
section of the text is titled ‘The Resurrection’, and there is a plethora of earlier 
references to the prison as a tomb. Moreover, the depression that inevitably assails 
Berkman upon his release is sketchily described, and at one point he buys a gun with the 
intention of committing suicide, but his full return to ‘life’, the life of an anarchist, 
comes on the last page when he hears news of police harassment of anarchist comrades:
55 White, ‘The Value o f  Narrativity’, p. 5, p. 8.
56 White, ‘The Value o f  Narrativity’, pp. 22-23.
57 White, ‘The Value o f  Narrativity’, p. 17.
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The news electrifies me. I feel myself transported into the past, the days of 
struggle and persecution. Philo was right! The enemy is challenging, the 
struggle is going on!... I see the graves of Waldheim open, and hear the 
voices from the tomb.58
White sees only one possible ending for a story -  ‘What else could narrative 
closure consist of than the passage from one moral order to another?’. In the passage 
from death to life, in White’s words, Berkman’s ‘very right to narrate hinges upon a 
certain relationship to authority per se’.59 Yet more fundamentally, the narrative shows a 
Berkman who learns valuable lessons from his experience, in contrast to Goldman’s 
troubled narrator, whose enabling faith seems to be a moveable feast. In moving from 
the moral order of ‘the Cause’ to an appreciation of the value of human life and the 
individual, Berkman’s narrative ‘I’ displays a marked narrational authority. This is 
evident from the very first line of the Memoirs -  ‘clearly every detail of that day is 
engraved on my mind’ {PMOA, p. 5). The absolute declaration of memorial fidelity 
allows no room for debate, and hence while Goldman’s text apparently maintains a 
resolute commitment to her faith, but yet reveals a subject in conflict, Berkman’s text 
offers a journey leading to a reversal of values that seems, somewhat problematically, 
only to strengthen the authority of the cogito of the narrator. Yet in the volume of 
letters, Goldman explicitly criticises Berkman for including details that she finds 
anachronistic in his text, arguing that he has passed off his contemporary views as those 
of his period of incarceration -  ‘you did not even reason that way when you came out in 
1906’ she writes.60 Indeed Berkman’s reworked feelings towards the individual could 
be complicated by some of his writing in the letters, for in 1934, with both he and 
Goldman in despair at the progress of fascism across Europe, he wrote to her that ‘I
58 PMOA, p. 518. Waldheim is the cemetery where the Chicago martyrs were buried. Berkman’s return to 
‘life’ is clearly complicated by a similar relationship to the Haymarket dead as the one which Goldman’s 
text demonstrates.
59 White, ‘The Value o f  Narrativity’, p. 26, p. 22.
60 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 95.
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have almost lost all faith in the “free individual as the basis of a free society’” .61 As I 
have suggested with Goldman, there can be no one single Berkman, be it the narrator or 
character, the young prisoner or experienced lag. The textual heritage has a literal and a 
metaphorical tunnel undermining its foundation -  just as with their bitter experiences in 
Russia, the facts never simply speak for themselves. White concludes his essay arguing 
that the ‘value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a 
desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an 
image of life that is and can only be imaginary’.62 Berkman was ever ready to assert the 
authority of will over life, and in fact he finally died by his own hand in 1936, rather 
than face the continuing pain of a disabling cancer. Yet the work of interpretation 
tunnels through this authority and exposes it, as White suggests, as imaginary.
Goldman can be seen to represent the authority inherent in the autobiography’s 
attempt to birth its author as narrator of the life lived. Berkman, on the other hand, 
represents the attempt by the narrating cogito to maintain a developmental coherence 
that would simultaneously establish its own authority over the text. In this reading they 
can be seen to both affirm central critical values surrounding generic expectations of 
autobiography while at the same time undermining themselves and their own authority. 
To conclude, though, there is one particular critical concern that I have not addressed in 
these texts and that is the question of memory. White comments, in passing, that ‘the 
reality of these events does not consist in the fact that they occurred but that, in the first 
place, they were remembered and, second, that they are capable of finding a place in a
/ ' - I
chronologically ordered sequence’. A comparison of the autobiographical writings of
61 Goldman and Berkman, Nowhere at Home, p. 105.
62 White, ‘The Value o f  Narrativity’, p. 27.
63 White, ‘The Value o f  Narrativity’, p. 23. Although in an answer to one o f  the critical responses to his 
essay White distinguishes between ‘personal rather than public memory’, as my concern is the authority 
o f the narrator and not the status o f  history, the model seems translatable. See Hayden White, ‘The 
Narrativization o f Real Events’, Critical Inquiry, 7 (1980), 793-798 (p. 798).
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Rudolf Rocker and his younger son Fermin makes for a demonstration of the 
contentious question of memory when it comes to putting a life onto a page.
Remembering the Rockers
In 1895, while Berkman was in prison, and Goldman was preparing for her first trip to
London, Rudolf Rocker arrived in England with his partner Milly. His text, The London
Years, recounts this period of his life spent in London (exiled from the Germany of his
birth by dint of his politics) the last third of which covers his period as an interned
‘enemy alien’ during the First World War.64 In tone and substance it strikes a contrast
with the passion of Goldman or the drama of Berkman, for despite Rocker being the
leading anarcho-syndicalist of his day, labour activist and advocate of the overthrow of
the state, the text adopts a more measured approach to its narrative. Rocker even comes
to reprove the more fiery Russian exiles who arrive in London with ‘terrorist ideas’ (L7,
p. 193), while he writes approvingly of England as ‘a country with a liberal tradition, a
land of tolerance and fair play’ (LY, p. 186).65 Indeed even his son Fermin commented
that ‘there is perhaps a certain irony in the fact that for all his espousal of the
revolutionary method, my father never used anything more lethal than his fists’.66
Rocker’s anarchism, as seen through the pages of The London Years is of an
attractive stripe. In one passage he neatly sums up what might be described as his anti-
foundationalist approach:
My innermost conviction was that Anarchism was not to be conceived as a 
definite closed system, nor as a future millenium [j /c], but only as a 
particular trend in the historic development towards freedom in all fields of 
human thought and action, and that no strict and unalterable lines could 
therefore be laid down for it.
64 For a fuller account o f  Rudolf Rocker’s life, see Mina Graur, An Anarchist ‘R abbi’: The Life and 
Teachings o f  R udolf Rocker (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).
65 It might be added that if  Rocker had perhaps expanded his horizon to take account o f what was 
happening in Ireland at the time, to take one country at random, this notion o f  fair play might have been 
somewhat more difficult to maintain.
66 Fermin Rocker, The East E nd Years: A Stepney Childhood (London: Freedom Press, 1998), p. 82. All 
further references in this chapter will be given as EEY with page number.
171
Freedom is never attained; it must always be striven for. Consequently its 
claims have no limit, and can neither be enclosed in a programme nor 
prescribed as a definite rule for the future. {LY, p. 145)
This contrasts greatly with the likes of Goldman and Berkman’s youthful sense that they
were on the edge of a revolution, needing only one last heave to bring about dramatic
social change. Rocker’s less dramatic claim to transcendental authority over the rights
and wrongs of the future direction of human society is also reflected in his activism. He
argues against the notion that anarchists are merely Utopians -  ‘it is completely wrong
to suppose that Anarchists reject the idea of an improvement of conditions in present-
day society. What we said was that the people must work and fight for that
improvement. It would not come by itself (LY, p. 168).
In keeping with this more measured approach the narrative of The London Years 
displays an unassumingly moderate tone. The order of events is largely chronological, 
but the text shows an occasional tendency to interrupt the narrative flow. For example, 
only one chapter after his narrated arrival in London, Rocker digresses to give portraits 
of Louise Michel, a survivor of the Paris Commune, and Errico Malatesta, an exiled 
Italian anarchist {LY, pp. 72-77). Occasionally during ancillary character sketches, the 
narrative leaps forward in time to close a particular sketch with the fact and date of a 
character’s death {LY, p. 63, p. 131). At other times the narrative voice intervenes 
directly in the text to signal a deferment of some further detail -  ‘I shall have more to 
say about him later’ writes Rocker of one acquaintance {LY, p. 235). These digressions 
and deferments would seem to represent a minor skirmish between memory and 
narrative chronological consistency. Yet Rocker the narrator never comes to question 
the status of his own memory. This might not be cause for much surprise if one accepts 
Fermin Rocker’s portrait of his father’s ability as a public speaker: he writes that ‘his 
phenomenal memory proved to be an important asset, enabling him to cite with ease the 
historical facts, figures, and quotations needed to prove his point’ {EEY, p. 76) While
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Rudolf Rocker’s unquestioning reliance on his memory might not be a hugely 
authoritarian gesture, it does strike a marked contrast to the memoirs of his son, Fermin.
Fermin Rocker’s memoir, The East End Years: A Stepney Childhood, is of an 
even more limited period of time than his father’s, the first ten years of his life, and 
given that it is published by the anarchist Freedom Press, its principal interest would 
seem to lie in its portrayal of a previous generation of anarchist activists. The title is 
clearly an echo and acknowledgement of Rudolf Rocker’s title, and in the preface 
Fermin writes that his father ‘plays a very important part in this narrative’ (.EEY, p. 5). 
Yet the differences begin almost immediately. The narrative of The East End Years is 
framed by Fermin’s return to London in 1966, some thirty seven years (by his account) 
after he left. The very opening foregrounds the question of the temporal disjunction 
between the narrator and the subject of the narrative, and this is soon reflected in the 
text. Fermin’s historical narrative begins with ‘I must have been about three years old’, 
and continues that prior to that age, he has ‘only the haziest recollection’ (EEY, p. 11). 
Hence the text makes no attempt to assert the sovereignty of the narrator’s memory over 
the events recounted, and this becomes a recurring motif in The East End Years. 
Moreover the degree of self-questioning that the text displays goes beyond the mere 
issue of memory. For example, in recalling his (childhood) understanding of the politics 
of his father’s comrades, Fermin writes that while he could not comprehend the ‘Babel 
of tongues’ of the numerous international visitors, ‘this much, however, I did know, or 
at least so I  thought: these were the people who were fighting the good fight’ (EEY, p. 
15, my emphasis). Even regarding Fermin’s opinion of his father’s oratorical skills, the 
text tempers his conclusion with a certain reserve -  ‘For all my bias in this matter, the 
chances are that my father was indeed the best speaker at those gatherings’ (EEY, p. 75).
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Fermin Rocker went on to have a moderately successful career as an artist.67 He 
writes that his ‘visual memory’ was an asset to him in his artistic career, and it seems 
that its influence can be noted in an impressionistic streak in the terms the narrative uses 
to approach the subject of The East End Years {EEY, p. 28). The text is punctuated by 
reflections on the scene visible, or the light at play: for example, Fermin describes the 
view from the window of the family flat in Stepney -  ‘I can still remember spectacular 
sunsets when the great cupola [of St. Paul’s Cathedral] was boldly silhouetted against 
the evening sky’ {EEY, p. 13). He writes that the area around Stepney Green made ‘a 
pleasing composition’ {EEY, p. 14). The ‘particular stamp and atmosphere’ of the flat 
was due to the portraits hanging on the walls, with Fermin’s attention focused on the 
portrait of Bakunin {EEY, p. 16). On regular walks with his father, they would pass 
blacksmiths ‘hammering away at a piece of glowing metal amid a shower of sparks, 
making a picture that never failed to attract us’ {EEY, p. 28). Later, when on holiday in 
Bournemouth, the family took a boat trip to see the Needles. Although a summer heat 
haze initially shrouded the rocks, the mist lifts, and ‘their abrupt emergence and the 
strange and dramatic light that illuminated the scene provided a visual experience I have 
never forgotten’ {EEY, p. 115). Even on the very last page, as Fermin recounts his 
mother and he being reunited with his now deported father, in Amsterdam, the city is 
described as ‘basking in the mellow light of the October sun’ and the houses ‘finding 
their quivering image in the waters below’ {EEY, p. 184). Just as the text offers the 
reader ‘images’ of the scenes the narrator witnessed, it equally suggests the possibility 
that the text itself is just one image among many potential images of the life recounted. 
This approach, while not escaping the criticism that Hayden White makes of the urge to 
narrate, can at least be said, in contradistinction to Rudolf Rocker’s text, to foreground 
the question of memory and thus the authority of the narrator over the subject narrated.
67 Apparently the highpoint in his career was the sale o f one o f  his canvases to Mick Jagger. See Andrew 
Whitehead, ‘Fermin Rocker: Painter from a Family of London Anarchists’, Guardian, 26 October 2004, 
available online at <http://www.guardian.co.Uk/obituaries/story/0,, 1335868,OO.html>.
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At the same time, this leaves untroubled the presumed identity between author and 
narrator: indeed none of the texts considered can be said to attempt to question that 
point of potential incongruity.
When Georges Gusdorf wrote that the testimony of an author regarding his or 
her own life would never produce an ‘ultimate, conclusive authority’, it was not only 
because, as he put it, ‘objective scrutiny will always discover inaccuracies’, but also 
‘much more because there is never an end to this dialogue of a life with itself in search 
of its own absolute.’ The absolute is a concept clearly rejected in the work of the 
(anarchist) authors considered above, whether as an ideological starting point, as with 
Rocker, or as a result of their experiences, as with Goldman and Berkman. Yet despite a 
lifelong struggle against the absolutist claims of state authority, the figure of authority 
can be perceived to be, perhaps unwittingly, at work within the accounts they have left 
of their lives. In some aspects the loose collection of anarchist autobiographical texts 
that I have considered here, which can neither be said to be representative nor 
comprehensive, demonstrates a surprising degree of conservatism in conformity with 
generic expectations. On the other hand, the work of interpretation opens out these texts 
and shows how there are still many lessons left to be learnt from them, just not, perhaps, 
the ones the texts themselves attempt to hand down. Inspiration can still be readily 
drawn from these accounts of previous lives lived in struggle, without contradicting 
their primary lesson, that of not ceding to authority, even if it is to the authority that the 
text seeks to claim. In his introduction to The London Years, Rudolf Rocker wrote that 
‘social ideas are not something only to dream about for the future. If they are to mean 
anything at all they must be translated into our daily life, here and now; they must shape 
our relations with our fellow-man’ {LY, p. 56). What this chapter has attempted to show 
is that they should also be translated into the relations between the text and the reader.
68 Gusdorf, ‘Conditions and Limits o f  Autobiography’, p. 48.
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7
Contemporary Anarchist Writing: 
‘More Subtle Than Programs’?
‘An old anarchist idea is that the new world must be created within the 
shell of the old.’ (John Moore)1
Having criss-crossed, temporally speaking, more than a century of anarchist writing, it 
might be reasonable to bring this study to something of a conclusion with a look at 
anarchist writing as it stands at the present. The panorama of such writing confronting 
the reader is certainly dizzying. If one begins to try to outline the current wealth of 
anarchist literature and publishing, one can only give a tiny flavour of what is available. 
There is the academic journal Anarchist Studies that has been referred to several times 
during this thesis; there are the American printed journals Zmag, Fifth Estate, Anarchy: 
A Journal o f  Desire Armed, Social Anarchism, Green Anarchy and Perspectives on 
Anarchist Theory; in the U.K. there are annuals such as Aufheben or the recently folded 
Do or Die; the magazines of the various federations, Black Flag and Direct Action; the 
newspapers Freedom and Green Anarchist; and the free sheets such as the widely read 
Schnews, the Anarchist Federation’s Resistance, or the South Wales-based Gagged. Of 
the online resources (which multiply and duplicate themselves daily) major ones would 
include the Anarchy Archives, referred to several times in this thesis, as well as the 
exhaustive Znet, along with the Research on Anarchism site, the Green Anarchy 
Archive, the ‘flag, blackened, net’ site, the Primitivism site, the Marxists Internet Archive 
(with a subsection on anarchism), or the Postanarchism Clearinghouse. Related to this 
would be the number of online discussion groups, such as the research on anarchism
1 John Moore, A Primitivist Primer, available online at <http://www.primitivism.com/primer.htm>.
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list, the postanarchism list or the newly established anarchist academics list. British 
academia has also seen a recent upswing in interest in anarchism, with the web- 
mounting of two unpublished PhD theses by Jamie Heckert and Uri Gordon, both 
inspired by and dealing with anarchism, as well as the formation of a new research 
body, the Specialist Group for the Study of Anarchism. Back in the non-virtual world, it 
would also be worth mentioning the various publishing houses, Freedom, A.K. Press, 
the Kate Sharpley Library, Black Rose, Black and Red and many more. Also the recent 
spate of more mainstream books covering the ‘anti-globalization movement’, for 
example No Logo, One No, Many Yeses or We Are Everywhere, has brought anarchist 
activism and an arguably anarchist critique more clearly into the public eye without 
perhaps labelling it as such. Such a list only begins to touch on the amount of English 
language material currently available. Taking the inspiration that I mentioned in the 
previous chapter to heart, if one goes forth to take up the struggle against the state and 
authority today, what textual experiences does contemporary anarchist writing hold out 
to the questing reader? And perhaps more importantly, from my point of view, can 
contemporary anarchist writing be seen to avoid the pitfalls that my previous chapters 
have argued are generated by the conflicts of form and content?
Once again, one encounters the prior question of definition -  how to identify 
‘contemporary’ and ‘anarchist’ writing. For the purposes of this chapter, I will take 
‘contemporary’ to mean since the 1960s, a dating that allows for something of a break 
from the classical anarchism of the likes of Goldman and Berkman, and looks towards 
the new multiplicity of concerns that currently exercises the anarchist milieu. The defeat 
of the Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War is generally viewed within the 
anarchist movement as signifying the twentieth-century nadir in the fortunes of 
anarchism, coming hard on the heels of the intoxicating successes experienced just a 
short while before in various parts of Spain with the collectivization of agriculture and
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2  *industry. Yet with the advent of the counter-cultural sixties the fortunes of anarchism 
revived. As John Clark notes, ‘to the surprise of practically all observers (excepting the 
small remnant of believers and visionaries) the movement began its return to the 
historical stage in the late 60’s’.3 One might conceivably tie this dating in with 
Lyotard’s argument that ‘in contemporary society and culture [...] the grand narrative 
has lost its credibility’. He suggests that ‘the decline of the narrative can be seen as an 
effect of the blossoming of techniques and technologies since the Second World War, 
which has shifted emphasis from the ends of action to its means’.4 If dominant 
discourses of dissent have seemed to struggle at times to deal with the plethora of 
critiques that feminism, anti-colonial struggles, environmentalism, gay rights, anti­
militarism and others have offered them, anarchism’s broad church has apparently 
grown as a result.5 This could be attributed to what John Moore calls the ‘distinctive 
character of anarchism’, that being ‘its continual capacity to redefine and reconfigure 
itself.6
What, though, defines an anarchist text? Indeed, given the points that I have 
made in the previous chapters, is Boal’s blank page not arguably more anarchistic than a 
page from the newspaper Freedom, founded over a century ago in London by Kropotkin 
and others? The texts that I have chosen to examine in this chapter can be said to be 
anarchist inasmuch as they all explicitly deal with questions concerning anarchism, or at 
the very least have been published in anarchist journals or papers.
2 For a discussion o f  the Spanish anarchist movement at the time o f  the Civil War, see Murray Bookchin, 
The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years 1868-1936 (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1998).
3 John Clark, The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture, Nature and Power (Montreal: Black Rose 
Books, 1986), p. 19.
4 Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff Bennington 
and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 37.
5 For a discussion o f  the diversified nature o f  the post-1960s left, focussing on the challenges thrown out 
by feminism, environmentalist and what he calls municipalism, see Murray Bookchin, ‘New Social 
Movements: The Anarchic Dimension’, in For Anarchism: History, Theory, and Practice, ed. by David 
Goodway (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 259-274.
6 John Moore, Prophets o f  the New World: Noam Chomsky, Murray Bookchin, and Fredy Perlman, 
available online at <http://lemming.mahost.org/johnmoore/prophets.htm>.
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In considering anarchist writing since the 1960s, there is clearly one figure that 
stands out well beyond the boundaries of the anarchist milieu, and that is Noam 
Chomsky. I have already outlined in the introduction some of my reasons for not 
addressing his work here. Writing from a different perspective, the neo-primitivist 
David Watson recounts an interview with Chomsky for the journal Anarchy, in which 
the interviewers, in seeking to discuss the various merits and demerits of civilisation per 
se, met with a blank refusal on the part of Chomsky to even consider the type of critique 
that they advanced. Watson characterises Chomsky’s faith in technology as 
‘disappointing’. For this reason the exclusion of Chomsky, a theorist who could be said 
to offer a vision of anarchism that is very much in keeping with the anarchisms 
considered in the previous chapters, may perhaps be allowed on grounds of opening up 
a little space for consideration of newer and differing forms of anarchism. This chapter 
will therefore consider texts which could loosely be grouped together under the green 
anarchist critique (still one of the most vital threads of anarchist thought), as well as 
contrast their varying relationships to technology, civilisation and the reader.
Chomsky’s rejection of the position of the Anarchy interviewers paradoxically 
leaves him looking quite conservative. In contrast John Clark argues that Murray 
Bookchin’s eco-anarchism ‘must be judged to be the first elaborated and theoretically
• ♦ •  R •sophisticated anarchist position in the history of political theory’. Hence in the essay 
cited above, John Moore suggests that to locate the three thinkers that he considers on 
an anarchist spectrum, Chomsky would be the most traditional, followed by Bookchin 
and ending with the radicalism of Fredy Perlman. Although Moore himself questions 
the validity of such a spectrum, it serves as a useful pretext to turn initially to the work 
of Murray Bookchin.
7 David Watson, Against the Megamachine: Essays on Empire & Its Enemies (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 
[n.d.]), p. 177. All further references in this chapter will be given as AM  with page number.
8 Clark, The Anarchist Moment, p. 202.
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Murray Bookchin
Bookchin first came to prominence in the sixties. He has written widely on subjects 
ranging from the history of the Spanish Civil War, to trenchant critiques of Marxism 
and the environmental movement, to visions of the anarchist society of the future. He is 
perhaps best known for his notion of social ecology, which finds expression in one of 
his early texts, Toward an Ecological Society.9 This text is a collection of essays that 
were originally published during the 1970s and which begins with a note of 
disillusionment, suggesting that ‘it must be bluntly asserted that hardly any authentic 
revolutionary opposition exists in North America and Europe’. Bookchin holds that 
‘what we now call “radical” is an odious mockery of three centuries of revolutionary 
opposition, social agitation, intellectual enlightenment, and popular insurgency’.10 
‘Perhaps at no time in modem history,’ the text argues, ‘has radical thought been in 
such grave peril of losing its very identity as a consistent critique of the existing social 
order and a coherent project for social reconstruction’ (TES, p. 11). From there the text 
moves on to what is the main focus of its consideration, the state of the environment. In 
the first essay in the collection, ‘The Power to Create, the Power to Destroy’, Bookchin 
writes that given the ‘despoilation [s/c] of the planet’ already noted by that point, ‘little 
more that [s/c] a generation may remain before the destruction of the environment 
becomes irreversible. [...] Time is running out’ (TES, p. 36).
Already from this dramatic opening, certain dominant themes and modes of 
address are evident. For example, one of the defining features of the ‘green’ text is that
9 Green anarchists, or in Bookchin’s case, social ecologists, sharply distinguish themselves from 
‘environmentalists’. Environmentalism would be another example o f  the instrumentalist rationality that 
has engendered the current lamentable state o f  the biosphere’s health, a rationality that sees the 
‘environment’ as an issue, a challenge, in short, a problem to be solved with the same means as 
occasioned the disaster in the first place. It could be said that environmentalism lives (albeit 
harmoniously) with nature (in the same sense as one lives with a microwave oven), whereas ecologists 
would seek to live in nature.
10 Murray Bookchin, Toward an Ecological Society (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980), p. 11. All 
further references in this chapter will be given as TES with page number.
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the ecological disaster facing the biosphere permits no vacillation. This is clearly not the
place to examine the rights and wrongs of a scientific analysis that seems to suggest that
we are in the process of eliminating ourselves from the universe. Such an
understanding, though, of the current crisis in environmental affairs seems inevitably to
lend campaigning or propagandists texts (such as Bookchin’s) a tone of apocalyptic
urgency, and the implications of this are that the reader tends to be presented with
something of an ultimatum. After outlining what he sees as the challenge to the
environmental movement, the essay ends with a section entitled ‘Between two choices’.
This is aimed at the north American anti-nuclear movement which Bookchin sees as
having lost its direction. The text makes the two alternatives explicit, and it openly ends
on a binary flourish with the penultimate sentence suggesting that ‘the choice lies in
either direction and there is no “in-between” terrain on which to compromise’ (TES, p.
54). Yet earlier in the essay Bookchin called for:
a revolution which will produce politically independent communities 
whose boundaries and populations will be defined by a new ecological 
consciousness; communities whose inhabitants will determine for 
themselves within the framework of this new consciousness the nature and 
level of their technologies, the forms taken by their social structures, world 
views, life styles, expressive arts, and all the other aspects of their daily 
lives. (TES, p. 45, my emphasis)
The question that this prompts is whether the type of reader who docilely accepts the
ultimatum offered by the text is the same person that the text visualises as the necessary
pre-requisite for the society of the future. It is hard to imagine that they would be the
same person.
Nevertheless the textual practice of the ultimatum is not limited to this one 
essay. Although Bookchin is relentless in his desire to deepen the ecological analysis, to 
go beyond the mere question of an ‘environmental crisis’, the textual strategy for 
achieving this again forces the means/ends dichotomy into the discussion. For example, 
in the second essay ‘Toward an Ecological Society’ the text questions whether:
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the environmental crisis does not have its roots in the very constitution of 
society as we know it today, if the changes that are needed to create a new 
equilibrium between the natural world and the social do not require a 
fundamental, indeed revolutionary, reconstitution of society along 
ecological lines. (TES, p. 58)
Bookchin convincingly argues that the basic notions of environmentalism are
inadequate to the task that it faces: it does not ‘bring into question the underlying notion
of the present society that man must dominate nature’ (TES, p. 59). Hence the text
argues for ‘a broader conception of nature and of humanity’s relationship with the
natural world. [Ecology] sees the balance and integrity of the biosphere as an end in
itself (TES, p. 59). Yet in arguing for a more balanced and harmonious relationship
between the human and the natural world, the text seems to overlook the opportunity to
establish a more balanced relationship with the reader. As with the previous essay, this
text self-consciously ends with an ultimatum:
either we will create an ecotopia based on ecological principles, or we will 
simply go under as a species. In my view this is not apocalyptic ranting -  it 
is a scientific judgement that is validated daily by the very law of life of the 
prevailing society. (TES, p. 71)
One can immediately note both the problematic manner in which the text tries to pre­
emptively counter the potential criticism that it is ‘apocalyptic ranting’, and also an echo 
of Proudhon’s texts in the bizarre recourse to science (given that the main thrust of 
Bookchin’s critique is against the problems that science, in the widest possible sense, 
has created for us). Perhaps most damningly, the blunt choice of an ‘either...or...’ leaves 
little room for the reader to determine his or her own responses to the issues raised in 
the text.
This rhetoric seems to fall even further out of step with the content of the text 
when one considers that in the same essay Bookchin criticises the ‘hierarchical 
mentality that arranges experience itself -  in all its forms -  along hierarchically 
pyramidal lines’, arguing that this is rather ‘a mode of perception and conceptualization 
into which we have been socialized by hierarchical society’ (TES, p. 60). While this is
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not necessarily a linguistic argument, Bookchin makes it one by directly drawing on the 
research evidence of the anthropologist Dorothy Lee, who suggested that non- 
hierarchical communities, or ‘primitive’ societies do not contemplate the world in terms 
of hierarchical orders, and indeed ‘in the absence of inequality, these truly organic 
communities do not even have a word for equality’ (TES, p. 60). The text then goes on 
to comment on the ‘absence of coercive and domineering values’ in cultures such as the 
Wintu Indians of California. Bookchin focuses the discussion on linguistic features, and 
the reliance on linguistic evidence to support the claim of a lack of a dominating 
character seems to make it all the stranger that his own text engages in comparable 
coercive strategies. One might well wonder if the Wintu have an expression for 
Bookchin’s preferred ‘either... or...’ formulation.
The text continues in this vein and it comes to seem nearly inevitable that each 
individual essay ends up with a version of the ‘either... or...’ formulation. In ‘Open 
Letter to the Ecology Movement’ the last paragraph suggests that the ‘two directions’ 
that the text has identified ‘cannot be reconciled’ (TES, p. 83). In ‘Energy, 
“Ecotechnology,” and Ecology’ Bookchin argues that scientific knowledge and 
technology ‘if properly reworked and rescaled, could finally eliminate scarcity, want, 
and denial, or [...] could tear down the planet if used for profit, accumulation and 
mindless growth’ (TES, p. 95). And the entire collection ends with a final Manichaean 
flourish: Bookchin flatly states that ‘there can be no compromises with contradictions -  
only their total resolution in a new ecological society or the inevitability of hopeless 
surrender’ (TES, p. 286).
Yet Bookchin’s politics clearly go against the grain of the text’s typical address 
to the reader. Indeed at times the text’s content seems positively opposed to the formal 
ultimatums. For example, in place of the dogmatic authorial voice that allows no 
compromises, in ‘Spontaneity and Organisation’ Bookchin writes that ‘revolutionaries
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have the responsibility of helping others become revolutionaries, not of “making”
revolutions’ (TES, p. 262) -  hardly a sentiment that would find favour in Bakunin’s
many secret societies. The bloody sense of revolution that is more readily found in the
nineteenth and early twentieth-century texts gives way here to a suggestion that:
The system must fall, not fight; and it will fall only when its institutions 
have been so hollowed out by the new Enlightenment, and its power so 
undermined physically and morally, that an insurrectionary confrontation 
will be more symbolic than real. (TES, p. 260)
In reformulating the very notion of the typical leftist revolution (‘revolution is not only
an assault on the established order but also a festival in the streets. The revolution is
desire carried into the social terrain and universalized’ (TES, p. 262)), Bookchin offers a
thoroughgoing critique of many aspects of socialist and anarchist orthodoxy. The
contrast that his critique makes with its own rhetorical form thus becomes all the more
glaring. So when Bookchin writes that the ‘countercultural movement’ has ‘concretely
redefined the now innocuous word “revolution” in a truly revolutionary manner, as a
practice that subverts apocryphal abstractions and theories’ (TES, p. 253), one might
well ask where better to begin this practice than in the very texts that discuss
subversion. It would seem, then, that as with Emma Goldman’s theatre criticism, there
is a distinct disparity between the content of Bookchin’s text and the mode in which it
addresses the reader.
Although Bookchin’s texts engage with notions of subversion, revolution and a 
radical re-structuring of the social organisation, the question might be asked as to just 
how much of the social inheritance Bookchin seeks to disown. In the introduction to 
Toward an Ecological Society Bookchin specifically discusses the example of the 
‘technically primitive hunting bands’ that the anthropological work of Marshall Sahlins 
has examined. Although Bookchin recognises that with their limited needs these 
communities seem not to have had a concept of ‘scarcity’ (in Bookchin’s analysis 
capitalism promotes the myth of scarcity to rationalise the unequal distribution of the
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planet’s resources, when in fact for him we live amongst mismanaged abundance), he 
refuses to contemplate the idea that they might provide a model for future human 
society -  ‘it lies within human potentialities to be more than a “noble savage,” a product 
of natural history alone’ (TES, p. 24).
David Watson
The relationship to just such primitive societies provides a much more attractive model 
for another branch of contemporary anarchism, one which has been labelled primitivist. 
The British academic John Moore gives the most succinct precis of anarcho-primitivism 
in his text A Primitivist Primer. In it Moore cites the American journal Fifth Estate, 
from where much of the primitivist critique originated, offering a definition of it as a 
‘critical analysis of the technological structure of western civilization, combined with a 
reappraisal of the indigenous world and the character of primitive and original 
communities’.11 One of the writers of the Fifth Estate circle is David Watson, and his 
collection of essays, Against the Megamachine, identifies him as being further along the 
radical (green) spectrum than Chomsky or Bookchin, while also seeming to exemplify 
the primitivist critique. Moore cites the Fifth Estate as contending that they ‘are not 
anarchists per se, but pro-anarchy’, and Watson’s collection is, in a similar vein, 
prefaced by an epigraph from Gandhi -  ‘I myself am an anarchist, but of another type...’ 
(AM, p. vi).12 Watson’s text begins in quite a strikingly modest tone. It is true that it 
shares Bookchin’s sense of urgency, indeed being a more recent text perhaps the sense 
of urgency is heightened -  Watson writes that ‘the green world in which we evolved is 
being shredded by our instruments, our way of life, our very rationality’ (AM, p. 8) and 
continues that ‘no generation has ever faced such prospects’ (AM, p. 9).
11 Fifth Estate, as cited by Moore, A Primitivist Primer.
12 Fifth Estate, as cited by Moore, A Primitivist Primer. For a discussion o f the nature o f the anarchist 
influence in the Indian independence movement, see Geoffrey Ostergaard, ‘Indian Anarchism: The 
Curious Case o f Vinoba Bhave, Anarchist “Saint o f  the Government’” , in For Anarchism: History,
Theory, and Practice, ed. by David Goodway (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 201-216.
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Watson’s text, though, would seem to differ from Bookchin’s in terms of 
content when one considers the nuances of their critique of technology. Technology has 
deformed our relationship to nature -  Watson sees Francis Bacon as ‘exemplary’ of this 
colonising mindset when he wrote that ‘the harlot’ nature should be bound into service -  
‘storm and occupy her castles and strongholds... and thus extend the bounds of human 
empire’ (AM, p. 8). In questioning the traditional notion that technology is neutral, the 
text argues that ‘missing from this view is the recognition that technology -  actually an 
interlocking system of apparatus, rational techniques and organization -  doesn’t merely 
follow design but changes the world in a systemic, ecological way’ (.AM, p. 16). Citing 
Langdon Winner’s work on technology, Watson argues that mass technics have become 
“‘structures whose conditions of operation demand the restructuring of their 
environments” [...] and thus of the very social relations that brought them about’ {AM, 
p. 65). The end result of this historical process is that we are left with a human subject 
that has been (partly) determined by technology, and Watson judges that ‘neither our 
technique nor our problem-solving rationality yield adequate responses to this 
catastrophe’ {AM, p. 8).
Bookchin shares this critique of technology. When questioning the concept of 
‘self-management’, he identifies a challenge to this traditional syndicalist notion in the 
very fact that ‘modem technology is intrinsically authoritarian’ and so escapes potential 
management by the self {TES, p. 117). Indeed he would even seem to share the notion 
that human subjectivity is changed by the encounter with technology -  the text argues 
that ‘the men and women who operate it [modern technology] are expected to undergo 
significant transformation as human beings’ {TES, p. 117). Yet the text refuses to 
contemplate technology itself as the problem, instead arguing that ‘what humanity needs 
is not a wholesale discarding of advanced technologies, but a sifting, indeed a further 
development of technology along ecological principles’ {TES, p. 37). Bookchin’s
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response to the crisis would therefore be to scale technology down, to such a point that 
it is no longer beyond the control of the human person manipulating it or operating it. A 
return to the artisan, then. This is what he argues for with his concept of ‘a people’s 
technology’, one which would be ‘a highly decentralized technics that is human in 
scale, simple in construction, and naturalistic in orientation’ (TES, p. 130).
In comparison Watson’s critique begins to make Bookchin look positively 
reformist, for while Against the Megamachine shares the conceptual orientation that 
technology can determine human subjectivity, Watson does not look to down-size the 
scale of the technology in use. In one essay Watson takes issue directly with Bookchin, 
suggesting that the latter believes that ‘technological relations are merely the 
consequence of underlying social relations’ (AM, p. 225). Rather than change these 
relations, in an essay entitled ‘We All Live in Bhopal’, the text contends that ‘we have 
to find our way back to the village, out of industrial civilization, out of this exterminist 
system’ (AM, p. 47). Watson criticises what he characterises as the traditional view of 
both the left and bourgeois liberalism that ‘human freedom is based necessarily on a 
material plenitude of goods and services’ (AM, p. 64). In opposition to this he postulates 
that the demise of the megamachine will mean ‘the renewal of subsistence cultures, 
which still hang on in villages, among tribal peoples struggling to survive [...] it means 
revivifying an aesthetic not of the assembly line but of the forest’ (AM, p. 116).
Despite these comments, Watson’s text insists that ‘no one, in any case, 
seriously argues a literal return to the life of ancient Greeks or eighteenth century 
Indians’ (AM, p. 140). This is a common characteristic of these texts, indeed even 
Bookchin’s work, as mentioned above, deemed it necessary to hold out the consoling 
guarantee that it was not positing a return to hunter-gatherer levels of existence. As John 
Moore swiftly points out in The Primitivist Primer, ‘the aim is not to replicate or return
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to the primitive, merely to see the primitive as a source of inspiration, as exemplifying 
11forms of anarchy’.
Given, though, that I have briefly sketched the object of Watson’s critique and
the outline of a response to it, how does the text go about putting these propositions to
the reader? I suggested earlier that the collection of essays begins with a modest tone,
and at the outset the text suggests that the essays are ‘more useful for the questions they
raise than for any specific response they recommend’ {AM, p. xii). In the first essay
Watson portrays the challenge thus: ‘we have to talk tentatively about how an
unprecedented, megatechnic empire and its corresponding constellation of cultures
might become a qualitatively different kind of society’ {AM, p. 9). The text posits a
dialogue with the reader and argues against the notion that ‘practical technique alone’
will find a solution to the crisis facing the earth {AM, p. 9). Instead, Watson continues:
I wish to speak for something simpler and more subtle than programs: a 
mindfulness about where we find ourselves, our context (certainly a green 
sensibility), and a respect not only for what we know but also for what we 
do not know and especially for what we cannot know. {AM, p. 10)
Watson’s text seems positively alive to the significance of language, and even goes so
far as to suggest that in the society of the future ‘a different language, spangled with
eternity, [would] find its way into daily discourse as the conditioning of industrialism
and manufactured values began to be shed’ {AM, p. 40). Furthermore, in the essay
‘Deep Ecology & Environmental Philosophy: On the Ethics of Crisis and the Crisis in
Ethics’ Watson specifically identifies the problems of binary thought underlying a
section of the deep ecology critique, a thought that reduces the environmental question
to one of hierarchies such as of nature over human. Watson observes that as opposed to
the worldview of a Hobbes, for example, with deep ecology ‘the values or poles are
simply reversed; the undifferentiated mass of humanity is compelled to don sackcloth
and ashes and make sacrifices in its standard of living to preserve nature’ {AM, p. 228).
13 Moore, A Primitivist Primer.
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This would seem to give cause for optimism that at least in terms of content, the text is 
aware of the shortcomings of simply forcing an inverted binary on the reader.
Yet in its more metaphorical language, Watson’s text displays a much greater 
overlap with Bookchin’s. Again the sense of impending crisis comes to overpower the 
text: when discussing the possibility that the greenhouse effect will perhaps suddenly 
cross a cataclysmic threshold (rather than produce a gradual meltdown), the text argues 
that ‘since modem science cannot understand thresholds, there is no telling how much 
time is left, only a certainty that it is running ou f (AM, p. 59, my emphasis). In ‘We All 
Live in Bhopal’ the text proposes that ‘by throwing off this Modem Way of Life, we 
won’t be “giving things up” or sacrificing, but throwing off a terrible burden. Let us do 
so soon before we are crushed by it’ (AM, p. 47). On other occasions the earth is 
compared to a house on fire (AM, p. 68), and the entire collection is peppered with a 
series of references to Melville’s Moby-Dick, in which the ruling classes or the captains 
of industry are compared to ‘distracted Ahabs trying to maintain control of their 
foundering ship’ (AM, p. 59). From there, then, it does not come as much of a surprise 
to find a Manichaean ultimatum awaiting the reader, when the text refers to the ‘forces 
that we most need to destroy if life is to prevail’ (AM, p. 81).
Watson’s text seems caught between a degree of self-consciousness of its own 
textuality and the urgency that the environmentalist critique appears to require (the 
simple necessity, if one is to ‘save the planet’ (in crude terms), to act now while there is 
still something left worth saving). Indeed in the keynote essay of the collection, 
‘Against the Megamachine’, Watson recognises that the very language the text employs 
is not free of the influence of the object of his critique. The essay begins with an 
invitation to the reader -  ‘how do we begin to discuss something as immense and 
pervasive as technology?’. The text then recognises that technology, in its view, has 
come to colonise not only the material world around us, but also ‘that internalized
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country of our thoughts, dreams and desires, in the way we consciously and
unconsciously see ourselves and our world’ (.AM, p. 117). Hence, in critiquing
technology, the text argues that ‘the common notion of technology’s “neutrality” does
not recognize that all tools have powerful symbolic content, are suggestive models for
thought and action which affect their users’ {AM, p. 123). The text does not go so far as
to suggest that we are now technologically determined subjects, seeking, rather, to
retain an element of agency for the ‘users’ to accept or reject the ‘model’ of the tool.
Yet the critique implies a challenge to the very text itself, for by following this logic
there is an argument that the text itself becomes an instrumental model for the reader.
This is something, though, that Watson addresses in the last section of the essay:
I recognize the contradictions in even publishing this essay. I am not sure 
how to move beyond the code [the language of technology]; in order to do 
so, with tremendous ambivalence and doubt, I partake in it in a limited, 
awkward, conditional way. {AM, p. 144)
In so doing, then, the text reveals an awareness of its own contradictory status, and so
simultaneously weakens the grounds for it to offer some grand solution to the problems
that it has identified, as well as opening up a greater discursive space for readerly
participation in the process that the text aspires to kick-start. Watson continues that ‘we
need the courage to explore a process of change in our thinking and practice -  to learn
how we might become less dependent on machines, less linked to “world
communications,” not more’ {AM, p. 144). Borrowing a term from another text on
technology, Watson ends the essay arguing for an ‘epistemological luddism’, a
‘conscious break with urban-industrial civilization’ {AM, p. 145).
Against the Megamachine at times appears as overpowering as Bookchin’s text, 
then at other moments seems a lot less closed to the reader that it is addressing. Of 
course it is necessary to situate this type of text within the larger discussion of which it 
forms a part. As my chapter on autobiography demonstrated, the supposedly real 
referent is immediately lost in the world of signifiers. Rather than suggest that Watson
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is trying to insist on the reality of the subject (of a world in crisis, of a civilization out of 
control) of his own discourse, I would prefer to keep in mind the sense of debate with 
what might be loosely called the official story about the state of the planet’s health. 
Indeed it might worth bearing in mind that up until very recently criticisms of the 
official story seemed to be relegated to the realm of pressure group discourse, and 
Watson’s work has contributed to fragmenting the hegemonic status of the official 
story.14 At times the text engages directly with representatives of this story, and Watson, 
just as I suggested Proudhon does, demonstrates an occasional deconstructive turn in 
dismantling the terms of his opponents’ logic. He addresses, for example, a text on The 
Existential Pleasures o f  Engineering, written by a ‘professional apologist for 
technology, Samuel C. Florman’ {AM, p. 138). When this text claims that the popularity 
of Luddite worries only ‘adds the dangers inherent in self-deception to all of the other 
dangers we already face’, Watson pinpoints how the text has already conceded that 
there are dangers in technology, those that we already face, and he shows how the text 
tries to evade a critical appraisal of technology based on a claim to universal human 
nature -  technology is simply a product of ‘the type of creature man is’ (Florman, cited 
by Watson, AM, p. 138).
So Watson’s is a contradictory text, one that at times seems to let the urgency of 
the crisis which it diagnoses overtake the responsible approach to the reader that it often 
shows. The challenge for a text such as this is to find a way to be an effective piece of 
propaganda without excluding the reader’s interpretation from the debate. When 
Watson writes that ‘civilization is like a jetliner’, the question is whether or not the text 
seeks to have the reader adopt the crash position, head between legs, or whether the
14 The notion that the major oil companies have had a direct hand in constructing the official story, 
specifically by funding attempts to discredit the science behind the notion o f  climate change, would 
appear to be gaining recognition. See for example George Monbiot, ‘The Fossil Fools’, available online at 
<http://www.monbiot.eom/archives/2004/04/27/the-fossil-fools/#more-860>. From a more activist 
perspective, see the campaign group Rising Tide’s ‘Factsheet Two: Dealing With Counter Arguments’on 
the debate about climate change, available online at 
<http://risingtide.org.uk/pages/resources/f2counter.htm>.
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very act of reading opens up a space to begin debating the course the journey is taking 
(AM, p. 187).15
John Zerzan
While Watson recognises that ‘there are no easy answers’ (AM, p. 144), with John 
Zerzan the question itself becomes much more complicated. Zerzan is certainly seen by 
some as the most radical writer working within the anarchist milieu today. In fact the 
Primitivist website suggests that he ‘may well be the most extreme author on the 
planet’.16 Zerzan’s first collection of essays is entitled Elements o f Refusal and the very 
title would seem to suggest a refusal of a totalising discourse, offering instead 
‘elements’ of a critique. Yet this suggestion is quickly dispelled by the preface to the 
second edition of the text, in which Zerzan writes with apparent confidence that 
‘everyone can feel the nothingness, the void, just beneath the surface of everyday
1 7routines and securities’. The ease with which the text invokes and speaks on behalf of 
an ‘everyone’ would seem to suggest that in the light of the challenge that I identified in 
the previous paragraph, Zerzan has opted for radical polemicizing rather than engaging 
with the difficulties of an open address to the reader. That this is the case becomes even 
clearer when he writes that ‘the group suicide of techno-occultists at Rancho Santa Fe 
(March 1997) is too faithful a reflection of the desperation generated by engulfing 
emptiness’ (ER, p. 7, my emphasis). It would seem that the text is more than overstating
15 The notion o f  what exactly an effective piece o f  propaganda would be is itself a subject for 
considerable debate. For example, one contrasting opinion from within anarchist circles would be Graham 
Purchase, who argues, somewhat definitively, that ‘the aim o f  the anarchist propaganda groups is to 
promote and facilitate the growth o f  a revolutionary workers movement and not to focus upon the 
structure, processes and development o f  their own organisations’. This sentiment is obviously in conflict 
with the eco-anarchist critique being considered in this chapter (with its ambition to do away with both 
the factory and work p er  se), and moreover conflicts with the notion expressed in the epigraph, that 
anarchism looks to build the new within the shell o f  the old. See Graham Purchase, ‘Anarchist 
Organisation: Why it is Failing’, available online at 
<http://www.spunk.org/library/writers/purchase/spOO 1825 .html>.
16 See ‘Interview -  John Zerzan’, available online at <http://www.primitivism.com/zerzan.htm>.
17 John Zerzan, Elements o f  Refusal, 2nd edn. (Columbia: C.A.L. Press/Paleo Editions, 1999), p. 7. All 
further references in this chapter will be given as ER with page number.
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its case by coercively suggesting that any sense of alienation or dissidence 
(‘desperation’), with regard to the world as it currently is, finds a ‘too faithful’ reflection 
in an act of group suicide. Indeed, while Zerzan cites, with apparent sympathy, one of 
the ‘would-be UFO voyagers’ as saying ‘Maybe I’m crazy but I don’t care. I’ve been 
here thirty-one years and there’s nothing for me here’ (ER, p. 7), one can immediately 
reflect that in place of such a total rejection of this world, the majority of the anti­
globalisation movement is happy to march under the somewhat more optimistic banner 
‘Another World Is Possible’.
Zerzan’s text seems untroubled by speaking in the name of the reader, and this 
homogenising gesture is reinforced when the text removes the possibility that there 
might be more than one answer to a question, contending instead that ‘the fragmentary, 
the cynical, and the partial define an extremely pervasive postmodern stance -  if such a 
cowardly, shifting outlook even qualifies as a stance’ (ER, p. 7). Zerzan’s opposition to 
the postmodern leads him in the contrary direction, to raise ‘the question of origins of 
our estrangement [which] is refused by a reigning culture that recognizes neither origins 
nor estrangement’ (ER, p. 7). Yet the question of origin is one that has exercised 
deconstruction greatly, for clearly an identifiable origin provides a foundation, and a 
foundation leads, not just etymologically, to fundamentalism. The problem with 
Zerzan’s text seems to be that it seeks to establish itself as a truth discourse, and it even 
acknowledges as much in the preface: in noting the degree of debate that the essays 
prompted when first published in Fifth Estate, Zerzan firstly rejects all the criticisms 
that have been levelled at his work, but then writes that ‘in trying to put forth the most 
cogent lines of thought, I may have written essays that seemed definitively closed to 
other perspectives. If so, I regret it’ (ER, p. 8).
Nevertheless, the breadth of the text’s critique is quite astonishing, and the 
overwhelmingly tight focus on the object of critique may well be both the essays’
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strength and weakness. In the first section of the collection, the five essays offer
respective critiques of time, language, number, art and agriculture. Moreover, in lieu of
Bookchin’s worries about his text being ‘apocalyptic ranting’, Zerzan’s text
demonstrates an exhaustive wealth of earlier scholarship in each area that he addresses.
Zerzan’s consideration of the nature of the five topics develops the notion that their
historical evolution is a reflection of a historical process of alienation of the human from
the natural world, from an epoch when prehistoric humanity lived in a state of
‘wholeness and grace’ (ER, p. 31). This is unembarrassedly premised on a concept of an
original plenitude that is now lost, or what the text occasionally refers to as a fall. For
example, from the start of the first essay on time, ‘Beginning of Time, End of Time’, the
text argues that ‘as with nature, time did not exist before the individual became separate
from it. Reification of this magnitude -  the beginning of time -  constitutes the Fall: the
initiation of alienation, of history’ (ER, p. 15). Likewise in the essay ‘Language: Origin
and Meaning’, the text commences with a speculation on the state in which we existed
prior to this estrangement:
Being alive in nature, before our abstraction from it, must have involved a 
perception and contact that we can scarcely comprehend from our levels of 
anguish and alienation. The communication with all of existence must have 
been an exquisite play of all the senses, reflecting the numberless, nameless 
varieties of pleasure and emotion once accessible within us. (ER, p. 31)18
Yet the text repeatedly follows a similar trajectory in the first five essays, and that is
that it begins with the notion of an original plenitude, then traces out the progress of our
alienation, before finally arriving at the present. This might be considered the weakness
of the text inasmuch as it refuses to consider the epistemological security with which the
origin can safely be stated.19 Simultaneously, though, this tight focus on the origins and
18 Elsewhere Zerzan has criticised what he refers to as the ‘postmodemist-poststructuralist assumption 
that language constitutes the human world and the human world constitutes the whole world’. See John 
Zerzan, ‘The Catastrophe o f  Postmodernism’, available online at 
<http://www.primitivism.com/postmodemism.htm>.
19 This aspect o f Zerzan’s work has been the object o f a rather poorly translated critique that was 
distributed as a leaflet at one o f his meetings in the UK in September 2000. Although focussing more on
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development of our alienation seems to make a distinct halt once it arrives at the 
present, and this is what I will now counterpose as the strength of Zerzan’s text.
For all the radicality of his critique, and the ultra-polemical dismissal of other 
points of view, the text resolutely refuses to hand down any suggestions as to what 
should concretely be done about the state of affairs that it observes. Indeed in 
comparison to the degree of research that underpins the critiques offered, the comments 
that the text limits itself to offering seem comparatively desultory. For example, in 
‘Language: Origin and Meaning’, in the opening paragraph the text argues that ‘our 
time on earth, characterized by the very opposite of those qualities [wholeness and 
grace], is in deepest need of a reversal of the dialectic that stripped the wholeness from 
our lives as a species’ (ER, p. 31). Or with regard to agriculture, that which enslaved 
free communities of hunter-gatherers to an alienated nature that they then had to 
domesticate in order to survive, the text concludes that ‘liberation is impossible without 
its dissolution’ (ER, p. 87). As for the evolution of number, Zerzan writes that it has left 
us with a world that is ‘mathematized and empty’ and as a consequence ‘the beginnings 
of this bleak journey, including the origins of the number concept, demand
the second o f  Zerzan’s texts, Future Primitive, the anonymous authors claim that he asserts, rather than 
proves, the original state o f  human nature. See ‘John Zerzan and the Primitive Confusion’, available 
online at <http://www.geocities.com/cordobakaf/zerzan_confusion.html>. Although differing 
substantially from the (perceived) political persuasion o f  the author o f  the anti-Zerzan piece, an online 
review agrees with the criticism that Zerzan seems to argue from an unproven starting point whilst trying 
to prove the subsequent alienation. See ‘Review o f “John Zerzan and the Primitive Confusion’” , available 
online at <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/3909/misc/petardprimrev.html>. In a similar 
vein, critiquing Zerzan for what might be called the performative contradiction that his work presents, 
Pendelton Vandiver argues in an online text that ‘epistemologically, we are getting into hot water when 
we simultaneously challenge the very existence o f  civilization while accepting its methodology and its 
conclusions.’ See Pendelton Vandiver, ‘Anarchist Epistemology’, available online at 
<http://www.insurgentdesire.org.uk/anarchistepistemology.htm>. Michael Albert, the editor of Zmag 
offers a different, and more fundamental, critique o f Zerzan’s text when he argues that it has made the 
logically faulty:
leap from disliking instances o f  some category to rejecting the whole category [and which] 
would lead to rejecting pretty much everything that is social or otherwise a product of  
human exchange and thought, but which turns up with horrible aspects in contemporary 
societies, and would thus imply wanting humans to revert to a kind o f pre-humanity state. 
Amazingly, Zerzan follows exactly that trajectory.
Albert’s criticisms, though, would seem to engage in what both Zerzan and Watson identify as a 
cost/benefit analysis o f  technology, ignoring their insight that as no system is perfect there will always be 
hidden costs, which in this case are costs that the biosphere is incapable o f withstanding. See Michael 
Albert, ‘Anarchism = Zerzan?’, available online at <http://www.zmag.org/zerzan.htm>.
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comprehension. It may be that this inquiry is essential to save us and our humanness’ 
(ER, p. 62). None of which, of course, gives the slightest idea as to what the text might 
propose as a way of living or organising today. In concluding the essay on language, the 
text suggests that ‘only a politics that undoes language and time and is thus visionary to 
the point of voluptuousness has any meaning’ (ER, p. 43). The phrase, ironically, seems 
to hover on the border of meaninglessness, although its status as an empty signifier 
would accordingly imbue it with a degree of radical gesturality that in one sense returns 
the initiative wholly to the reader. Despite Zerzan’s nostalgia for what he calls a ‘free or 
whole life’ (ER, p. 8), it is worth bearing in mind that the primitive critique is not, in 
John Moore’s words, unaware of the fact that ‘human beings can only now consciously 
choose to go wild; such a condition is no longer a spontaneous “second nature’” . So 
although it would be tempting to characterise Zerzan as proposing some type of return 
to a prelapsarian past, bearing in mind that the second half of the collection of essays is 
focused on the history of resistance and insurrection, from Luddism to modem day riots, 
it would be fairer to conclude that he is merely observing and waiting -  as he puts it in 
‘The Refusal of Technology’, ‘everything in the past and present is waiting, waiting to 
detonate’ (ER, p. 205).
Fredv Perlman
If the anarcho-primitivist critique can be characterised by a concern to re-interpret the 
past, then the pre-eminent work in the genre, at least according to John Moore, is Fredy
A  1
Perlman’s Against His-story, Against Leviathan!. This concern can be linked to the 
conclusions that I made in the chapter on autobiography: it is a question not so much of 
what the reality may or may not be, but rather how it is described. Perlman’s text is an
20 John Moore, ‘Beyond the Fragments: A Reaction to Industrial Society and Its Future’, available online 
at <http://www.insurgentdesire.org.uk/fragments.htm>.
21 In an interview Moore suggested that for him ‘everything follows from’ Perlman’s text. See John Filiss, 
‘Interview with John Moore’, available online at <http://www.insurgentdesire.org.uk/jminterview.htm>.
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attempt to answer his own question of why ‘people reproduce a miserable daily life?’ 
and is perhaps the text that most foregrounds this question of the language used to 
describe (or re-describe) a past that is no longer a given but is rather the object of 
interpretation.22 According to Moore, Perlman’s text is ‘a piece of genuinely subversive 
literature’, or what David Watson, in his ‘Homage to Fredy Perlman’ calls a ‘feverishly 
written book’, offering an account of the origins of human civilisation, and sitting 
uneasily, yet challengingly, between genres, ostensibly a history, at times novelistic, at 
times critique, at times myth.23 From the first page the text seeks to disorientate the 
reader, opening with a series of quotations, jumping from Matthew Arnold’s ‘darkling 
plain’ to Eliot’s ‘waste land’ while Yeats’s ‘rough beast’ slouches onwards {AH, pp. 1- 
2). Moreover the text offers a variety of subject positions to the reader, at times 
adopting a direct second person interrogation (‘This is savagery! Do you call it 
freedom?’), at times employing a ‘we’ (‘We’re on the side with the angels.’), at times 
speaking only in the first person, referring to contemporaries (including Zerzan) ‘whose 
lights I’ve borrowed’ {AH, pp. 1-2). As Moore comments in his reading of this opening 
passage, the text is clearly ‘not written in the dry, abstract discourse of political 
science’, and that the quotations suggest that it is a work ‘of literary discourse’.24
In seeking the answer to the question of alienation, Perlman re-writes history as 
the history of the Leviathan, borrowing the term from Hobbes to describe the birth and 
evolution of the state. In examining this history, Perlman wants to identify who is 
responsible for the ‘wrecking of the Biosphere’ {AH, p. 4). He rejects previous analyses 
which would blame humankind, for as a homogenising label, he finds it ‘too diffuse’
22 Fredy Perlman, Against His-story, Against Leviathan!: An Essay (Detroit: Black & Red, 1983), p. 25.
All further references in this chapter will be given as AH  with page number. For a different answer to this 
question from a more strictly economic perspective, see also his essay ‘The Reproduction o f Daily Life’, 
in Fredy Perlman, Anything Can Happen (London: Phoenix Press, 1992), pp. 31-49.
23 John Moore, ‘Pubic Secret: Fredy Perlman and the Literature o f Subversion’, in Twenty-first Century 
Anarchism: Unorthodox Ideas fo r  a New Millennium, ed. by Jon Purkis and James Bowen (London: 
Cassell, 1997), pp. 117-131 (p. 129). Watson, Against the Megamachine, p. 245.
24 Moore, ‘Public Secret’, p. 125.
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(AH, p. 4). Instead Perlman describes the development of ‘the beast’, retaining Yeats’ 
image, suggesting that this beast is ‘an excrescence on the planet’s surface’, a beast 
‘excreted by a human community [...] at most two or three hundred generations old’ 
(AH, p. 5). Following the notion that the text displays characteristics of poetic discourse, 
it seeks to name anew features that a contemporary reader might take for granted: for 
example, a Marxist critique would hold that the proletariat is forced to sell its labour to 
acquire the means to survive. Perlman extends this understanding in the sense that a 
place where one is forced to work is a work camp, for ‘labor is always forced labor’ 
(AH, p. 37), and as a result our world is a ‘Gulag’ populated by ‘zeks (namely 
conscripts, inmates, labor gang members)’ (AH, p. 3). The text also seeks to puncture 
the overarching pretensions of today’s ruling episteme, contrasting that with the 
visionary knowledge of earlier times -  ‘armored bullies stand guard and demand the 
password, Positive Evidence. No vision can pass by their gates.’ (AH, p. 2). Hence 
Perlman turns ingrained assumptions on their heads, and writes of the first human 
communities that:
Modem anthropologists who carry Gulag in their brains reduce such human 
communities to the motions that look most like work, and give the name 
Gatherers to people who pick and sometimes store their favourite foods. A 
bank clerk would call such communities Savings Banks! (AH, pp. 7-8)
The text’s strategy of renaming and reversing leads to a situation, in Moore’s words, in
which ‘the reader must invert the binarisms which hierarchically privilege civilization
over savagery. In short, the text attempts to subvert reader expectation concerning
y c
structures of cultural prestige’.
As with the other primitivist works considered earlier, Perlman’s text entertains 
a concept of an original plenitude. Yet the text seeks to both advance this concept while 
acknowledging the limitations upon our understanding of it (at one point he writes of 
his own account of Sumerian culture ‘There is no positive evidence for any of this’ (AH,
25 Moore, ‘Public Secret’, p. 126.
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p. 19)), as well as simultaneously deflating the more usual critique of primitive
communities which would see them as under-developed. Perlman calls these
communities ‘the Possessed’, and writes that:
The main part of our poverty is that the richness of life of the Possessed is 
barely accessible to us, even to those of us who have not chained our 
imaginations.
Our professors talk of fruits and nuts, animal skins and meat. They point 
to our supermarkets, full of fruits and nuts. We have an abundance our 
ancestors didn’t dream of, Q.E.D. {AH, p. 10)
Perlman’s text repeatedly asks why a people would choose to leave this state of
plenitude, in which work is not known because it is not understood in opposition to
play, activity which is freely undertaken for pleasure. Again Perlman inverts traditional
binaries to challenge our prevailing world-view, suggesting that if the !Kung people of
Africa who ‘miraculously survived as a community of free human beings into our own
exterminating age’ were to visit ‘our offices and factories, they might think we’re
playing. Why else would we be there?’ {AH, p. 8). The exit from this state of plenitude
is marked by a departure from nature, where ‘nature’ becomes something that lies
outside the city walls, alien and something to be conquered or visited. The walling of
cities also marks the sense of conflict, in that the original Leviathans came into
existence as military machines, and so the cycles of history that Against His-story,
Against Leviathan! describes are ones of domination, resistance, rebellion and liberation
of an enslaved people, only to chart how the newly liberated repeatedly end up
becoming the new oppressors. One of the more prominent examples would be how the
original Christians went from crucifixion to inquisition, how they were Imperial Rome’s
‘resistance movement’, yet centuries later became a force that tortured heretics and
burnt witches at the stake {AH, p. 113).
This sense of repetition is arguably a meta-narrational strategy to underscore one 
of the text’s central points. In challenging developmental theories of the linear progress 
of history (and the text seems to reserve particular scorn for the Marxist concept of the
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‘ripening’ of productive forces that brings about new social forms (AH, p. 136)),
Perlman draws on the knowledge and traditions of peoples such as the Potawatomi of
the Great Lakes, people who saw that if an event was ‘repeated, then the event was not
linear but rhythmic, and it was already known’ (AH, p. 241). He argues that:
early resisters have some clear and powerful conceptions; the generations 
who follow them eventually invert every one of those conceptions and turn 
the initial commitment on its head.
In retrospect we can see that the paths of betrayal are already paved 
before anyone has recourse to them, but this tells why the betrayal follows 
these paths, not why the betrayal takes place. (AH, p. 113)
The invitation seemingly extended to the reader is one of learning from the history of
Leviathan so as not to follow the well-worn paths of resurrecting a new oppression in
place of the old. Despite being written before the demise of the Soviet Union, the text
rejects any categorical distinction between the Leviathan of the West and that of the
East, arguing instead that ‘what is known is that Leviathan, the great artifice, single and
world-embracing for the first time in His-story, is decomposing’ (AH, p. 301). This then
links to one of the central motifs, that of dancing, something which encapsulates
freedom and which expresses the sense of cyclical time in its rhythmicality. While at the
beginning of the text Perlman wrote paradoxically that the darkling plain was ‘the place
to dance!’ (AH, p. 1), by the closing paragraph the dance is now something that is both
forced on the inhabitants of Leviathan, and will signal its downfall:
The cycle has come round again. America is where Anatolia was. It is a 
place where human beings, just to stay alive, have to jump, to dance, and 
by dancing revive the rhythms, recover cyclical time. An-archic and 
pantheistic dancers no longer sense the artifice and its linear His-story as 
All, but as merely one cycle, one long night, a stormy night that left Earth 
wounded, but a night that ends, as all nights end, when the sun rises. (AH, 
p. 302)
Perlman at least ends on a note of optimism, the belief that a change will come, and his 
sense of a people withdrawing (again) from the entrails of a Leviathan ties in with 
Watson’s notion of an epistemological Luddism, or Zerzan’s positing of a ‘larger 
culture of withdrawal, from the state as from work’ (ER, p. 213).
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Against His-story, Against Leviathan! is one of the few texts under consideration
in this chapter that has been the subject of previous academic commentary. In ‘Public
Secret: Fredy Perlman and the Literature of Subversion’ John Moore gives an excellent
close reading of the opening passage, and argues that the text ‘combines revolutionary
content with revolutionary form, political content and literary style’.26 Employing
Kristeva’s notion of heterogeneous contradiction, Moore suggests that Perlman’s text
overthrows ‘hegemonic binarisms’ and presents the reader with a ‘melange of
conflicting signals’, and therefore that it descends ‘into incoherence and multivalence to
stun the reader into fresh perception’.27 It might be countered that Moore perhaps
overstates the case when he writes that the text is a piece of ‘genuinely subversive
literature’, basing this claim on the fact that it would apparently fall foul of still extant
anti-sedition laws in the United States (laws under which Emma Goldman was
persecuted). For example, the comparison might be made with the Italian
insurrectionalist anarchist Alfredo Bonanno, who notes in the introduction to his text
‘Armed Joy’ (a discussion of the merits and demerits of the armed struggle against the
state, such as was being pursued by the Red Brigades in Italy at the time of writing) that
he was sentenced to eighteen months prison for writing the text, and that:
the book was ordered to be destroyed in Italy. The Italian Supreme Court 
ordered it to be burned. All the libraries who had a copy received a circular 
from the Home Ministry ordering its incineration. More than one librarian 
refused to bum the book, considering such a practice to be worthy of the 
Nazis or the Inquisition, but by law the volume cannot be consulted.28
Leaving aside the question of establishing an external yardstick for 
subversiveness (or its lack) in a text, Moore’s project, in his Kristevan reading of 
Perlman, seems very much to parallel my own, in the sense of seeking to question the 
relationship between content and form. Yet Moore’s reading of Perlman would
26 Moore, ‘Public Secret’, p. 129.
27 Moore, ‘Public Secret’, pp. 126-127.
28 Alfredo M. Bonanno, ‘Armed Joy’, trans. by Jean Weir, available online at 
<http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/a_joy.html>.
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apparently problematise my own conclusions regarding the work of Watson. If one 
conceives of a spectrum of radicality in terms of the address to the reader (borrowing 
Moore’s own notion of the spectrum of radicality from Chomsky to Perlman), Bookchin 
could be situated at one end of the spectrum (the authoritarian end), silently offering an 
ultimatum. In contrast to this, Watson’s text would seem to extend -  at times -  a polite 
comradely hand to the reader. Nevertheless the text undertakes this in wholly 
conventional terms and so locates itself in the centre of this spectrum. Perlman, in 
contrast, makes no direct appeal to the reader in the way Watson does, and yet his text 
radically destabilises the reader’s very epistemological locus, thus engineering a 
(Kristevan) subversion of the social order. This would prompt the question of whether a 
text (such as Watson’s) that seeks a dialogue with its reader, but that does so by 
confirming that reader as a knowing subject within the already existing discursive 
conventions, can still be characterized as subversive, following Moore’s schema.
John Moore
This question could be applied to one of Moore’s own works, his Anarchy & Ecstasy: 
Visions o f Halcyon Days. As should be clear already, Moore’s work bears explicit 
testimony to having been greatly influenced by the work of Perlman, and this text mixes 
a range of discursive modes, from academic discourse to magic rites to myth and 
paganism. In the introduction Moore cites the Situationist Debord, acknowledging his 
insight that revolutionary ideology is now ‘insufficiently radical’. Instead the text argues 
(in a gesture recalling Perlman’s re-inscription of visionary knowledge) that ‘total 
revolution must go beyond ideology to recover its roots through ecstatic visions’.
The text contains five short essays, including a re-reading of Paradise Lost that 
seeks to explode ‘one of the central ordering myths in Western Civilisation’, that being
29 John Moore, Anarchy and Ecstasy: Visions o f  Halcyon Days (London: Aporia Press, 1988), p. 3. All 
further references in this chapter will be given as AE with page number.
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the notion of creation and ‘subsequent fall of humanity’, which Moore understands as 
being common to both pagan and Christian discourse. (.AE, p. 4) The reason for this is 
that Moore sees this structuring myth as responsible for the notion that humanity finds 
itself caught in a struggle between opposing forces, both fighting for control over it. 
Hence in the Christian myth, God and Satan battle for this control, although Moore 
multiplies the binaries to include Taw and lawlessness for the community; capitalism 
and communism for the world; ruling class and proletariat for society [...] the list could 
be extended indefinitely’ (AE, p. 5). Moore identifies a ‘cuneal perspective’ here, 
‘conceiving the structure of the universe in terms of an inverted triangle’, and argues 
that this establishes a relationship of struggle between the forces of control and counter­
control, in which the controlled ‘apparently too weak to break the chains of control on 
their own [...] are doomed to remain pawns in an alternating game of eternal conformity 
or endlessly betrayed revolt’ (AE, p. 5). In order to intervene in this structure, Moore 
looks for an antipolitics, in the sense of being against politics in the dictionary definition 
as the science and art of government, an antipolitics ‘whose aim is the dissolution, not 
the seizure, of power’ (AE, p. 6).
In reading Paradise Lost then, Moore writes that ‘Chaos gave birth, and possibly 
can bring death, to nature’ (AE, p. 7). Therefore, he continues, the primordial matter of 
the universe is anarchic, anteceding creation, and consequently also awaiting the 
‘biodegradation’ of what has been created -  ‘to remerge with the extant realm of 
Anarchy’ (AE, p. 8). From this he argues that ‘the universe does not possess a cuneal 
structure, but (as a minimum) has a quadruplex form’ (AE, p. 6), which includes a 
fourth force, the ‘uncontrollables’ (AE, p. 8). As a call to arms, Moore’s text certainly 
strikes a radically different note to the types of texts considered above, lacking even the 
coercive sense of urgency that I have suggested is a characteristic of green-anarchist 
propaganda. Yet the text undoubtedly shares the same ambitions, for it turns its reading
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of Milton towards a desire ‘to achieve the social ecology that is so desperately needed’. 
The text posits that ‘liberation [...] can be achieved only through an attentive and 
sagacious anarchy’ (AE, p. 9). This would combine with an opening for religious 
thought at the heart of an anarchist critique, in this case the praxis of Zen, which, Moore 
contends, breaks the dependence on authority.
The text, in the light of Moore’s reading of Perlman, does not trouble the 
position of the reader, for as can be seen, its call for liberation comes in a well- 
structured and clearly argued essay. This can be found again in the essay ‘On Ecdysis’, 
where the text makes the sort of concession that is wholly absent from the work of 
Bookchin, declaring that ‘we must remain eternally vigilant, and not allow tentative 
possibilities to solidify into proscriptive dogmas. Anarchy can be defined as maintaining 
a field of infinite potentialities’ (AE, pp. 18-19). For however attractive the formulations 
may be, they would seem to run up against the questions that Moore raised in the 
Perlman reading, for it could hardly be said that they display (as cited above) the 
‘incoherence and multi valence’ which would ‘stun the reader into fresh perception’. Yet 
this, of course, is not to suggest that Moore’s reading of Perlman attempts to establish 
itself as a ‘proscriptive dogma’ as to how a subversive text should be written, although 
it does warn that ‘those who would write subversive literature would be well advised to 
pay attention to Kristeva’s notion of heterogeneous contradiction’. Nevertheless this 
begets an interesting complication with regard to my own examination of the figure of 
authority within anti-authoritarian texts -  does an explicit rejection of textual authority 
(such as Moore’s call for ‘eternal vigilance’) lose its force when couched in 
conventional language?
30 Moore, ‘Public Secret’, p. 129.
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The Crimethlnc Collective
One text that would seem to exemplify this dilemma is the recent publication from the 
Crimethlnc [sfc] Collective, Days o f War, Nights o f Love. Even from the outside covers, 
the text seeks to challenge the reader’s epistemological security -  on the back cover the 
text cites ‘reviews’ from, among others, the New York Times Book Review and J. D. 
Salinger. Among the list of authors credited as being part of the Crimethlnc Collective 
is Jeanette Winterson, ‘a widely acclaimed British novelist and critic’.31 These textual 
pointers would seem to encourage a healthy scepticism towards the text, and in fact this 
scepticism is something the text itself looks to promote. Open the front cover and a bold 
‘Warning’ greets the reader in block capitals - ‘THIS BOOK WILL NOT SAVE YOUR 
LIFE!’ (DW, p. 1). Indeed the visual layout of the text works as a challenge to the 
reader, for even at this stage a section of text appears at the foot of the first page upside 
down, a design tactic that is repeated at various stages during the book. At one point an 
article of several pages in length is printed upside down and in one quite literal sense the 
text could be said to challenge the position of the reader: the reader will be required to 
constantly shift the book around in order to be able to follow the text(s). The layout 
employs a style that owes more to the world of fanzines, with rapid changes in font, 
size, shading and orientation, and borrows (to use a neutral term) generously from other
T9sources for graphic and comic strip material. All of this, then, combines to deny the 
reader any sense of continuity or stability, never mind the simple matter of the veracity 
of the cited material used. While the preface acknowledges that ‘this book is composed 
of ideas and images we’ve remorselessly stolen and adjusted to our purposes’ (DW, p.
31 Crimethlnc Workers Collective, D ays o f  War, Nights o f  Love: Crimethinkfor Beginners (Atlanta: 
Crimethlnc Free Press, 2001), p. 281. All further references in this chapter will be given as D W  with page 
number.
32 Paul Rosen argues that the fanzine phenomena, linked to the birth and growth o f the punk music scene 
worldwide, promoted an ‘access aesthetic’, the sense that ‘making and writing about music should be 
open to anyone’. In this sense the opening page o f Days o f  War, Nights o f  Love reflects this notion when 
it states that the text as such is merely a ‘tool’ towards revolution -  the question o f making change is up to 
the reader (DW, p. 1). See Paul Rosen, “‘It was easy, it was cheap, go and do it!”: Technology and 
Anarchy in the UK Music Industry’, in Twenty-first Century Anarchism: Unorthodox Ideas fo r  a New 
Millennium, ed. by Jon Purkis and James Bowen (London: Cassell, 1997), pp. 99-116 (p. 103).
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11), one graphic has a (Salome-type) figure with a speech bubble containing one of the 
better known aphorisms from Wilde’s plays, ‘I can resist anything, except temptation’, 
along with the words ‘William Burroughs’ running perpendicularly alongside, as if in 
invitation to attribute the quotation to Burroughs (DW, p. 128).
Nevertheless the text does contain serious writing and should not be overlooked 
as a jumble of ephemera. If such a heterogeneous text can be characterised at all, 
perhaps the words from the preface suffice, suggesting that ‘Crimethlnc. is the first 
stirrings of a revolt that will take us all out of history’ (DW, p. 9). In this sense the text 
shares something of an orientation with the likes of Zerzan and Perlman, who seek to re­
establish an unalienated human selfhood, as opposed to the history of alienation and 
oppression as described in their texts. Thus in answer to the question ‘Is Crimethlnc a 
movement?’, one of the contributors, NietzsChe Guevara, writes that ‘our real quest [...] 
is for Life itself (DW, p. 169). So the text proposes, in its many and varied articles and 
commentaries (the main section of the text is a ‘Crimethlnc Contra-diction-ary’ with a 
series of texts beginning with ‘A is for Anarchy’ etc.), an escape or transcendence of 
current social values, be they in relation to sexuality, work, technology or politics. In 
doing so, it warns the reader, right from the preface, that:
It is crucial to point out that this book isn’t designed to be used in the way a 
‘normal’ book is. Rather than reading it from one cover to the other, 
casting perfunctory votes of disapproval or agreement along the way (or 
even deciding to ‘buy in’ to our ideas, in passive consumer fashion), and 
then putting it on the shelf as another inert possession, we hope you will 
use this as a tool in your own efforts -  not just to think about the world, but 
also to change it. (DW, p. 11)
Yet the nature of the textual address is still relatively conventional, despite the
disruption of the physicality of linear reading, and this returns the discussion once again
to the question that Moore raised in relation to subversive content and subversive form.
Indeed the text perhaps runs into even more serious difficulties when considered from a
different perspective. The text attempts to fracture the humanist essence that would
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underpin contemporary notions of self, encouraging the reader to ‘make your own good 
and evil’ (DW, p. 27), and ‘to be wary of culture and tradition: never to accept them as 
given but rather to choose what is right for you at the time and reject the rest’ (DW, pp. 
85-86). In pop-culture tones, the text suggests that one thing history can teach is that 
humans ‘have lived in a thousand different kinds of societies, with ten thousand 
different tables of values, ten thousand different relationships to each other and the 
world around them, ten thousand different conceptions of self (DW, p. 14). The text is 
peppered with a general use of the ‘we’ along with arguments based on what individuals 
feel or do in given situations, and in fact recognises as much when one contributor 
argues that ‘you’ll find that if you speak honestly for yourself, you are probably 
speaking for others as well: that’s a part of being human (and our excuse for throwing 
around the word “we” so mercilessly in these pages’ (DW, p. 211).
This sense of reserving a locus from which one can speak on behalf of others 
raises the same problems as those that I identified in the chapter on Proudhon, those 
being his reservation of a certain space for unquestioned authority (in the family). The 
problem is, again, that once this discursive space is conceded or authorised, then it 
becomes a question of arguing over the limits to its mandate. This then leads inevitably 
to a species of bickering over just how representative the original text is, which 
(necessarily) displaces any revolutionary energies it may have had, or have sought to 
unleash, to begin with. This can be seen in the acerbic review that Ramor Ryan offers of 
Days o f War, Nights o f Love for the journal Perspectives on Anarchist Theory. Although 
Ryan recognises that the text ‘is a manifesto against complacency, passivity, and 
pessimism’ and that ‘one can’t begrudge their productivity, or their fervent desire to
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spread their plagiarized word’, he damns the text for ‘self-righteous sermonizing’.33
Ryan’s critique, though, is based on what is missing from the text, for in his view:
there is no analysis of the macro-political situation; no capitalist 
globalization, or US hegemony, or imperialism. [...] Their quest for 
individual freedom in the form of squatting, shoplifting, jumping trains, 
and eating out of garbage cans could be considered a way of living off the 
belly of the beast, if not inside the whale. As tactics and strategy, these 
don’t get us very far toward the goal of ‘total liberation.’34
The response that Ryan offers is obviously premised on a traditional notion of
anarchist struggle. Moreover his is a purely content-based critique, lamenting, for
example, the ‘unbearable lightness and depthlessness of their philosophy and praxis’
and lambasting its ‘individualist, selfish, and inchoate rebel ideology that eschews work,
political organizing, and class struggle’. Clearly the whole critique of work and mass
movements that has emerged from eco-anarchism is not a major influence in the
perspective that Ryan articulates. For Ryan, therefore, the form of the text seems to be a
distraction from its lack of content, yet the review fails to consider whether there should
be any correlation between the two. When he asks of the text ‘to what end do they do it
and for what purpose?’, there is one question that is clearly necessarily absent from such
a content-based critique -  the one of how the text addresses itself to the reader. In this
sense, although I would disagree with Ryan’s reasons for his dissatisfaction with Days
o f War, Nights o f  Love, I would share the sense of dissatisfaction, for once again, it
seems to be another text that offers radical content without questioning the conventional
posture that it adopts towards the reader.
To sum up, it can be seen that the problems that I identified in nineteenth and
early twentieth-century anarchism are not ones that this discourse can be said to have
happily surmounted. For example, in relation to Bakunin I demonstrated how the
33 Ramor Ryan, ‘Days o f  War and Nights o f  Horror’, Perspectives on Anarchist Theory, 8 (2004), 17-21 
(p. 21, p. 20), available online at <http://www.anarchist- 
studies.org/fIlemanager/download/7/vol8no2.pdf>.
34 Ryan, ‘Days o f War and Nights o f  Horror’, p. 19.
35 Ryan, ‘Days o f War and Nights o f  Horror’, p. 21.
36 Ryan, ‘Days o f War and Nights o f  Horror’, p. 21.
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unquestioned assumption of what the ‘real’ is permits a textual authoritarianism. This 
could be said to be one of the hallmarks of the ecologist texts that have been considered 
in this chapter. If one conflates this problem with Proudhon’s trait of setting aside a 
sphere of permitted authority, then one can begin to see that the urgency of the ‘real’ 
threat to the biosphere begets a coercive textual address that offers the reader naked 
Manichaean ‘either... or...’ ultimatums, or metaphorically and apocalyptically locates 
the reader on a crashing aeroplane. In defence of the texts considered in this chapter, it 
can be said that they do not engage in the type of construction of a readerly subject 
position that I identified at work in the (political) texts of Emma Goldman. With 
reference to the conclusions of my chapter on autobiography, in which Berkman’s 
Memoirs offer a self-assured narrator that seems wholly in control of the events being 
narrated, these texts can be seen, at times, (perhaps gently) to question the author-status 
of their narrative voices, reflecting a greater communality with the fragmented subject 
that emerges from Goldman’s text.
I would like, though, to return to the comments of my first chapter, in which I 
considered the dichotomy between form and content in Goldman’s theatre analysis. If 
one attempts to translate the notion of the self-activity of the theatre spectator (now 
participant) that Boal proposes into the realm of the literature considered here, then 
Perlman’s text would seem to be the only one that displays an address to the reader that 
would even begin to emulate this. Against this, perhaps, from an anarchist activist 
perspective, one might arguably have to weigh the requirements of propaganda: while 
Perlman’s text might be the one that most disrupts the text’s own tendency to impose its 
authority on the reading process, it might be asked if a somewhat obscure book, from a 
peripheral current of thought within a minor ideological position on the margins of left- 
wing politics (and a politics arguably on the back foot faced with the neo-liberal 
onslaught of the past few decades) can be said to be effective propaganda. This, though,
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brings an entire constellation of values into the discussion which are simply not my 
concern here, but while John Moore writes that the new world must be created within 
the shell of the old, I would adapt this axiom to say that a new form of addressing the 
reader must be written from within the shell of an outmoded anarchist textuality.
8
(In)conclusion
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In December 1851 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon wrote to a friend to rebuke the request for a 
revolutionary blueprint: ‘Do not expect me to provide you with a system. My system is 
Progress, that is to say the need to work constantly toward discovering the unknown 
while the past is being exhausted.’1 With this Proudhon pinpointed the permanent 
challenge that theories of anarchism face -  to elaborate their critique without imposing 
an artificial fixity that would coalesce into a ‘system’ that subsequently constrains the 
freedom of others yet to come. The particular challenge that this thesis has attempted to 
negotiate is one of outlining the possible shape of an anarchist textual theory, in this 
instance a politics of reading and writing which interrogates textual constructions as 
well as the significances that can be read in those constructions. This challenge, though, 
must unfold without setting the terms of the debate or foreclosing on future discussion, 
without ever, in Derrida’s words, placing a ‘reassuring end to the reference from sign to 
sign’.2 Although Proudhon saw the ‘work’ towards the future as constant, that is to say, 
never-ending, in this case the work of elaborating an anarchist theory of the text has 
scarcely begun.
This thesis has examined the discourse of anarchism, focussing particularly on 
the figures of authority legible in certain texts. Joseph Raz, in his introduction to 
Authority, contends that ‘the notion of a right to rule is deeply disturbing’, arguing that 
‘most people are puzzled by the idea that one person should have a right to rule
1 Proudhon, Selected Writings, p. 243.
2 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 49.
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another’.3 While it is beyond the remit of this thesis to speak on behalf of ‘most people’, 
my motivation stemmed from a comparable puzzlement -h o w  can a text, in this 
instance an anarchist text, seek to rule over the production of meaning? Is a text’s bid 
for control of its own meaning ever tenable? And how does such a text set about the 
(textual) construction of such a ‘right’ to rule?
These are the questions that I have examined in this thesis. In analysing the 
textuality of anarchism, I have sought to bring a set of literary concerns to bear on its 
discourse. Thus the anarchism-literature conjunction was considered in chapter two, 
where Emma Goldman’s text of theatre criticism was critically re-read for its potential 
as a starting point for theorising an anarchist approach to literature. Goldman’s text 
yielded valuable insights, inasmuch as it constitutes a precursor to a renewed anarchist 
engagement with literary texts, a precursor that clearly disavowed the conflation of 
author and text when it comes to establishing the significance of a given text for a 
particular reader. Indeed rather than select texts on some naive basis of ideological 
adequacy for anarchist ends, Goldman scarcely mentions her anarchist orientation and 
instead opts for eliciting their ‘social significance’. This significance allows the plays to 
function within the cultural and historical context that produced them, a gesture that 
stands in stark contrast to some of the dehistoricising gestures of subsequent critics. 
Goldman’s theatre criticism also demonstrated an openness to wider questions of 
literary form, beyond the bounds of the text as such, and as a result permitted a 
productive comparison with the theories of Bertolt Brecht and Augusto Boal. By 
reading Goldman alongside Brecht and Boal, it was shown that she took the first steps 
on a path that would be more fully explored by these later critics. The didacticism that 
Goldman advocates is not in itself problematic, but the discussion clarified that 
bourgeois theatre and theatre critics argue against didacticism in a gesture seemingly
3 Joseph Raz, ‘Introduction’, in Authority, ed. by Joseph Raz (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 1-19 
(P- 3).
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designed to naturalise or make invisible their own ideological project. Nevertheless 
Goldman failed to make the leap towards action that Boal proposes, despite her concern 
for addressing the wrongs of society. Her appeal to a sector of the theatre-going public 
to support the cause of the working class would seem to institute a certain vanguardism 
that goes against the direct action ethic that is synonymous with anarchism, and so her 
theatre criticism locates the form/content debate (recast as means/ends) right at the heart 
of the discussion of anarchist texts.
Chapter three took the concerns raised in the preceding chapter and turned to the 
work of the ‘father’ of anarchism, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon directly addresses 
the question of authority in his work, and so sets some of the parameters for a 
consideration of the functioning of authority within anarchist texts. Proudhon’s critique 
of state authority is premised on the rhetorical strategy of permitting a restricted sphere 
of legitimate authority within the family, while denying the legitimacy of translating 
this authority to the public sphere. My reading of this showed that Proudhon’s text, by 
creating a discursive space for authority to go unchallenged, ended up by claiming that 
authority for its own critique, thus constructing the figure of Proudhon as father to his 
own text. Moreover, his theory foresaw that the public (state) realm would eventually be 
subsumed within the economic, and it is his theory of property-as-thefl (in terms of 
temporal dominance) that allows the Derridean notion of the ‘irreducibility of 
temporalizing’ to be brought to bear on the concept of natural (familial) authority.4 By 
redeploying Proudhon’s economic logic against the text’s move to reserve a restricted 
sphere of legitimacy for authority in the family, the whole logic of authority is brought 
to a point of crisis where it is no longer sustainable. Proudhon’s notion of the 
(economic) contract was then applied to the relationship between text and reader, 
consequently removing any grounds for accepting restrictions on interpretative freedom.
4 Derrida, ‘Difference’, p. 130.
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Yet Proudhon’s own criticisms of other models of societal organisation demonstrated a 
wily sense of the deconstructive by exhausting the internally contradictory logic of his 
opponents’ positions. In turning that exhaustive critique back on the Proudhonian text, 
my reading recuperated Proudhon’s insistence on liberty without submitting to his 
paternal authority.
Chapter four examined the notion of the authority of the real in relation to the 
work of Michael Bakunin. This chapter reviewed some of the critical and biographical 
texts that have been written on Bakunin, and discovered therein a tropological 
sedimentation that seems to betray the unwritten assumption of textual access to the 
‘truth’ of who Bakunin was. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of the author-function, I 
went on to argue that the contradictions apparent in both Bakunin’s actions and texts 
prompt a critical response clearly marked by anxiety over these incoherencies. This 
anxiety is indicative of a desire to determine (and therefore control) a univocal meaning 
for ‘Bakunin’, something that can only be achieved at the cost of the reader’s 
interpretative freedom. That this desire is untenable becomes clear from the terms of 
Bakunin’s own theory, where he maintains the impossibility of conceptualising the 
‘reality of flesh and blood’. The reader is therefore plunged into a world of 
representations, where the reality has always already been lost and the freedom upon 
which Bakunin insisted all his life is restored to that same reader of his texts.
In chapter five I returned to Emma Goldman, but this time to consider her 
overtly political writings. Goldman’s work attempts to reconcile the competing political 
claims of the individual and of society, but in so doing raises the question of the mode 
of address to the reader. In her work I mapped the construction of a subject position for 
the reader that explicitly institutes a disjuncture between the reader and the wider 
community whose liberation the text purports to seek. Hence Goldman’s texts come to 
display a characteristic ambivalence, on the one hand castigating the unresponsive
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‘mass’ while on the other hand appealing to the individual reader to exert him or herself 
for the benefit of that mass. By interpellating its reader as ‘non-mass’ Goldman’s text 
frustrates its own revolutionary ambitions.
Having applied the insights I gleaned from Goldman’s problematizing of the 
form/content dichotomy to anarchism in its more usual discursive articulation as 
politics, in chapter six I returned to more strictly literary terrain with a consideration of 
anarchist autobiographies. The genre of autobiography raises interesting questions about 
the nature of the relationship to the brute facts of a past life lived, and the authority 
necessary to tell its story. Autobiographical theory has established the instability of the 
putative congruence of the author, narrator and protagonist of an autobiographical story. 
Drawing on this theoretical insight, I showed how Emma Goldman’s life story is 
narrated through the prism of what she calls her ‘passionate ideal’. This invokes a 
discourse of faith that provides the authority and religious imagery for her story while at 
the same time constructing the Emma Goldman of the autobiographical page as a 
narrated fiction. Nevertheless Goldman’s apparently unswerving faith comes to produce 
a fractured subject whose faith is one of constant negotiation with her surroundings. In 
comparison the text of Alexander Berkman’s memoirs constructs a narrator who 
undergoes an immense change during the course of Berkman’s fourteen-year prison 
sentence. Berkman’s text takes on the contours of a Bildungsroman, but when read in 
the light of Hayden White’s theory of narrativity it becomes clear that there is an 
authority that goes unremarked in the course of the story -  that being the authority to 
narrate the story and more precisely to bring it to an end, to achieve what White sees as 
the passage from one moral order to another. In conclusion this chapter then compares 
the autobiographical texts left by leading anarcho-syndicalist Rudolf Rocker and his son 
Fermin Rocker. In contrasting the two accounts of lives that overlapped for a substantial 
time, the question of memory is brought into sharp relief. The unquestioned reliability
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of the memory of the narrator of the autobiographical story is thus revealed as another 
figuration of textual authority.
My final chapter brought this thesis up to the present day with an examination of 
some examples of contemporary anarchist writing. This chapter largely focused on eco- 
anarchism, comparing the textual strategies of a mainstream anarchist theorist such as 
Murray Bookchin with the more radical periphery of the green anarchist tradition in the 
shape of the primitivists. Bookchin’s texts call for a revolution in the way that humans 
live and interact, yet I showed how his texts evince an extremely authoritarian address 
to the reader, typically ending with a Manichaean flourish that attempts to impose the 
terms of that very revolution. Despite the apparent (and at times controversial) radicality 
of the primitivist critique of technology, some of the texts examined seemed 
unconcerned with searching for different textual tools with which to build a new type of 
relationship with their readers, again illustrating the gulf between content and form. 
However other anarchist texts have begun to move away from generic conformity in 
terms of their textual construction, and demonstrate a willingness to put their subversive 
content into subversive textual action. This chapter illustrated that when it comes to 
what I would contend are outmoded forms of anarchist textuality, there is arguably as 
much continuity as there is rupture among the texts currently being produced.
The work that this thesis has undertaken is, as I have already suggested, really 
only beginning. Although individual anarchist authors have in the past written texts on 
art and on literature, there has as yet been no serious study of the relationship of 
anarchism to literary production, nor much consideration of how anarchism’s politics 
might be brought into dialogue with a theory of reading and writing. Standing like a 
signpost at the beginning of an intersection of anarchist concerns with literature, this 
thesis points to several different avenues of future research. Firstly it strikes me that my 
argument here could only be strengthened by further research into the historical
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antecedents of anarchism’s engagement with artistic production in general. Although it 
derives most of its arguments from a consideration of visual art, Proudhon’s Du 
Principe De L ’Art et Sa Destination Sociale would be one text worthy of future 
consideration, along with Kropotkin’s survey of his national literature, Russian 
Literature.5 Likewise the writings concerning aesthetics of twentieth-century anarchists 
such as Herbert Read, Alex Comfort or Paul Goodman could also be investigated, along 
with works such as Rudolf Rocker’s more sociologically orientated Nationalism and 
Culture.6 In political terms, a consideration of the rhetorical strategies of some of the 
more recent anarchistic global justice movements, specifically groups such as People’s 
Global Action and the UK-based Dissent network, would extend the trajectory of the 
three chapters that focused specifically on political discourse.7 This aspect could be 
greatly expanded to include a consideration of the structural role and demands of 
propaganda in relation to the literary text, something I was only able to remark on here. 
The genre of anarchist autobiography would also merit much greater scholarly scrutiny, 
given that there is a rich tradition of material still to be considered, such as Albert 
Meltzer’s record of a life dedicated to the anarchist cause, or Stuart Christie’s account 
of his attempt to assassinate General Franco and his involvement with the Angry 
Brigade.8 The identification of a body of specifically anarchist fiction would be a more 
challenging task, given that the genealogy could run from William Morris’s News From 
Nowhere through to Ursula Le Guin’s landmark science fiction novel The Dispossessed,
5 See Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Du Principe De L 'Art etDe Sa Destination Sociale (Paris: Gamier Freres, 
1865; repr. Famborough: Gregg International, 1971). This text, along with the vast majority of 
Proudhon’s work, sadly remains untranslated into English. See also Kropotkin, Russian Literature.
6 See for example Herbert Read, Poetry and Anarchism (London: Faber and Faber, 1938); Alex Comfort, 
Art and Social Responsibility: Lectures on the Ideology o f  Romanticism (London: Falcon Press, 1946); 
Paul Goodman, Speaking and Language: Defence o f  Poetry (New York: Random House, 1971); Rudolf 
Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, trans. by Ray E. Chase (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1998).
7 These groups could be located in a post-Zapatista world. Although the discourse o f the Zapatista 
uprising in Mexico has received a great deal o f critical attention, other groups that are largely inspired by 
them have not. For a recent example o f the scholarship on the Zapatistas, see Simon Tormey, ‘“Not in my 
Name”: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique o f Representation’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59 (2006), 138- 
154.
8 See Albert Meltzer, I Couldn't Paint Golden Angels: Sixty Years o f  Commonplace Life and Anarchist 
Agitation (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1996); Stuart Christie, Granny Made Me an Anarchist (London: 
Scribner, 2005).
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a text that has received a reasonable degree of attention, and which illustrates the 
overlap with utopian fiction.9 One author, though, who seems to have received little by 
way of academic scrutiny is the American writer Edward Abbey, whose The Monkey 
Wrench Gang is credited by some as having been the fictional inspiration for the birth 
of ‘ecotage’, environmental direct action carried out by groups under the umbrella of 
names such as Earth First! or the Earth Liberation Front.10
Gustav Landauer, the German anarchist who was murdered in the aftermath of 
the Bavarian Revolution of 1918, once wrote that ‘the state is not something which can 
be destroyed by a revolution, but is a condition, a certain relationship between human 
beings, a mode of human behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by 
behaving differently’.11 This thesis has sought to explore the nature of the historical 
construction of certain anarchist texts as well as the relationships between them and 
their readers. In offering this critique, in exploring the textual figurations of authority, 
this thesis has looked to open up the possibility of textually establishing just what 
Landauer calls an ‘other relationship’. This would mean continuing this process of 
interrogating anarchism’s textuality. Although authority may etymologically lie in the 
hands of the author, I have shown how it functions in many differing aspects of textual 
construction, whether it be Proudhon’s claim for an extra-textual locus of natural 
authority; the desire for critical authority over the meaning of ‘Bakunin’; or the attempt 
by the text either to define the reader (in Goldman’s case) or confront the reader (in 
Bookchin’s case). Hence an anarchist textual theory cannot be simply about dethroning 
the author from his or her textual sovereignty -  a gesture that, in any case, has long 
since been accomplished. This thesis has thus highlighted a number of concerns that can
9 See William Morris, Three Works: A Dream o f  John Ball, The Pilgrims o f  Hope, News from Nowhere 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1968); Ursula K. Le Guin, The Dispossessed (London: Millennium,
1999).
10 See Edward Abbey, The Monkey Wrench Gang (London: Picador, 1982). Abbey has also left a text of 
memoirs which would warrant inclusion in further discussion o f anarchist autobiographies. See Edward 
Abbey, Confessions o f  a Barbarian: Selections from the Journals o f  Edward Abbey, 1951-1989 (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1994).
11 Gustav Landauer, as cited by Colin Ward, Anarchy in Action (London: Freedom Press, 1973), p. 23.
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serve, for the time being, as the starting point for an anarchist theory of the text. Taking 
Bakunin’s insistence on (the reader’s) freedom as a watchword, these would include: a 
relentless and self-conscious questioning of the figure of authority within anarchism; an 
affirmation of the implications of Barthes’s death of the author; a rejection of the 
restriction of the locus of signification as being exclusively limited to the (printed) text; 
a refusal to subscribe to the critical demand for authorial consistency, adopting, rather, a 
bricoleur’s approach to reading such texts as are useful or relevant at a given moment; 
and a careful consideration of the implications of the mode of address to the text’s 
reader. In bringing these concerns to the forefront of a discussion of anarchism, I hope 
that this investigation of the textuality of anarchist politics can serve as the first step 
towards establishing the provisional form of an anarchist politics of the text.
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